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It is the major thesis of this paper that American 
Catholics were given recognition as a major force in society 
and were raised to "a new level of association" during the 
first administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. In presenting 
this argument, the terms Catholic Church and American 
Catholics are used interchangeably. The expressions of the 
Church are derived from Catholic newspapers and periodicals, 
from the statements of leading churchmen and laymen, and 
from the positions taken by major Catholic organizations.
Although the decision of the Democratic party to 
nominate Roosevelt instead of A1 Smith in 1932 generated some 
Catholic resentment, this did not have any effect on the 
election results in November. Roosevelt touched a sympa­
thetic note during the campaign when he quoted from the Papal 
encyclicals to prove that his program was no more radical 
than the Pope's. In November, Roosevelt swept to victory in 
all the large urban areas of the United States.
In 1932, American Catholics faced the depression and 
the new President with a concrete program of social reform.
This program was based on the past statements of the Ameri­
can bishops, on the work of various individual priests, and 
on the Papal encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XI. 
Some of the proposals embodied in this program were: a
living wage for labor, minimum-wage laws, the right of 
government to intervene in the economy for the "common good," 
old-age insurance, and government recognition of labor's 
right to organize. In many ways, American Catholics were 
intellectually prepared for the type of innovation which 
Roosevelt brought to the American scene.
In 1933, it became apparent that much of the enthusi­
astic response generated among Catholics for Roosevelt's 
program was the result of the special interpretation being 
given the New Deal by many Catholic sources. To many such 
observers, the New Deal represented a significant attempt 
to institutionalize the Papal economic program in the 
United States.
While foreign affairs were undoubtedly secondary to 
domestic legislation during the first Roosevelt administra­
tion, certain issues developed which had special meaning 
for American Catholics. The President's decision to extend 
diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union was opposed by
the Catholic Church as not being in the best interest of the 
United States. Roosevelt was aware of Catholic opposition 
to recognition and took steps to ameliorate it. The Presi­
dent incorporated in the terms of recognition a guarantee of 
religious liberty for Americans in Russia.
The second issue of foreign affairs which attracted 
considerable Catholic attention revolved around the anti­
clerical policies being pursued by the Mexican government in 
1934 and 1935. American Catholics were incensed by what 
seemed unwarranted persecution of their brethren south of 
the border. Certain Catholic groups began a campaign to 
pressure Roosevelt into intervening in Mexico to alleviate 
the persecution. While Roosevelt was not opposed to making 
statements in favor of religious liberty— statements which 
could reasonably be assumed to answer the demands of American 
Catholics— he refused to actively intervene in the internal 
affairs of a foreign country.
During the presidential election of 1936, two of 
Roosevelt's major critics were prominent Catholic figures—
Al Smith and Reverend Charles Coughlin. While some 
politicians feared lest these voices be heeded by Catholic 
Democrats, others, including the President, were reassured
by the support received from such Catholic notables as 
George Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago and Reverend John A. 
Ryan of Washington. While taking no official action against 
Coughlin, a large segment of the Church exp-essed pro-Roose­
velt opinions before the election. The election results of 
19J6 indicated that American Catholics had remained faithiul 
to the Democratic ^arty.
vii
INTRODUCTION
In 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected President 
of the United States. Few Roman Catholics realized it at 
the time, but this event was to initiate a new era in their 
Church's place in American society. Disturbed and made 
insecure by the campaign of 1928,^ the Church, represented 
by the hierarchy and by individual members, was to reach a 
degree of recognition and intimacy under Roosevelt that would 
have astounded their forefathers. This state of affairs was 
the result of two forces: the political acumen of Franklin
Roosevelt and the largely fortuitous similarity between much
^Writing in 1955, Richard Hofstadter, The Age of 
Reform (New York, 1955), p. 300, said that Roman Catholics 
in the United States never really recovered from the 1928 
"trauma" and that this had made impossible their "effort at 
assimilation" and attempts "at the achievement of full 
American identity." Lowell Dyson, "The Quest for Power: 
Father Coughlin and the Election of 1936," (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, Columbia University, 1937), p. 66, speaks of the 
Roman Catholic's need "to belong" after the 1928 election 
and of how Father Coughlin fitted into the picture because 
he translated the social encyclicals of the Popes into 
Populist or native American terms. Oscar Handlin, A1 Smith 
and His America (Boston, 1958), p. 188, recognizes the 
frustration of American Catholics after 1928, but he feels 
that this sense of alienation was never removed but only sub­
merged by the economic crisis of the 1930's.
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of the New Deal's reform legislation and the social and 
economic teachings of the Church.
If, as one observer has remarked, "the Depression and
Roosevelt years . . . were a providential opportunity for
Catholics . . .  to make their voices heard in changing the
2nation's social situation," it was no less a time when the 
President recognized the power and influence which could be 
exerted by American Catholics. Samuel Lubell has stated 
that it was A1 Smith who, in 1928, awakened the urban masses, 
largely Roman Catholic, to a political consciousness and a 
sympathy for the Democratic party. It should also be pointed 
out that subsequently it was FDR who maintained the allegiance 
of American Catholics toward the party by the recognition he 
extended them and the finesse with which he treated them.
It is also clear that the New Deal provoked a true 
social consciousness among many Catholics. Lubell has stated:
The quickened pace of social change touched off 
by the depression and New Deal forced the Church 
leaders to become articulate on all sorts of 
questions which had lain dormant during the 1920’s 
like the expanding role of the government, the 
sharpened class cleavage which the Roosevelt 
Revolution brought and the dramatic extension of 
trade unionism into the mass production industries
^Francis J. Lally, The Catholic Church in a Changing 
America (Boston, 1962), p. 48.
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where Catholic workers were so heavily concen­
trated . ̂
But this opportunity to contribute to the economic dialogue 
was only one facet of the sense of belonging achieved by 
American Catholics under President Roosevelt. Unfortunately, 
the story of how Roosevelt exploited this frustration has to 
be gained from indirect sources, since the President himself 
very seldom spoke from this point of view. Yet enough 
evidence exists to show that he was aware of American 
Catholics as a political force of no small consequence.
This essay, however, attempts primarily to tell the 
story from the point of view of American Catholics and how 
they reacted to the New Deal in domestic and foreign affairs 
from 1932 to 1936.^ Events of the 1930's in many cases 
evoked the same response from Catholics as they did from 
every other American citizen. This essay attempts to discuss 
Catholic reaction to the major events of the period and the
3Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics 
(2nd ed., rev.; New York, 1956), p. 236.
^The term "American Catholics" is used interchangeably 
with the term "the Catholic Church." My use of both terms 
will be defended later. Generally they imply the public 
opinions of the Church hierarchy, the Catholic press, promi­
nent Catholic spokesmen, and various Church-affiliated groups 
such as the Knights of Colombus. The analysis is largely 
limited to these sources, since most Church archives for this 
period are still closed.
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reasons for their particular response.
My major thesis is that it was under Franklin Roosevelt 
and the New Deal that American Catholics were given recogni­
tion as a major force in society and were raised to "a new 
level of association . . . indicating a change in the 
'official' American attitude toward the Church, and equally 
important, in the Church's disposition toward the govern­
ment."^ But this major thesis involves many subsidiary
5This statement is made by Lally, The Catholic Church 
in a Changing America, p. 48, but he does little to support 
it with historical evidence. It is my hope that this dis­
sertation will add the support of historical scholarship to 
what I consider a correct and penetrating observation.
Other authors who have struck a similar theme include 
William V. Shannon, The American Irish (New York, 1964), p. 
327, who speaks of new opportunity under Roosevelt but limits 
his analysis to American Irish. Allen Guttmann, The Wound 
in the Heart: America and the Spanish Civil War (New York,
1962), p. 45, says that members of the Catholic hierarchy 
had been trying to "accommodate themselves to American 
Society" for years, but only succeeded in the New Deal. At 
this time, the Church gained an importance it had "never 
enjoyed in any other administration." The appointments of 
Farley and Kennedy, for example, made Catholics forget the 
bigotry of 1928. William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D . 
Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York, 1963), p. 332, recog­
nizes that many new groups received recognition under FDR but, 
significantly, he says: "equal representation for religious
groups became so well accepted that, as one priest wryly 
complained, one never saw a picture of a priest in a news­
paper unless he was flanked on either side by a minister and 
a rabbi." It might be added that for Catholics this equal 
time represented a gain in status.
findings which will unfold with the story. For example, much 
New Deal reform legislation was accepted eagerly by American 
Catholics because it was presented to ther, by their leaders, 
as an American version of the Papal encyclicals. In this 
sense the New Deal liberalized American Catholics by showing 
them how radical were the Church's teaching on social 
problems.
I fully realize that there are weighty problems to 
encounter in any such study as proposed in the foregoing 
paragraphs. Perhaps some criticism can be eliminated if it 
is stated at the outset that this paper does not attempt to 
discuss the theoretical, and largely philosophical, problem 
of the proper relationship between church and state. This 
particular problem has been debated through the ages from 
Augustine to John Courtney Murray. It seems, however, that 
we can recognize at least the fundamental connection between 
church and state without getting into the knotty problem of 
the proper order of this relationship. Taking the liberty 
of defining the terms of my own argument, I propose to sur­
mount the difficulty of church-state relations by simply 
pointing out that both institutions operate through temporal 
forces and on the same group of people. This congruence 
necessarily involves infringement by both church and state
on each other's interest, for the spiritual and temporal 
concerns of man are not easily divided.
Two prominent Catholic voices of the 1930's discussed 
this problem of church and state in terms that may well have 
reflected the attitude of the majority of their co-religionist 
about the issue. Reverend Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., pointed 
out in true scholastic fashion that, since politics is con­
cerned with the art of governing, which is concerned with 
ethics, and since ethics is really the science of morals, 
which is the concern of the Church, therefore, "the Church 
is interested in politics, since she is the guardian of 
Faith and Morals." If the political problems involved con­
cern only secular things and not "fundamental moral issues, 
the Church not only leaves you free to cooperate with your 
party, but makes no claim to intervene in political issues." 
The difficulty here, of course, is that the Church reserves 
to itself the right to decide when fundamental moral issues 
are involved.6 Another major Catholic figure of the 1930's, 
Reverend James Gillis, editor of The Catholic World, was 
heard to say that it is both impossible and undesirable to 
completely eliminate religion from political conduct, for it
£Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., "Some Things New and 
Old," The Catholic Mind, XXXVIII (December 8, 1940), 518.
should serve as a purifying element.7 These two opinions 
probably reflected the thinking of many Catholic priests on 
the problem of the Church and politics. The opinions might 
be condemned by the more sophisticated as being inadequate 
for such a profound subject, but they appear adequate enough 
for most Catholics.
Another tricky problem in a study of this kind, which
might lead to criticism, is the use of group terms. It is
important to note that when I speak of "the Catholic Church,"
I am referring to that institution on a purely secular 
0level. Some critics would deny any use of the term "American 
Catholic Church," because there is no one central controlling 
body in America and because each bishop is largely autonomous 
in his diocese. Furthermore, argue these critics, the 
bishoprics differ widely in problems, affluence, and ethnic 
make-up.^ Yet it seems clear that there is enough central­
ization and enough community of attitude to permit one the
7The Boston Pilot, November 10, 1932, p. 5.
Q See Will Herberg, Protestant. Catholic, Jew (Anchor 
ed., 1960), p. 4, for the same distinction.
^Reverend Thomas McAvoy, "The Catholic Church in the 
United States," in The Catholic Church in World Affairs, eds. 
Waldemar Gurian and M. A. Fitzsimmons (Notre Dame, Indiana, 
1954), p. 361.
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license of the term "American Catholic Church." We see the 
statements of the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), 
which the bishops of the United States often use to publicize 
their collegiate attitude toward a problem. We see the 
Catholic press, which depends largely on the news service of 
the NCWC, as another source permitting an isolation of 
Catholic opinion. Furthermore, my research for this study 
revealed a high degree of unanimity among the Catholic press 
and lay groups toward public questions such as American 
recognition of Russia and the effectiveness of New Deal 
legislation. Certainly I make no claim of unanimous opinion 
for American Catholics. There does seem to be, however, a 
great similarity in the opinions expressed by the "public 
mind" of the Church, as seen in the public statements of the 
hierarchy, of prominent prelates and laymen, the editorial 
opinion of the Catholic press, and the resolutions passed by 
various Catholic societies on key issues during the 1930's; 
there is enough to make such a study as this worthwhile.
There is also a problem in labeling individuals as 
spokesmen for one group when they may not be acting for that 
group at all.^® Church membership is only one of many
^ R .  M. Darrow, "Catholic Political Power: A Study
of the Activities of the American Catholic Church on behalf
9
memberships claiming an individual's allegiance. The plural­
ism of American society makes difficult the delineation of 
one overriding motive for an individual action, and the much 
maligned American "individualism" has permeated the Catholic's 
relationship with his Church and made blind obedience as out­
dated as the Inquisition.^ In fact, certain studies have 
shown that among Protestants, at least, those who are deeply 
committed to their church are those who feel most strongly 
that the church should stay out of politics. Conversely this 
means that those members who find the voice of their church
most meaningful are those who would most vigorously deny the
12church a voice on political issues.
Another term in this study certain to cause difficulty 
is "the Catholic vote." This particular phrase has proved
of Franco. . . . "  (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1953), p. iii, admits the distinction of individ­
ual churchmen and the Church but remarks: "this delicate
problem of judgment hardly calls for refusing to recognize 
that the Church acts as an organized institution through 
denying its temporal existence."
^ R .  M. Darrow, "The Church and Techniques of Political 
Action," in Religion in American Life, eds. James W. Smith 
and A. L. Jamison (4 vols.; Princeton, 1961), II, 170-71.
•^Charles Glock, "The Political Role of the Church as 
Defined by Its Parishioners," Public Opinion Quarterly,
XVIII (1954-1955), 337.
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very offensive to many Catholic prelates, one of whom has
called it "one of the greatest myths of American politics."^
Usually an offense is taken because such a concept indicates
a captive and precommitted segment of the public, and impugns
the intelligence of the individual Catholic. Furthermore,
some political scientists would deny historians the ability
to even interpret voting in such terms because of insufficient
14data and weak conceptual tools. Others say that the Church 
can no more influence its members to vote one way than can 
labor unions, and that much of the Church's political power 
is based on bluff.
Yet the fact remains that practically all political
^Peter H. Odegard, "Catholicism and Elections in the 
United States," in Religion and Politics, ed. Peter H.
Odegard (Rutgers University, 1960), p. 125, where Rev. Thomas 
McAvoy is quoted. See also the following: Elmer Roper, "The
Myth of the Catholic Vote," in Religion and Politics, p. 152, 
who says Catholics are "just as free . . . unfettered and 
just as divided . . .  as any other group"; Reverend George B. 
Ford, Interview in Columbia University Oral History Project, 
p. 105, who says there is no Catholic vote because Catholics 
owe allegiance to the Church only on matters of faith and 
morals.
14Lee Benson, "Research Problems in American Political 
Historiography," in Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences, 
ed. Mirra Komarovsky (Glencoe, Illinois, 1958), p. 114.
^Herbert C. Pell, Interview in Columbia University 
Oral History Project, pp. 358, 360.
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analysts talk in terms of a "Catholic vote."^ It is also
clear that Roosevelt was only one of many politicians who
17believed there was such a vote and acted accordingly. 
Finally, there is no disputing the fact that many prominent 
Catholic figures spoke in terms of influencing their co­
religionists to vote a certain way.
Perhaps some of the difficulty and offensiveness of 
the term can be eliminated if we dispel the idea that the 
Catholic vote is "captive" and "pre-committed." To say that 
FDR received the Catholic vote implies neither of the above 
traits. One does not have to propose that priests dictated 
to the laity on public matters, but merely that acceptance
and advocacy by priests of a certain attitude might be
18"filtered through to their religious communities."
^Samuel Lubell is only one of many who use the term. 
Of interest here is a recent issue of Newsweek {November 2, 
1964) which carried an article by Lou Harris, public opinion 
analyst, which indicated that President Johnson would get as 
much of "the Catholic vote" as had President Kennedy.
17James Farley and Thomas Corcoran are two others who 
accept the term. James Farley, Interview with author,
March 20, 1965, Washington, D. C.; Thomas Corcoran, Interview 
with author, July 15, 1965, Washington, D. C.
-*-®Odegard, "Catholicism and Elections," p. 120, says, 
"It is not unlikely that some parishioners . . . simply
follow the lead of their priest as an expression of group 
solidarity so frequently found among Catholics."
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Roosevelt, in particular, realized the freedom of this vote
to shift allegiance, because he was constantly on guard lest
19he offend the Church and lose Catholic support. Perhaps 
he had too simplified a view of the Church's ability to shift 
votes, but his belief that respect for the Church could only 
help him among Catholics seems well grounded.
When I speak of Catholics supporting FDR, I mean 
that, during the period 1932 to 1936, they generally felt 
that their place in American society was more secure under 
his guidance than under what his opponents offered. But this 
interpretation might provoke the question, Why then dis­
tinguish the voters' religious affiliation at all? I feel 
that religious affiliation was important because the public
mind of the Catholic Church did involve itself with public
20issues during this period. The Catholic press, the 
hierarchy, and various lay organizations did take stands on
■^Jim Farley remarked that FDR had great respect for 
the power of the American hierarchy. Farley interview.
20Darrow, "Catholic Political Power," p. 21, says in 
1936 the Catholic press consisted of 134 newspapers, with a 
circulation of 2.3 million; 198 magazines, with a circula­
tion of 4.6 million; and various other publications for a 
total circulation of 8.9 million. All of these organs 
depended largely upon the NCWC news service for national 
coverage at this time according to Rev. George Higgins, NCWC, 
Interview with author, April 29, 1965, Washington, D. C.
13
issues of national consequence. While this public pressure 
was not always decisive for the individual Catholic, it was 
one of the forces affecting his opinion and consequent 
political behavior toward an issue, and as such should be 
examined.
It should be made clear at this point that no
criticism is implied regarding the Church's interest in public
questions. Indeed it is impossible for the Church to remain
isolated from the currents of the times. When one considers
that politicians are aware of the Church's strength in
changing public opinion, it becomes obvious that they should
"give churches their due as part of the ordinary political
21process of adjustment." The Church does not have to 
deliberately call for political action with regard to a 
certain issue. The attitudes of the Church form part of the 
climate of opinion in which politicians operate, and reactions 
are often on an indirect pressure basis. As for the individ­
ual clergyman, if he is pastor to a flock which comprises 
the majority of a voting element in a city or district, he 
will automatically find that he shares political power with
21Darrow, "The Church and Techniques of Political 
Action," p. 165.
14
the politicians simply by virtue of his position as inter-
22preter of the commonweal.
Finally, it should be made clear that the Church often
refuses to cooperate with politicians who directly seek her
support. It may be said that politicians try to use the
Church for political ends more than the Church tries to use
23politicians for religious ends.
22ibid., pp. 164, 165.
23Darrow, "Catholic Political Power," p. 34.
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND
Franklin Roosevelt came to the Presidency eminently 
suited to accept and appreciate the growing political 
maturity of American Catholics. His own religious con­
victions were amorphous enough to allow him a tolerance for 
doctrinal differences, yet formal enough to generate an 
appreciation for the hierarchical structure of the Catholic 
Church. Equally persuasive was his political experience with 
the Church in the state of New York as Senator, as supporter 
of A1 Smith in 1928, and as Governor.
It is difficult enough to assess any man's personal 
religious convictions. When that man is as complex and as 
much of an enigma as Franklin Roosevelt, the task becomes 
especially foolhardy. We can easily set down the formal fact 
that Roosevelt was an Episcopalian, but what especially does 
this mean? He once admitted to Harold Ickes, his Secretary 
of the Interior, that this allegiance had developed primarily 
because his father had found it more convenient to attend the
15
16
Episcopal Church than a more remote Dutch Reformed Church.
He boasted of being "low-church" and of preferring a Baptist
sermon to that of an Episcopalian.^" Yet he was very proud of
his own wardenship in the Church. Furthermore, he liked to
draw attention to the fact that one of his relatives was a
prince of the Catholic Church. Archbishop James Roosevelt
Bayley of Baltimore was a cousin and known as "Rosey" Bayley
among the Roosevelts. FDR also boasted of his close personal
relationship with James Cardinal Gibbons, another prince of
2the Catholic hierarchy.
It is difficult to gauge Roosevelt's religious
sincerity. He was a man who could insist that his Cabinet
meet for prayer before assuming public office, who could look
after the spiritual conversion of his own household staff,
and who could contribute financially to his own and other
3churches in the Hyde Park area. Yet he was also a man who
could joke about the relative political strength of each
^"Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes 
(3 vols.; New York, 1954), II, 290.
2Frank Freidel, "Roosevelt's Father," The Franklin D . 
Roosevelt Collector, V (November, 1952), 5.
^Grace Tully, F. D. R., My Boss (New York, 1949),
pp. 112, 354; Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New 
York, 1946), p. 140.
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religious group and how to balance them. He once remarked
to James Farley, his Postmaster General, that clergymen be
appointed to a government committee on the basis of their
4total political strength.
The answer to this seemingly paradoxical attitude 
toward religion may be found in FDR's personal theology and 
religious convictions. It seems clear that, theologically 
speaking, "in matters of the soul Mr. Roosevelt was a con- 
servative." He accepted the basic tenets of Christianity 
with the certitude of a fundamentalist. Frances Perkins, 
Secretary of Labor during the New Deal, has written most 
perceptively on this side of Roosevelt. She points out that 
the major problems of Higher Criticism of the Bible and
"scientific discoveries . . . bothered him not in the
£least." It might be added that this lack of intellectual 
and theological background may have permitted FDR the flexi­
bility and receptiveness to al . faiths which made his 
presidency congenial to Catholics . nd others. Roosevelt
^James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, the Roosevelt 
Years (New York, 1948), p. 59.
^George N. Shuster, "Mr. Roosevelt," Commonweal,
April 25, 1945, p. 38.
Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, p. 140.
18
himself gave some insight into his view on religion in a 
reply he made in March, 1935, to a query regarding the 
religious affiliation of his ancestors. "In the dim distant 
past," he said, "they may have been Jews or Catholics or 
Protestants. What I am more interested in is whether they 
were good citizens and believers in God. I hope they were 
both."7
Franklin Roosevelt's political awareness of the 
Catholic Church started early in his career. When, as a 
member of the State Senate of New York in 1911, he attempted 
to lead a revolt against Tammany control of the Democratic 
nomination to the United States Senate, he felt the barbs of 
the Catholic hierarchy. William F. Sheeham, the Tammany 
candidate, was an Irish Catholic. This, however, had little 
to do with Roosevelt's and the other Insurgent's opposition 
to him. They simply felt that he war not the best man for
7Samuel Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (13 vols.; New York, 1938-1950), IV, 
96. This democratic approach to religion, however, was not 
the only factor in FDR's receptiveness to the Catholic Church, 
but must be viewed with the rising political consciousness of 
the Church. Roosevelt's views on religion seem to fit a 
pattern brilliantly outlined in Herberg, Protestant, p. 75, 
where the author observes that Americans have become dedicated 
not to one religion but to the idea that religion itself is 
good for society and that the most popular religion is the 
"American Way of Life."
19
the job. Yet, Bishop Patrick A. Ludden of Syracuse, New 
York, condemned FDR and his friends as being motivated by
Q"bigotry and the old spirit of Knownothingism." Roosevelt
quickly replied to this outburst, terming it "uncalled for, 
unnecessary and unfortunate." He denied that the controversy 
had any religious overtonas and admonished that the Bishop
Qdid not know what he was talking about.
It was, of course, during the 1928 presidential 
campaign that Roosevelt really became intimate with the 
problem of the Catholic Church's relationship to American 
public life. As an early and strenuous supporter of A1 
Smith, Roosevelt was squarely in the middle of the religious 
question. Before the campaign started, FDR did not think 
that Smith's Catholicism or his humble origins would hurt 
his chances for election.^® When the religious issue did 
crop up during the campaign, Roosevelt gave Smith political 
advice on how to answer some of the more sophisticated
Q t ,°Vlastimil Kybal, "Senator Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
1910-1913," The Franklin D. Roosevelt Collector, IV (November, 
1951), 13.
9Ibid., 14.
l°Harold F. Gosnell, Champion Campaigner: Franklin
D. Roosevelt (New York, 1952), p. 75.
Protestant charges.11 Informally, Roosevelt combatted 
religious bigotry while vacationing at Warm Springs, Georgia 
shortly before the election. Here he was astounded at how 
ignorant the Southern rural dweller was of Catholicism.1^
His private correspondence during this period (before 1928) 
was filled with letters answering charges that a Catholic 
should not be President.1"1
Roosevelt also took formal steps against the bigotry 
he saw developing in the campaign of 1928. Speaking at 
Binghamton, New York, on October 17, 1928, he made light of 
the issue by joking that some people were not opposed to 
Irish Catholics, only Roman Catholics.1^ Yet a few days 
later, on October 20, at Buffalo, New York, he spoke with an 
extremely serious tone on the question. Calling upon his 
experiences in Europe during World War I, he reminded his 
audience that no religious question was raised when American
11Edmund A. Moore, A Catholic Runs for President:
The Campaign of 1928 (New York, 1956), pp. 72-73.
^ E l e a n o r  Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York,
1949), p. 40.
^Bernard Bellush, "Apprenticeship for the Presidency 
Franklin D. Roosevelt as Governor of New York" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia, 1950), II, 22.
14Rosenman, Public Papers, I, 20-21.
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"doughboys" went to defend freedom, and those of all creeds 
died side by side. He hoped this great lesson would not be 
forgotten. But if any man could remember the war experiences 
and still "cast his ballot in the interest of intolerance and 
of a violation of the spirit of the Constitution of the U.S.," 
then, concluded Roosevelt, "I say solemnly to that man or 
woman, 'May God have mercy on your miserable soul; ",i5
With the thought of presenting a formal complaint to 
a Congressional committee at some time in the future, Louis 
Howe, FDR's personal secretary, systematically collected 
letters and documents which contained bigoted information 
against Smith, traced them to their source, and prepared a 
substantial file of evidence. Howe was assisted by Roose­
velt's private secretary Grace Tully, an Irish Catholic and 
former secretary to Patrick Cardinal Hayes of New York. This 
file was eventually forwarded to Washington but no use was 
ever made of i t . ^
Ironically, it seems that while Smith's Catholicism 
hurt his chances for the Presidency, at the same time "FDR's
defense of Smith and attacks on religious bigotry won for
*
15Ibid., I, 36-38.
1 f. __Grace Tully, FDR, p. 34; Eleanor Roosevelt, This I 
Remember, p. 40.
him the sympathy of many New York Catholics. While it is 
true that Louis Howe was worried because Roosevelt's defense 
of Smith and attacks on bigotry was being interpreted as 
attacks against Protestantism in general, it is also true 
that FDR received a plurality of 406,505 in New York City 
which was only 32,000 less than the Smith vote. This support 
in New York City, combined with some upstate backing, was 
enough to elect Roosevelt Governor, succeeding Smith.
Roosevelt as Governor continued to receive the support 
of New York's Catholic element. One of the more outstanding 
instances where Catholics noted his favorable attitude was 
his signing of the Love-Hayes bill in 1932. This bill made 
it unlawful to inquire into the religious beliefs of anyone 
seeking a teaching position in the public schools. The bill 
had sprung from a complaint by a Catholic woman who said she 
had been discriminated against in applying for a teaching 
position because of her religion. All of the Catholic news­
papers in the state had supported the bill in their editorials
18and rejoiced at FDR's favorable action.
17Gosnell, Champion Campaigner, p. 90; Bellush, 
"Apprenticeship," III, 39. Needless to say, religion was not 
an issue in Roosevelt's campaign, but his defense of Smith 
certainly made him more attractive to New York Catholics.
^ The Brooklyn Tablet, March 26, 1932, p. 1.
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In June, 1929, Roosevelt spoke at Fordham University, 
a Jesuit institution in New York City. In his address he 
praised those men and women who turned their backs on 
materialistic careers to devote their life to charity and 
the service of God. More important than FDR's theme, however, 
was the fact that when the Jesuit president of Fordham, upon 
giving Roosevelt an honorary degree, commented that here was 
a man who might someday be President, the ten thousand in 
attendance cheered enthusiastically. It seemed that some 
American Catholics could look upon the presidential candidacy
of Franklin Roosevelt with favor, an attitude that his own
19understanding and sympathy for them had generated. ^
l^Frank B. Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt (3 vols.; 
Boston, 1952- ), III, 72. Thomas Corcoran noted that it
was impossible for Roosevelt not to be aware of the Church 
because of his political roots in New York. Interview with 
author, July 15, 1965, Washington, D. C.
CHAPTER II
THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE
As the election year of 1932 dawned, it became clear 
that the Democrats had their best chance of winning the 
Presidency since Woodrow Wilson's triumph in 1916. This 
fact was probably the main reason for A1 Smith's decision to 
contest the nomination with Roosevelt. This put the Roose­
velt forces in the embarrassing position of courting the 
support of those sections of the country that had rejected 
Smith in 1928. The ensuing fight for the nomination produced 
a bitter reaction among many Eastern Catholics, and after the 
convention Roosevelt devoted a major effort to woo them back 
into the Democratic fold.
Catholic reaction to the news that Smith had decided 
to seek the nomination in 1932 was ambiguous. It was true 
that some Catholic political analysts felt that his entrance 
on the scene would stop the "Roosevelt Express," and that 
Smith had a good chance to win both the nomination and the
25
election.^ Furthermore, Jim Farley had found spotty support 
for Smith in his tour of the country. Smith's strong showing 
in the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania primaries indicated 
that to many easterners he was still a hero. But Farley noted 
that the Smith sentiment "comes mostly from ardent Catholic 
admirers and in some instances from strong wet advocates."2
All Catholics were not in favor of Smith's running 
again in 1932. Father John A. Ryan, a leading Catholic 
social thinker throughout the 1930's, remembered the vicious 
bigotry of 1928 and was reluctant to do anything to revive
3this spirit. The editor of The Catholic World, Reverend
/
James Gillis, worried about the constitutional crisis which 
might result from another Smith campaign. After all, if 
Smith should be rejected again on the basis of his religion, 
the constitutional clause that no religious test be required
1C. W. Thompson, "Today and Next November," Commonweal, 
June 1, 1932, p. 119; Extension, XXVII (June, 1932), 24-25.
2James A. Farley, Behind the Ballots (New York, 1938), 
p. 84; Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 7; J. Joseph 
Huthmacher, Massachusetts People and Politics, 1919-1933 
(Cambridge, 1959), p. 237.
3Reverend John A. Ryan to Thomas R. Lynch, February 5, 
1930, John A. Ryan Papers, Catholic University of America, 
Washington, D. C. The Ryan Papers are arranged chronologi­
cally by date of correspondence.
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for office would prove meaningless. This editor did not feel 
the nation could stand another display like that of 1928.
Yet on second thought he felt it might be better to clarify 
the issue once and for all.4
Another indication of the division of Catholic senti­
ment toward the Democratic nomination was the fact that a 
number of prominent Catholic laymen worked actively for 
Roosevelt. Frank P. Walsh, a well-known New York attorney 
and Catholic layman, supported FDR before and at the conven­
tion. Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana, later selected to 
be Roosevelt's Attorney General, also worked to secure the 
nomination for FDR at Chicago.^ Irish Catholic politicians,
4The Catholic World. CXXXIV (March, 1932), 734. A 
few years after the election, a story was published which 
indicated that the American hierarchy had not supported Smith 
in 1932. Seeking a reconciliation with American society, the 
Bishops were embarrassed by Smith's tendency to remind his 
audience of 1928. Indications were that Smith's preconvention 
campaign of 1932 was promoting and reviving the same atmos­
phere that had existed in 1928. The Bishops felt the time 
was not ripe for a Catholic President and that more harm 
than good would result from the attempt. This story, the 
authenticity of which is unsubstantiated, appeared in The 
Monitor of San Francisco, April 21, 1934, p. 1.
^Frank P. Walsh to Ewing Y. Mitchell, January 19, 1932, 
Box 134, Frank P. Walsh Papers, New York Public Library; 
Clipping of "National FDR League for President," Box 405, 
Thomas J. Walsh Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of 
Congress.
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such as Parley and Ed Flynn of the Bronx and James M. Curley 
of Boston, were also behind the Roosevelt machine. Colonel 
P. H. Callahan, a Kentucky businessman and influential 
Catholic layman, had urged Roosevelt to make the race long 
before 1932. Callahan was of the opinion that Smith had
received a pro-Catholic vote in 1928 and had no cause to
£complain about the results.
The Commonweal, a national Catholic magazine edited 
by laymen, pledged neutrality in the race for the Democratic 
nomination, but it could not refrain from speaking of Roose­
velt as a man whose "strength may be said to lie in a happy 
blend of skill and knowledge." The editor also played up 
the Governor's great familiarity with the problems of
7agriculture and taxation.
Yet it was also clear that Roosevelt was taking a 
calculated risk by basing his nomination on the support of 
the Southern wing of the party. Of course, he could do little 
else while Smith maintained the allegiance of the East. But 
when Roosevelt's antiprohibition speech of 1932 was accepted
^FDR to Callahan, December 5, 1929, in F.D.R.; His 
Personal Letters, ed. Elliott Roosevelt (3 vols.; New York, 
1947-1950), III, 93.
7Commonweal, May 4, 1932, p. 3.
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without a protest in the South, the New York Times could 
editorialize that this proved the South's opposition to 
Smith in 1928 had been on religious grounds. "The same 
people who rejected a 'wet' Smith have now accepted a 'wet'
gRoosevelt, because the latter is not a Catholic."
Roosevelt was soon labeled the candidate of the
Southern bigots by certain Catholic sources, who pointed out
othat the anti-eastern wing of the party was behind him.
One of Smith's more reckless supporters even tried to docu­
ment this accusation by forwarding to the delegates at Chicago 
copies of letters purporting to show that the Ku Klux Klan 
was supporting PDR in the South. F. B. Summers and C. W.
Jones were named as two Klansmen who had solicited other 
Klansmen to support FDR in Georgia. Both Roosevelt and 
Farley dismissed these charges as ridiculous.^
These scattered attacks seemed to have little effect 
on the Governor's drive for the nomination. It was true that 
FDR was counting on the support of those elements in the 
Democratic party which had rejected Smith at the polls in
^New York Times, February 23, 1932, p. 16.
9C. W. Thompson, "The New Portent at Chicago," Common­
weal, July 13, 1932, p. 282.
10New York Times, June 21, 1932, p. 8.
1928. But this support did not require extensive proselyt­
izing by FDR. Many southern delegates were antagonized by 
Smith's and by National Chairman Raskob1s attempts to pre­
commit the party to an antiprohibition stand before the 
convention met. Raskob's antiprohibition and high tariff 
philosophy pushed many southern conservatives into the Roose­
velt camp.1! It was also true that FDR had a reputation of 
tolerance among Catholics in New York, had defended
Catholicism in 1928, and had considerable support from Irish
12Catholics in the East. The Roosevelt forces could assume
that the attitude of The Catholic World did not represent
that of American Catholics:
. . . the Democratic party should show its hand. . . .
If the democratic delegates reject Smith without 
giving some bona fide reason for his "unavaila­
bility," all the world will know that they have 
rejected him because of his religion. In that 
jase the party writes itself down a coward and an 
enemy to religious liberty and it deserves all the 
beatings it has ever had or will ever get.1^
During the convention, some of Roosevelt's advisers
realized that something would have to be done to overcome
11Frank Freidel, F. D. R. and the South (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, 1964), p. 30.
!^Huthmacher, Massachusetts, pp. 230-39.
13The Catholic World, CXXXIV (March, 1932), 737.
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the bitterness aroused among many eastern Catholics by the 
rejection of Smith. Furthermore, Roosevelt himself realized 
that although the South and West might give him the nomina­
tion, the big electoral votes of the East would be needed to 
win the Presidency. Ed Flynn, one of Roosevelt's closest 
friends, suggested that the vice-presidential nomination go 
to someone who would appease the northeastern Catholics.
This proposal was rejected, and John Nance Garner, who was 
described by The Catholic Mirror as "a representative of
perhaps bigotry's banner state," was picked because Roosevelt
14needed the Texas delegation for the nomination.
Evidence of Catholic bitterness over the convention
results mounted as the delegates left Chicago to return home.
Members of the Massachusetts delegation were heard to mutter
15they would not vote for the "Klan candidate." The Cutholic 
press also gave indications of displeasure with the Roosevelt 
nomination. The Ave Maria, published at Notre Dame, said 
that William G. McAdoo deserved the boos he received from 
the Chicago galleries when he helped put Roosevelt across at
l40scar Handlin, A1 Smith and His America, p. 166.
See The Michigan Catholic, July 14, 1932, p. 4, for the sug­
gestion that Senator Walsh of Montana be chosen as vice- 
presidential nominee.
l^Huthmacher, Massachusetts, p. 239.
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the convention.^6 The Chicago diocesan paper, The New World,
wondered why the Democrats made "a concerted effort to shut
out of the convention even mention of a Catholic candidate?"
But then why bother, mused the editor, when they already
have the Catholic vote "in their pocket"?^7 The Catholic
Mirror of Springfield, Massachusetts, announced that bigotry
was "a steamroller in 1932" and that the Democrats had less
excuse for it than the Republicans. The party had denied
Smith the nomination simply because of his religion and had
compounded its offense by choosing as vice-presidential
nominee a man from one of the most bigoted states in the 
18Union. The Italian News commented that the Democratic
party of A1 Smith had nothing in common with the forces
19which nominated Franklin Roosevelt in Chicago.
The spirit of resentment building up in segments of 
the Catholic population was apparent to neutral observers.
The New York Times editorialized on the bitterness and
^Cited approvingly by The Michigan Catholic, July 28, 
1932, p. 4.
17The New World, July 22, 1932, p. 4.




spirit of rebellion which was evident among Catholic voters 
of Connecticut and Massachusetts. Arthur Krock, noted 
political analyst for the paper, said, "Something will have
to be done if FDR expects to carry Massachusetts this
,.20 year."
One of the most surprising manifestations of this
Catholic bitterness was the development of a movement to vote
for Norman Thomas, the Socialist candidate, as a protest.
The movement first came to public attention when C. W.
Thompson wrote an article for the Commonweal, in which he
debated the propriety of a Catholic voting for Thomas. He
concluded that since the Democrats were ruled by southern
bigots, Catholics might well vote for Thomas "with a clear
conscience." Thompson portrayed Thomas as a defender of
21religious liberty and no tool of Russia. Anthony J. Beck,
editor of The Michigan Catholic, wrote from Detroit that
there was strong sentiment in that section of the country
22for Thomas from both laymen and clergy. Father John Ryan,
^ N e w  York Times, September 5, 1932, p. 10; October 
25, 1932, p. 10.
21C. W. Thompson, "Will Catholics Vote for Thomas?" 
Commonweal, August 31, 1932, pp. 422-24.
22a. j. Beck to Rev. John A. Ryan, September 25,
1932, Ryan Papers.
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when asked for advice, was reluctant to deny a Catholic's
right to vote for Thomas or even to doubt the wisdom of
23doing so.
An indication of the proportions of the Catholic 
movement for Thomas is the storm of opposition it called 
forth. Ryan's reluctance was not shared by other Catholic 
sources, who were quick to condemn what they saw as a 
dangerous movement. The editors of Commonweal could not 
even agree with the position taken by their contributor,
C. W. Thompson. They pointed out that the Socialist offered 
"an all embracing philosophy which was entirely natural­
istic." A vote for Thomas might not mean acceptance of 
socialism but it was a dangerous flirtation.24 Another 
national Catholic magazine, America, published by the 
Jesuits, was even more vigorous in its opposition. The 
socialist view of the world was, it declared, totally alien 
to the Catholic view. Furthermore, Thomas was in favor of 
recognizing the Soviet Union, a move that should be strenu­
ously opposed. The editor of America thought that Catholics
2^Rev. John A. Ryan to Rev. Francis J. Martin, 
February, 1933, Ryan Papers.
^^Commonwea1, September 7, 1932, pp. 437-38.
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were forbidden to vote for Thomas "even in the phantom form 
of a 'protest vote.'"
On a more local level, several diocesan papers came 
out against what they considered growing sympathy for Norman 
Thomas in their midst. The geographic locations of these 
papers give some indication that this was not an isolated 
movement. The Boston Pilot said that the great interest in 
Thomas exhibited by Catholics could only be an indication of 
"lack of enthusiasm" for either Roosevelt or Hoover. Yet 
the editor felt that a Socialist vote would be dangerous and 
unwise. The Denver Register commented that the mail it 
received indicated a growing preference for Thomas among its 
readers; the editor, however, felt that it would be best for 
his readers to vote for one of the major candidates, 
"especially in view of the stand taken by Alfred E. Smith, 
whose admirers were responsible for the letters about which
t
we are writing." A vote for Thomas would be a wasted one. 
The Michigan Catholic, published in Detroit, admitted that a 
number of intelligent Catholics had expressed a desire to 
vote for Thomas, but the editor cautioned them against such
^5Rev. Gerard B. Donnelly, S.J., "Can Catholics Vote 
Socialist?" America, October 15, 1932, p. 32; America, 
September 10, 1932, p. 536.
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a move. The Socialists had a cosmology, he explained, which 
would replace religion, and it would be dangerous to support 
them at the polls. The-Catholic Messenger of Davenport, Iowa, 
was even more blunt about the matter: Socialists were anti-
Christian, and a "vote for the Socialist ticket is a vote 
for the recognition and approval of the actions of the 
Russian Soviet. "2^
If the protest vote for Thomas was not enough to 
worry Democratic leaders, they also had to contend with 
Republican attempts to exploit the dissatisfaction of 
Catholic voters over the rejection of Smith. Paul Y.
Anderson, writing in The Nation, August 3, 1932, suggested 
that Eastern Republicans were busy telling Smith supporters 
in New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts that FDR workers 
had used anti-Catholic propaganda in the South and West to 
gain the nomination over Smith. One Catholic editor observed 
that this campaign was not limited to the East and was 
proving surprisingly effective among Catholics.27 Apparently 
the campaign was serious enough to cause Jim Farley to speak
The Boston Pilot, November 5, 1932, p. 4; The Denver 
Register, November 6, 1932, p. 1; The Michigan Catholic, 
September 29, 1932, p. 4; The Catholic Messenger, August 18, 
1932, p. 2.
27Extension, XXVII (October, 1932), 23.
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out against it before the State Democratic Convention of 
Rhode Island on October 7, 1932. He accused Republicans of 
reviving the religious issue with a new angle and pleaded
with Catholics not to let Republicans put them in the same
28position as the bigots of 1928.
The fact was that very few Catholic publications put
stock in this attempt to label Roosevelt as anti-Catholic.
Some called the evidence supporting the claim so meager that
only an idiot would fall for it. Others resented the fact
that the party which benefited most from bigotry four years
ago would attempt to do so again, only this time in reverse.
The attempt to use vice-presidential nominee Garner as a
scapegoat for southern bigotry of 1928 was described as
"detestable business." Finally, this campaign's assumption
that Catholics voted for religious reasons was especially
29irksome to some Catholics.
The actions of A1 Smith were also important in cutting 
the ground out from under the attempts to deprive Roosevelt 
of Catholic support in 1932. Roosevelt realized that the
2^New York Times, October 8, 1932, p. 2.
29The Cleveland Universe Bulletin, September 1, 1932; 
Extension, XXVII (October, 1932), 23; The Catholic Transcript, 
August 18, 1932, p. 4; America, August 13, 1932, p. 439.
South and West could nominate him but that to be elected he 
would need the big electoral support of the East. And it 
was in the East that Smith had his most loyal supporters. 
After the Chicago convention, Smith had mumbled something 
about being a party man but had done nothing publicly to 
support the ticket. Roosevelt's advisers, among them Felix 
Frankfurter, tried to promote a reconciliation between the 
two New Y o r k e r s . I n  August, vice-presidential candidate 
Garner visited Smith in New York. Their conversation was 
private, but in a speech immediately following the meeting 
Garner, "with tears in his eyes," took an apologetic attitude 
about the defection of Texas in 1928 and condemned religious 
bigotry in general. In the meantime, Senator David I. Walsh 
of Massachusetts, a close friend of Smith, was trying to 
persuade the ex-Governor to support FDR for the sake of the 
party. Whatever the consequences of these actions, Roosevelt 
and Smith did join forces to support the nomination of 
Herbert Lehman for Governor of New York. The newspapers
30See Bellush, "Apprenticeship," II, 24, where it is 
noted that back in 1928 FDR had confided to a friend that
failure to nominate Smith would cause great defections in
the East from the Democratic party because of the "blind, 
hero-worshipping following" he had.
33FDR to Felix Frankfurter, September 14, 1932, in 
Personal Letters, III, 301.
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carried pictures of them shaking hands. Such camaraderie 
was a source of elation to Parley and Howe. They felt it 
would eliminate the possibility of any Irish Catholic defec­
tion from the ticket in November.3^
Smith campaigned for Roosevelt in the East. After 
the ex-Governor's first speech in Newark, New Jersey, some 
newspapermen complained because he brought up the religious 
issue of the 1928 campaign. But there was no question that
the crowds still appreciated him. Although slow warming up,
3 3Smith eventually came around to full support for FDR. The 
apogee of his efforts for the party was reached in Boston on 
October 27. There, speaking to fifteen thousand people, he 
closed his address with a remark interpreted as a rebuttal 
to the anti-Catholic rumors being used against Roosevelt. 
"There can be," Smith said, "no bigotry and there can be no 
resentment in the Catholic heart. It cannot be there."3^
3^Rexford G. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt (New 
York, 1957), p. 245; Huthmacher, Massachusetts, pp. 241-42; 
Clipping of The Boston Advertiser, July 2, 1932, in Scrapbook 
No. 48, David I. Walsh Manuscripts, Holy Cross College, 
Worcester, Massachusetts; The Catholic Transcript, November
10, 1932, p. 4, in which the editor insists that it was 
Garner who won Smith over to campaign for FDR.
33New York Times, October 28, 1932, p. 1.
■^Quoted by Huthmacher, Massachusetts, p. 248.
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The New York Times called Smith's tour of Massachusetts a
triumph and pointed out that "priests were in the forefront
of every crowd eager to clasp his hand and state their
3 5approval of his speech."
It is difficult to say how much effect Smith's efforts 
really had on Catholic voters. It seems clear that after 
Maine went Democratic in its mid-September election, most 
political professionals in the East saw a walk-away for 
Roosevelt in November, with or without Smith's help. In 
Massachusetts, after some initial hesitation, Senator David 
Walsh came out strongly for the ticket, and he seems to have 
played an important role in swinging the Bay State into the 
Democratic column.^
Yet it is also clear that Smith's support of Roosevelt 
was looked upon by some Catholic sources as a final bene­
diction to the candidate. The Commonweal remarked in 
September that "the show is in jeopardy until A1 Smith makes
^ New York Times, October 29, 1932, p. 1.
36Huthmacher, Massachusetts, p. 245; Clipping of 
Boston Advertiser, July 2, 1932, Scrapbook No. 48, David 
Walsh Papers; Jim Farley says Smith did help in the East 
but that the Roosevelt camp was not overly concerned with 
the possibility of Irish Catholics defecting, interview 
with author, March 20, 1965.
up his mind to join." The Michigan Catholic and The Catholic
Herald felt that reconciliation of Smith and Roosevelt would
deal a death blow to the whispering campaign which was
37attempting to exploit religious feeling. Father John Ryan
had been approached early in the campaign about endorsing
Roosevelt and thereby undercutting the anti-Catholic campaign
being waged in the East. Ryan was now told, by these same
Catholic sources, that the issue was no longer in doubt
because of the splendid reaction to Smith's New England
campaign. John McHugh Stuart wrote that Smith's endeavor
"makes doubly sure that we will have in the White House . . .
a knowledgeful friend and intelligent champion of the social
and economic doctrines recommended to us by Authority and 
3ftexperience.'
In spite of these indications, it appears certain that 
Roosevelt would have received considerable Catholic support 
regardless of the actions of A1 Smith. FDR had a number of 
things working in his favor. First, there was a natural 
tendency to view Hoover as the man who had profited by the
3^The Michigan Catholic, October 13, 1932, p. 4; The 
Catholic Herald of Milwaukee, October 13, 1932, p. 4.
38John McHugh Stuart to Rev. John A. Ryan, October 29, 
1932, Ryan Papers.
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anti-Catholicism of 1928. Roosevelt, on the other hand, had
defended Smith and presented a posture of tolerance in 1928.
Furthermore, Roosevelt was intimate with many prominent
Catholics; and two of his chief advisers, Farley and Flynn,
3 9were Catholics.
Perhaps the most attractive thing Roosevelt did during 
the 1932 campaign, from the Church's point of view, was to 
quote from the Papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno of Pius XI, 
in a speech at Detroit, October 2, 1932. Roosevelt called 
the encyclical "just as radical as I am," and "one of the 
greatest documents of modern t i m e s . T h e  fact that a
3 9Gosnell, Champion Campaigner, p. 131; The New World, 
July 15, 1932, p. 1, reminded its public that Roosevelt was a 
distant relative of Mother Elizabeth Ann Seaton, foundress of 
the Sisters of Charity and a "distinguished figure in Catholic 
Church history in this country."
^Rosenman, Public Papers, I, 778. The section of the 
encyclical quoted is as follows: "It is patent in our days
that not alone is wealth accumulated, but immense power and 
despotic economic domination are concentrated in the hands 
of a few, and that those few are frequently not the owners 
but only the trustees and directors of invested funds which 
they administer at their good pleasure. . . .
"This accumulation of power, the characteristic note 
of the modern economic order, is a natural result of limit­
less free competition, which permits the survival of those 
only who are the strongest, which often means those who fight 
most relentlessly, who pay least heed to the dictates of con­
science.
"This concentration of power has led to a threefold 
struggle for domination: First, there is the struggle for
dictatorship in the economic sphere itself; then the fierce 
battle to acquire control of the government, so that its
42
presidential candidate had quoted approvingly from an
encyclical by the Pope had an immediate effect on American
Catholics. To one editor, this demonstrated that at last
Catholic social teaching was having an effect in this 
41country. Another felt that Roosevelt could not be accused
of radicalism by his opponents, since he was no more radical
42than the Pope. To some, his actions, implying "endorse­
ment of some fundamental principles of Christian social 
reform," required great courage. This public service would, 
suggested one editor, go down as the most important remark 
of the entire campaign. His condemnation of laissez-faire 
capitalism gave hope that perhaps here was a man really con­
cerned with social justice.^
The obvious significance of FDR's Detroit remarks for 
American Catholics was seen by John M. Stuart, a politically 
active New Yorker and friend of Father John Ryan. Stuart
resources and authority may be abused in the economic 
struggle, and finally, the clash between the Governments 
themselves."
^ The Catholic Herald, December 15, 1932, p. 4.
^ America, October 15, 1932, p. 31.
4^The Michigan Catholic, October 6, 1932, p. 4; 
Commonweal, October 12, 1932, p. 545; Denver Catholic 
Register, November 20, 1932, p. 1.
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wrote Ryan asking the priest to comment on the Detroit speech 
and promising to publicize his remarks in New England, "where 
I fear there is likely to be a recognizable defection of our 
people through tribal pride." Ryan had received a similar 
query from Reverend Bryan J. McEntegart of Omaha.44 Further­
more, Roosevelt himself had written Ryan asking that the 
priest give some professional advice to Raymond Moley to be 
used in the campaign. Despite this contact, Ryan had not at 
first viewed Roosevelt's candidacy with exuberance. The 
priest had preferred Newton Baker for the Democratic nomina­
tion. But by September he was writing the Honorable W. F. 
Connolly of Detroit, who had published an article on why 
Catholics should support Roosevelt, on how much he admired
the latter's views. Ryan suggested they be given wide
45publicity by the Democratic National Committee. Yet Ryan 
refused to help the Democratic cause directly by writing on 
the similarity of Roosevelt's views with the Papal encyclicals. 
The priest admitted that FDR was obviously familiar with the 
Catholic documents and had accepted "important parts of its
44John M. Stuart to Ryan, October 3, 1932; Ryan to 
Stuart, October 5, 1932, Ryan Papers.
45Francis L. Broderick, The Right Reverend New Dealer; 
John A. Ryan (New York, 1963), p. 208; Father Ryan to W. F. 
Connolly, September 17, 1932, Ryan Papers.
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fQuadraqesimo Annol philosophy." He also felt that Roose­
velt's Commonwealth Club address in San Francisco was in 
harmony with Catholic teaching, but he did not wish to con­
tribute an article on these conclusions. Instead, Stuart
was sent copies of old articles by Ryan in which Hoover’s
46policies were criticized.
Ryan was not the only prominent Catholic who con­
sidered Roosevelt the best choice in 1932. Frank Murphy, 
Mayor of Detroit and later Attorney General, supported FDR
long before the Chicago convention and worked actively for
47his nomination. Frank P. Walsh of New York had been
appointed by Governor Roosevelt to the New York Power
Authority and had supported the Governor for the nomination 
48in 1932. The already famous radio priest of Detroit, 
Reverend Charles E. Coughlin, came out early in support of 
Roosevelt. On a visit to New York City with Frank Murphy in
^Rev. John Ryan to John M. Stuart, October 13, 1932, 
and October 18, 1932, Ryan Papers.
^Richard D. Lunt, "The High Ministry of Government: 
The Political Career of Frank Murphy" (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, University of New Mexico, 1962), p. 63.
48Frank P. Walsh to Lewis Howe, December 9, 1931, Box 
134, F. P. Walsh Papers. Archbishop Glennon of Omaha had 
remarked that Walsh presented an "impressive speech" for FDR. 
William P. Harvey to Walsh, August, 1932, Box 134, F. P. 
Walsh Papers.
45
the spring of 1932, the priest offered his services to
49support FDR's theory of government.
When the votes were finally counted in November, the
fears of the Roosevelt camp seemed largely exaggerated.
Franklin Roosevelt was the overwhelming victor. He received
27,821,857 votes to 15,761,841 for Hoover and carried forty-
two states with 472 electoral votes. Of the seventy-seven
northern counties with large Catholic populations, which
Smith swung out of the Republican camp in 1928, the vast
majority supported Roosevelt in 1932.^ In Boston, Roosevelt
51did better among Irish and Italian voters than had Smith.
The new President showed impressive strength in the 
twelve largest urban areas in the United States, areas with 
big Catholic populations. Among others, he carried Boston, 
Massachusetts; Cook County (Chicago), Illinois; Orleans 
Parish (New Orleans), Louisiana; Wayne County (Detroit), 
Michigan; St. Louis, Missouri; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and New
^Freidel, Roosevelt, III, 285.
50Lubell, Future of American Politics, p. 37. Lubell 
also points out that fifty-seven of these counties remained 
Democratic in every presidential election from 1928 to 
1948.
5-*-Huthmacher, Massachusetts, pp. 250-51.
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COYork City by impressive majorities.
It seems clear that the vast majority of American
Catholics supported FDR at the polls in 1932. The reason
for this support is more elusive. One author attributes it
to no more than "a reasonable expectation of future favors."'^
This interpretation seems inadequate. Clearly the crisis of
the depression and the desire for change affected Catholics
as it did most other Americans. Although there was much in
Roosevelt's program that appealed to Catholic leaders, and
the candidate himself was conscious of Catholic political
strength, it seems impossible to isolate a "Catholic vote"
in the Democratic mandate.
After the election, however, American Catholics went
about interpreting the results in their own fashion. Some
considered the entire campaign a disappointment and felt sure
54the depression would continue. Others felt that FDR had 
proved himself during the campaign and that, while "1 is
52Edgar E. Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt 
(Stanford University, 1947), pp. 20, 82, 103, 110, 120, 130, 
149, 180.
C ODaniel F. Cleary, "Catholics and Politics," in 
Catholicism in America: A Series of Articles from the
Commonweal (New York, 1954), p. 98.
5^The Catholic Telegraph of Cincinnati, November 10, 
1932, p. 4.
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not so able a man as Alfred E. Smith, . . .  he will 
unquestionably make a splendid President." The name of A1 
Smith continued to appear, in Catholic analyses of the elec­
tion. One publication felt that Smith was solely responsible 
for Roosevelt's victory in New England. Another theme put 
forth was that Roosevelt's victory was "poetic retribution"
for Smith and American Catholics. As one editor expressed
57it, "A1 Smith has had his day now." While some Catholics
praised the lack of religious bigotry in the campaign,
others noted that the bigotry that did exist was directed
58against Roosevelt and Garner for their pro-Catholicism.
^ Denver Catholic Register, November 10, 1932, p. 1.
^ The Monitor, December 10, 1932, p. 8, quotes favor­
ably this opinion expressed by The Ave Maria.
57The Michigan Catholic, November 10, 1932, p. 4; 
America, November 19, 1932, p. 149.
W. Shields, "Bigotry in the Last Election," 
America, December 3, 1932, p. 203; The Catholic World, CXVI 
(December, 1932), 365.
CHAPTER III
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, 1932
When Franklin Roosevelt entered office in 1932, 
American Catholics had a social philosophy with which to 
interpret the measures of the New Deal. The state and 
content of this social thought was the cumulative result of 
three elements forged in the preceding fifteen years: the
"Bishops Program for Social Reconstruction of 1919," the 
Papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno of 1931, and the work of 
Church liberals such as John A. Ryan, Charles Coughlin, and 
Dorothy Day. It was these elements which Catholics drew 
upon when they faced the depression of the 1930's. This is 
not to say that Catholic priests and laymen had not been 
concerned with social problems before 1929. Rather, the 
depression acted as a catalyst to their views and they became 
bolder in espousing them.^
^•Aaron Abell, "The Catholic Church and the American 




Before attributing too much importance to the 
depression and the New Deal as well-springs of Catholic 
social consciousness, we should recall that in the 19th 
century the Knights of Labor drew support from James Cardinal 
Gibbons. In 1906, Reverend John A. Ryan wrote a book calling 
for a "living wage." Furthermore, many other priests and 
organizations within the Church had taken radical social 
positions long before the great depression.2
In 1919, the bishops of the United States published a 
document which spelled out a program of "Social Reconstruc­
tion." The program was so radical that one prominent busi­
nessman wrote that socialism had found a home in the 
Catholic Church. Specifically, the bishops called for 
minimum-wage laws and governmental intervention in the 
economy to crush monopolies. For labor they advocated unem­
ployment, health, and old-age insurance and government 
recognition of labor's right to organize. Other measures 
that they sponsored included public housing developments, 
legal safeguards relating to women and child labor, and a
2Edward Marciniak, "Catholics and Social Reform," in 
Catholicism in America, pp. 123-24.
^Reverend John Tracy Ellis, American Catholicism 
(Chicago, 1956), pp. 142-43.
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4share by labor in management and ownership.
The impact of this document can be seen in retrospect.
By 1945, John T. McNicholas, Archbishop of Cincinnati, was
eulogizing Archbishop Schrembs, late Bishop of Cleveland, by
stressing that the latter had signed the Bishops' Program of
1919. Archbishop McNicholas pointed out that of the twelve
major proposals offered in 1919, all but one had become
federal law.^ A member of the Roosevelt administration,
Solicitor General Robert H. Jackson, remarked in 1939 that
. . . liberal political thinking in America has 
been profoundly influenced by the "Bishops1 
Program of Social Reconstruction." . . . What 
suffering might have been spared to men had 
the voice of the Bishops been heeded by those 
who came to power in 1920 instead of having to 
wait for the disaster-born administration of 
1933.6
Another document to which Catholics had reference 
during the depression and the New Deal was the Papal ency­
clical Quadragesimo Anno by Pope Pius XI, written in 1931.^
4Broderick, Right Reverend, pp. 104-106; Ellis, 
American Catholicism, p. 142.
^Ellis, American Catholicism, p. 143.
^Quoted in Shannon, American Irish, p. 326.
^The document's real title was "On Reconstructing the 
Social Order," and was a supplement to the famous encyclical 
Rerum novarum of Leo XIII (1891).
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Because of the pivotal role that this document played in 
Catholic interpretation of the New Deal, an analysis of its 
major points is in order.
The general theme of the encyclical was a condemnation 
of laissez-faire capitalism. Pius XI reiterated certain 
thoughts in the earlier document by Leo XIII. Leo had 
rejected the old watch-dog concept of the state and had 
called on government to "put forth every effort so that 
through the entire scheme of laws and institutions . . . both 
public and individual well being may develop spontaneously
Qout of the very structure and administration of the State."
He had also encouraged the organization of unions to protect 
the rights of the laborer. Pius reaffirmed these ideas, but 
he also developed new principles of his own. He began by 
distinguishing the "twofold character of ownership of goods." 
The right of private ownership he defended, but he dis­
tinguished this from the use of ownership, declaring that
the latter should be manifested with due regard for the common
ggood as defined by the State. While denying the claims of
OQuoted in Quadragesimo Anno (National Catholic Wel­




both Manchester Liberal and Socialist, the Pope did agree 
that
. . . the riches that economic-social develop­
ments constantly increase ought to be so 
distributed among individual persons and 
classes that the common advantage of all . . .
will be safeguarded.10
He called for a wage for labor sufficient to support both 
the worker and his family. "Opportunity to work [should] be 
provided to those who are able and willing to work."^
The Pope rejected capitalism as the answer to man's 
ills. He denied the value of unlimited and free economic 
competition because, in truth, a dictatorship had grown out 
of this system. "It is obvious that not only is wealth con­
centrated in our times, but an immense power and despotic 
economic dictatorship is consolidated in the hands of a 
few. . . . "  Furthermore, these few did not really own the—  
property but were only the "managing directors," who never­
theless were all but unlimited in their disposition of this 
power.
Free competition has destroyed itself; economic 
dictatorship has supplanted the free market; un­
bridled ambition for power has likewise succeeded 
greed for gain; all economic life has become
10Ibid., p. 23. 11Ibid., p. 28.
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tragically hard, inexorable, and cruel.12 
As a substitute for this jungle-like system, the Pope called 
for industrial partnership: the cooperation of both labor
and capital in the formation of vocational guilds. Although 
broad in concept, this goal of vocational groupings was to be 
the criterion by which many Catholics estimated the worth of 
the New Deal.13
Whatever the source of their information, one thing 
is clear: by 1932 many American Catholics, both lay and
clergy, were generally appalled at the economic situation 
which existed and were calling vigorously for radical reform 
of the economic and social structure of the country. This 
concern was reflected in a joint statement by the American 
hierarchy, published on November 12, 1931, under the auspices 
of the National Catholic Welfare Conference. The bishops 
expressed sympathy for those suffering from the depression, 
blamed unrestricted individualism for the economic disloca­
tions, and offered detailed cures for the situation. For one 
thing, they called for the study and application of the Papal
12Q. A ., pp. 37-38.
13Aaron I. Abell, American Catholicism and Social 
Action: A Search for Social Justice, 1865-1950 (New York,
1960), p. 263.
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encyclical Quadragesimp Anno by all elements of society. For 
another, they insisted that "the wealthy are obligated in con­
science to contribute for the relief of those who suffer and 
the more so because the system under which they suffer has 
yielded wealth to others." Specifically this meant a living 
wage for labor and a more equal sharing of profits. The 
bishops also expressed their conviction that "federal and 
state appropriations for relief in some form will become 
necessary." They proposed a "joint conference" of labor, 
business, and the government to deal with the depression.^
The National Catholic Welfare Conference, which had 
sponsored the Bishops' remarks, was a ten-year old organiza­
tion which had sprung from the National Catholic War Council. 
This latter group had been formed during World War I to 
enable the Catholic hierarchy to more effectively support 
the United States' involvement in the European conflict 
after 1917. In essence the group was a national council for 
Catholic affairs. It was directed by the bishops of the 
United States through a council which met frequently each 
year. Between meetings, the work of the NCWC was carried on 
by a permanent staff of priests and laymen. Located in
^Raphael M. Huber, ed., Our Bishops Speak. . ., 
1919-1951 (Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1952), pp. 194-96.
Washington, D. C., and influenced by such Catholic liberals 
as Reverend John A. Ryan and Reverend John J. Burke, the 
NCWC played a large role in the discussion of public affairs.
One month after the Bishops issued their statement, 
other evidence appeared of growing Catholic dissatisfaction 
with Hoover's method for solving the depression. Father 
Ryan of Catholic University and the Social Action Department 
of NCWC made an appearance before a Senate Committee. As a 
first step in combating the depression, Father Ryan called 
for five billion dollars in federal public works to provide 
relief from unemployment.^-6 In the meantime, Ryan's 
assistant in NCWC, Reverend Raymond A. McGowan, issued a 
joint statement with Reverend James Myers of the Federal 
Council of Churches of Christ in America, and Rabbi Edward 
L. Israel of the Central Conference of American Rabbis. 
Echoing the Bishops' statement, these men called for a more 
equal distribution of wealth and income. They deplored the 
practice of some businesses to cut wages during the economic 
crisis. "It is now time," read their statement, "that the
^Daniel Callahan, The Mind of the Catholic Layman 
(New York, 1963), pp. 86-87; Broderick, Right Reverend, pp. 
235-36. NCWC continues to be active today with headquarters 
on Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D. C.
^6The Catholic World, CXXXIV (December, 1931), 366.
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engineering principle of planning . . . should be extended 
to the control of entire industries and of industry in 
general." ̂
Over and over, prominent Catholics were heard
demanding more positive action by the Federal government in
combating the depression. Father Charles Coughlin of Detroit
called for a rejection of the idea that the state should
18interfere with its citizens as little as possible.
Reverend Dr. Francis J. Haas, Director of the National 
Catholic Conference of Social Work, while addressing his 
students on July 1, 1932, in Philadelphia, called for an end 
to cliches such as "balanced budget" and "no dole." He 
suggested instead an emergency program of massive Federal 
spending and a high surtax on large incomes and inherit­
ances.^ In an Independence Day address to the American 
Legion of Washington, D. C . , Reverend Edmund A. Walsh, vice- 
president of Georgetown University, called for a new concept
^Quoted in The Catholic World, CXXIV (December,
1931), 623.
Shannon, American Irish, p. 296, calls Coughlin "a 
path breaker and propagandist for the radicalism of the sub­
sequent New Deal" and says the priest prepared Irish 
Catholics for an intellectual acceptance of the New Deal as 
being in the tradition of the Church.
-̂9The Brooklyn Tablet, July 9, 1932, p. 1.
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of capital. He pointed out that the best way of preventing 
the advance of Communism in this country was to give the 
laborer a wage above his immediate worth to provide insurance 
against unemployment and old age. "The few people who 
control all the money in the country," said Walsh, "have a 
choice of giving up some of it or having the government con­
script it, or [seeing] a mob rob them."20 Reverend Joseph 
A. Cashen of Duluth, Minnesota, speaking on the radio under 
the sponsorship of the Federated Trades Assembly, March 4, 
1932, called for "active, adequate, and effective inter­
vention by the United States Government" to end unemployment
21and decentralize the wealth of the Nation.
The 18th annual convention of the National Conference 
of Catholic Charities, held September 25 through 28 at Omaha, 
Nebraska, provided an opportunity for Catholics to speak out 
on the emergency facing the country. Very Reverend A. J. 
Muench of St. Francis, Wisconsin, rejected the rugged individ­
ualism concept of business and the laissez-faire philosophy 
of government. He called for a redistribution of wealth on 
a broader base. Furthermore, the Sherman Act needed
20The Brooklyn Tablet, July 16, 1932, p. 2. 
2^Ibid., March 12, 1932, p. 1.
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revision, for "only on the basis of cooperation can rational
planning of production and distribution be made a reality."
Muench was quick to make clear that the planning he called
for should come not from the state, but from the "industrial
22and trade units themselves."
Catholic laymen at the conference also spoke out on 
the situation. Frank P. Walsh, chairman of the New York 
State Power Commission, said that the efforts of credit 
extension and public works being pursued by President Hoover 
were wholly inadequate to meet the demands of relief. War­
time measures were called for, insisted Walsh. He also 
called for a rejection of the theories of the English 
classical economists with their iron laws and suggested a 
return to the guild system of the Middle Ages as a way out 
of the depression.̂
James Fitzgerald, another layman at the conference and 
an official of the St. Vincent de Paul Society from Detroit, 
took this occasion to castigate Hoover's relief policies as 
inadequate. Fitzgerald felt that the assumption by Hoover
2 2̂National Conference of Catholic Charities, Proceed­
ings , 1932-1941 (9 vols.; Omaha, Nebraska, 1932-1941), 18th 




that local initiative should be the major source of relief 
was erroneous. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was 
supposed to provide funds in an emergency. In fact, Fitz­
gerald commented, few funds were being distributed. He felt 
the administration should realize that Federal relief funds 
were needed now and that "necessity knows no law."2^
James F. Murphy of Detroit, president of the NCCC 
Omaha Conference, rejected the idea that "blind economic 
forces" were the cause of the depression. On the one hand 
he condemned the "ruthless free competition which ends 
inevitably in economic dictatorship," and the procrastination 
of the government in "mobilizing the resources of the nation 
for relief. . . . "  Yet Murphy insisted that he was also 
against excessive centralization and bureaucracy of govern­
ment .
While the foregoing statements indicate that a growing 
segment of American Catholics advocated more radical measures 
in combating the depression, not all shared this feeling. 
Indeed, Father John Ryan had to admit that by the end of 1932 
most of the Catholic clergy in America was still illiterate
2^NCCC Proceedings, 1932, pp. 28-33.
2^Ibid., pp. 4-6.
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26regarding economics. Reverend M. DeMunnynck, writing in 
The Catholic Mind, stressed the fact that private ownership 
was "an indisputable natural r i g h t . A n o t h e r  writer, 
Reverend Lewis Watt, also came to the defense of private 
property. While admitting that economic relations could not 
be left to "the free play of competition," Watt did not feel 
that abolishment of private property would help cure the 
depression. But he did feel that state action was "absolutely 
necessary."
Among the Catholic hierarchy, the Archbishop of 
Cincinnati, John T. McNicholas, felt that one of the main 
causes of the depression was the reckless spending of the 
Federal government. He remarked that "probably the expenses 
of government administration could be reduced fifty per cent, 
if fads and frills were eliminated." He also called for an
2Qend to "useless bureaus and endless commissions."
26Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 201.
27Rev. M. DeMunnynck, "Right of Private Ownership,"
The Catholic Mind, XXX (January 22, 1932), 40.
2®Rev. Lewis Watt, S.J., "Economic Principles and 
Social Practice," The Catholic Mind, XXX (March 22, 1932),
124.
29Quoted by The Brooklyn Tablet, April 2, 1932,
p. 1.
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Some sort of low point in prophecy was reached by the 
Milwaukee Catholic Herald when, after the November election, 
the editor announced that any effort by the new administra­
tion "to launch the government upon new enterprises will run 
counter to the insistent demand for public economy." "The 
public," insisted the editor, "will not stand for more 
government spending."^0
Most Catholic spokesmen took a more radical reading 
of the depression and of the action needed to combat it. In 
their interpretation they were influenced by the belief that 
the ideas expressed in the encyclical of Pius XI held the 
answer to the American dilemma. For example, the National 
Catholic Alumni Federation undertook the sponsorship of 
regional meetings to promote social justice. In New York 
City on November 20, 1932, a call went out for a crusade 
based on the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI. The goals 
of these meetings were twofold: to educate American indus­
trialists to the fact that "modern capitalism has already 
failed," and to promote the "embodiment of papal principles 
into the governmental framework of the nation." The three 
main speakers at the New York meeting were Reverend James M.
■^Milwaukee Catholic Herald, November 10, 1932, p. 4.
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Gillis, editor of The Catholic World, Reverend Wilfrid 
Parsons, S.J., editor of America, and Reverend John A. Ryan. 
Father Gillis predicted a vast social upheaval in America if 
capitalism did not reform. Father Parsons condemned laissez- 
faire economics, and Father Ryan said American capitalism was
— Olcommitting suicide by stressing production over consumption.
Father Ryan had been an early exponent of the idea 
that the papal encyclicals could help solve the economic 
crisis. He pointed out "that the public authorities are 
obliged to promote the welfare of the people by many kinds 
of positive measures" and that the state should care for the
poor and provide relief. He condemned the Hoover administra-
3 2tion for not recognizing these facts. Ryan stressed the
fact that national planning was advocated by Pope Pius XI
3 3and that individualism was "a blind alley."
Father Parsons was another propagator of the ency­
clicals. He lamented how few American Catholics realized
33New York Times, November 21, 1932, p. 19.
3^Rev. John A. Ryan, "National Responsibility in the 
Present Crisis," The Catholic World, CXXXVI (November, 1932), 
169.
3 3 Rev. John A. Ryan, "After the Depression," Catholic 
Action, January, 1932, p. 5; also NCCC Proceedings, 1932,
p. 20.
that the Pope had condemned concentration of wealth and 
rugged individualism— phrases that Parsons associated with 
the Hoover regime. The priest felt that the Pope’s call for 
an abolition of antitrust laws and the rejection of the free 
competition philosophy behind such laws was especially timely
O Afor American consideration. Parsons' magazine, America, 
had called the Democratic platform of 1932 "a hodge-podge of 
economic theory," and had boasted that only Pius XI was bold 
enough to go to the root of the depression— laissez-faire 
economics. The editors proudly remarked that "Pius XI
remains the most radical in social economics among all the
3 5public men of our age."
Other voices joined the chorus stressing the relevance
of the Pope's encyclical to the depression. Mayor Frank
Murphy of Detroit spoke before the International Federation
of Catholic Alumni at a meeting in New York City in November,
1932, The Mayor chose the Papal encyclicals as his topic and
emphasized their applicability to the current economic 
36crisis. The Catholic Central Verein of America, at its
3^Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., "The Pope and the 
Depression," The Catholic Mind, XXX (June 22, 1932), 244.
3^America, July 9, 1932, pp. 320-21.
3^The Brooklyn Tablet, November 26, 1932, p. 1.
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77th general convention in St. Louis, August 19-24, 1932,
passed a resolution calling for the reconstruction of society
along the lines of vocational groups as laid down by
37Quadragesimo Anno.
Another theme in the growing Catholic demand for 
economic reform was a bitter criticism of American capitalism. 
Already some of this has been made evident in the remarks of 
Ryan and Parsons. Catholic editors soon joined in this 
criticism. One editor said that if the depression proved 
anything, it proved "that the enormously wealthy men of the 
world are not its wise men."'*® Father Gillis used the 
editorial pages of The Catholic World to publicly disasso­
ciate the Catholic Church from capitalism, although he 
admitted the right of private property. Gillis felt that 
the depression should certainly make clear to all that 
"injustices" and "mad incongruities" were "inherent in the 
capitalistic system." To dismiss all attempts at reform as 
"communistic" was folly and revealed an inordinate fear 
complex.^9
3?The Central-Blatt and Social Justice Review 
(Official Journal of the Catholic Central Verein), September, 
1932, pp. 173-75.
3**Penver Catholic Register, August 14, 1932, p. 1.
39«rhe Catholic World, CXXXIII (May, 1931), 231-32;
(July, 1931), 487-88.
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The speakers at the Catholic Alumni Federation meeting 
of 1932 took the occasion to attack American capitalism. 
Father Gillis continued his criticism and accepted the fact 
that a social revolution was beginning in the United States. 
His only question was how much violence would accompany the 
revolution. According to Gillis, capitalists had treated 
labor "worse than . . .  an animal." Father Parsons pointed 
out that the existing economic structure "actually has pro­
duced nothing but unlimited competition and unlimited 
opportunity for avarice and greed." Father Ryan remarked 
that capitalism had committed suicide by its narrow policies. 
He branded the attempt to blame the depression on the normal 
cycles of business as a delusion. Joseph A. Porcelli of 
Fordham University took the opportunity to call for laws to 
force industrialists to practice social justice.40
During the early 1930's Catholics were offered more 
than one forum for expressing their social views. In 
Detroit, Father Coughlin was developing the base for his 
Union for Social Justice with an emphasis on Federal control 
of finance. For those who found the program of Father 
Coughlin either too vague or too hysterical, there was the
40"a  Warning to Capitalist," 1932 clipping in Ryan 
Papers; The Catholic World, CXXXVI (December, 1932), 367.
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Catholic League for Social Justice. This group was the out­
come of a meeting early in 1932 of Catholic teachers, indus­
trialists, and economists, held under the auspices of the 
National Catholic Convert's League, to study the depression.
It was announced at the meeting that the Calvert Associates, 
publishers of Commonweal, were forming a League of Social 
Justice to promote the "study and application of the teachings 
of Pius XI." The leading spirit in this movement was Michael 
O 'Shaughnessy, an oil executive and journalist. In October, 
1932, the League received the endorsement of Cardinal Hayes 
of New York.4"*"
0'Shaughnessy set the tone and goals of the new 
organization soon after he began publication of the Social 
Justice Bulletin, the League's official monthly organ. He 
outlined a plan to bring the United States out of the depres­
sion. O 'Shaughnessy envisioned the formation of trade 
associations of all industrial units, which would provide 
health and accident insurance for members. These associations 
would also work for stabilization of production and prices.
All trade associations would be under a directorate composed 
of management, labor, and the consumer. A government
41Abell, American Catholicism, p. 242.
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tribunal would be set up to decide labor-management disputes 
and would have veto power over the directorate.42
It is impossible to estimate the influence of 
O 'Shaughnessy and his group. They were small in number and 
had little publicity. It is known that his plan was circu­
lated among the members of Roosevelt's new cabinet. Further­
more, the National Catholic Alumni Federation adopted some 
of 0 1Shaughnessy's ideas and during the 1930*s called for 
trade associations as a means of promoting economic 
stability ,4^
After Roosevelt's victory in November, 1932, Catholics 
became still more radical in their approach to the economic 
crisis. Father John Ryan wrote Raymond Moley that things 
were looking up because Hoover was getting out. He expressed 
hope that Roosevelt would be what he appeared— a man who knew 
the importance of restoring the purchasing power of the 
people and who would concentrate on redistribution rather 
than expansion of production.44 Meanwhile, Richard Dana
42Ibid., pp. 245, 246.
4^Abell, American Catholicism, p. 245; The Brooklyn 
Tablet, February 20, 1932, p. 1.
44Rev. John A. Ryan to Raymond Moley, November 29, 
1932, Ryan Papers.
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Skinner, associate editor of Commonweal, addressed the 
Knights of Columbus in New York and said that antitrust laws 
must be repealed because they promoted ruthless competition, 
a prime cause of the depression.
Father Frederick Siedenburg, S.J., Dean of Detroit 
University, gave a presidential address before the Illinois 
Conference of Social Work in which he called for an "economy 
of abundance" to replace the "economy of scarcity" under 
which the United States was now operating. The common good 
must replace the selfishness of the capitalist. Socializa­
tion of production and distribution should come about by 
evolution rather than revolution. Old age insurance, 
minimum wage laws, and workmen's compensation were only a 
few things needed. Siedenburg concluded, in a tone which 
was shared by many American Catholics, that . . i f  need 
be, the Government must pour out its billions for relief and 
for Government work."46
By early 1933, it appeared that a large segment of 
American Catholics were favorably disposed toward the vigor­
ous type of leadership Roosevelt would soon offer them.
45The Brooklyn Tablet, December 10, 1932, p. 3.
46Quoted in NCWC News Service, Urbana, Illinois, 
December 5, 1932; The Brooklyn Tablet, December 10, 1932, 
p. 1.
CHAPTER IV
THE NEW DEAL AS CATHOLIC TEACHING
As the character of the New Deal unfolded during 
1933, it met enthusiastic response from many American 
Catholics. On a more general and superficial level this 
support seemed to be generated because Catholic spokesmen 
and the Catholic press presented the reform legislation of 
the New Deal as being based on, and embodying, Catholic 
social teaching, in particular the ideas of the Papal 
encyclicals. Such being the case, Catholics were urged to 
give their wholehearted support to Roosevelt's policies.
During 1933, the Catholic press constantly presented 
the New Deal as an American version of the Papal encyclicals. 
This campaign began with an interpretation of Roosevelt1s 
inaugural address. As one editor remarked, the great 
similarity of FDR's speech to Quadragesimo Anno made it clear 
that "the new President has really grasped, the spirit of that 
document." His program "is merely a practical application of
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the Papal principles for social reconstruction."'1' Both the 
Pope and the President assigned blame for the present crisis 
to the same cause— the unscrupulous practices of business.2 
The Catholic Times of London even went so far as to arrange 
the remarks of President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XI in 
parallel columns, to demonstrate that both men condemned 
capitalism. The similarities, felt the author, showed that 
FDR had not merely quoted the Papal encyclical in the 
campaign as would a shallow politician, but had done so as a 
sincere student of its principles. He concluded: "the
Roosevelt plan of social reconstruction is the Catholic 
plan."3
After Roosevelt had been in office for one month, a 
few Catholic editors felt that their first impressions of 
the President had been confirmed. The goals of Leo XIII and 
Pius XI were being sought by business, labor, and the govern­
ment. "The close similarity [of the New Deal] to the recom­
mendations of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI" was, wrote a
^Denver Catholic Register, March 12, 1933, p. 1.
2The Catholic World, CXXXVII (April, 1933), 107.
^Quoted by The Catholic Herald, March 30, 1933, p. 4; 
Denver Catholic Register, March 23, 1933, p. 4.
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Cincinnati newspaper, especially apparent in the call for
the abolition of child labor, and for the establishment of
minimum hours and wages for labor.^ This similarity called
for enthusiastic support of the President's program by
American Catholics. “The New Deal," claimed a Milwaukee
paper, embodied "principles for which Catholic leaders have
been making propaganda for years, principles set forth in
Papal encyclicals. . . . Indeed, the Christian social
justice which seemed to be behind the New Deal could only be
traced to the encyclicals of the Popes. The recognition by
FDR that labor deserved more consideration in our society
£was rooted in Papal thinking.
Some prominent Catholic sources even insisted that 
without the groundwork laid by the Catholic Church, the New 
Deal would not have been received so well by the people. 
Commenting on a speech by Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes, 
in which he rejected rugged individualism, one editor
^The Catholic Herald, April 20, 1933, p. 4? The 
Brooklyn Tablet, April 22, 1933, p. 3; Cincinnati Catholic 
Telegraph, July 27, 1933, p. 4.
~*The Catholic Herald, July 27, 1933, p. 4.
^The Brooklyn Tablet, July 29, 1933, p. 1; America, 
August 5, 1933, p. 411; The Michigan Catholic, August 3, 
1933, p. 4.
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remarked that "the seed sown by Leo XIII is beginning to 
grow into a mighty tree."7 Reverend A. J. Hogan, S.J., 
President of Fordham University, felt that Catholic social 
thinking had made for "the ready acceptance of the New Deal." 
He thought it obvious that the administration was familiar 
with the Papal plan. Such men as Father John Ryan, Michael 
0 1Shaughnessy, and Father Charles Coughlin, said Hogan, had 
"prepared the way for acceptance of the New Deal by 
Catholics" by familiarizing them with the Papal ency­
clicals.® Reverend John F. O'Hara, Vice-President of Notre 
Dame University, echoed the sentiments expressed by Father 
Hogan. O'Hara, too, felt that FDR was expounding the social 
teaching of the Church. Speaking to the Knights of Columbus 
in Waterbury, Connecticut, Father O'Hara remarked that 
President Roosevelt "discovered Catholic economics for us," 
and that he had used the encyclicals constantly. The priest 
speculated that perhaps some rich Catholics would now 
finally learn from the President of the United States the
gChurch's teaching on wealth.
7America, November 18, 1933, pp. 146-47.
®NCCC Proceedings, October 1-4, 1933, pp. 50-52.
9NCWC News Service, January 22, 1934; Father John Ryan 
to Father George M. Sanvage, January 29, 1934, Ryan Papers.
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Leaders of Catholic lay organizations contributed 
their support to the thesis that the New Deal was based on 
Catholic teaching. Edmond B. Butler, President of the 
National Catholic Alumni Federation, wrote a letter to the 
heads of alumni groups of Catholic colleges in the United 
States, urging them to support the New Deal. The reason 
why they should support the program was obvious. "The 
principles for which we have argued," wrote Butler, "and 
which were laid down for us in the encyclicals, Rerum Novarum 
and Quadragesimo Anno, seem for the first time in the history 
of our country, to be guiding the National Administration 
during this formative period." Catholics must ensure the 
success of this experiment. Indeed, "it is the duty of every 
educated Catholic . . .  to take an active part," argued 
Butler.^ He was supported in this line of reasoning by 
William J. McGinley, Supreme Secretary of the Knights of 
Columbus. McGinley was received by Pope Pius XI in Rome in 
October, 1933. Upon leaving the Papal apartments, the Knight 
expressed the thesis that President Roosevelt was being 
inspired in his deeds by Christian teaching, foremost of
^■°NCWC News Service, July 17, 1933; New York Times, 
July 14, 1933, p. 8.
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which was the encyclical of Pius XI.11
The views of Butler and McGinley found support in the 
statements of the American hierarchy. The Most Reverend 
John Mark Gannon, Bishop of Erie, Pennsylvania, urged the 
Catholic Daughters of America, at their convention in 
Colorado Springs, to help President Roosevelt put through 
his program. The Bishop felt that the President was 
"thoroughly acquainted with the principles laid down by our 
Holy Father in his many encyclicals." Furthermore, the 
President was "attempting to follow these principles in the
New Deal." In fact, the New Deal was the Papal program in
12practice. Another bishop, Most Reverend Edmond Heelan of 
Sioux City, Iowa, wrote the priests of his diocese that they 
should find a certain satisfaction in the fact that President 
Roosevelt was using the Papal teachings as the basis of his 
program of recovery. Bishops John A. Duffy of Syracuse, New 
York, and Michael J. Gallagher of Detroit, Michigan, were two 
more members of the hierarchy who praised Roosevelt's program 
and felt that it was based on the encyclicals. Gallagher*
^NCWC News Service, October 6, 1933; the editorials 
of the NCWC, carried over their News Service, also reiterated 
this theme, see April 17, 1933.
^Ibid. , "News Letter," July 10, 193 3.
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even went so far as to say that Catholics had "a solemn 
obligation" to support the New Deal.^
The question naturally arises as to how much of this 
comment was simply wishful thinking on the part of American 
Catholics. Were they simply projecting their desires or was 
there solid evidence that the New Deal embodied ideas 
similar to those of the Church? An answer to these questions 
can only come from a detailed analysis of the major pieces of 
New Deal legislation. Preceding such an analysis, however, 
it might be well to make a few preliminary remarks on the 
administration's familiarity with the Papal encyclicals.
Evidence does exist which demonstrates that Roosevelt 
was familiar with the Church's social program. During the 
campaign of 1932, he had quoted from Quadragesimo Anno. 
Furthermore, he had received a letter from R. Dana Skinner 
of New York, with whom he appears to have been on a first- 
name basis, in which Skinner commented on the wisdom of 
quoting from the Papal document. Skinner sent FDR an 
article on Quadragesimo Anno by Father Wilfrid Parsons, and 
suggested that a study of it be made as a basis for social 
action against the depression. Roosevelt replied by
^ NCWC News Service, February 19, 1934; The Brooklyn 
Tablet, August 19, 1933, p. 2.
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referring Skinner to brain truster Raymond Moley, but 
admitted that he was interested in the ideas projected by 
the encyclical.̂  After the election, Skinner wrote to the 
President-elect again on the subject of the encyclicals.
This time he spoke of winning Catholics' support to the 
"industries control idea" by convincing them that FDR's pro­
gram was identical with the plan of Pope Pius XI. This was 
a tempting suggestion, but there is no evidence that Roose­
velt personally pursued such a policy.1"*
There are other signs that Roosevelt was at least 
cognizant of the message of the encyclical. Reverend 
Charles Coughlin boasted in the pages of The Catholic Uni­
verse Bulletin of Cleveland, that he had "sat down with Mr.
Roosevelt and read the encyclical over to him page by 
16page." Michael O 1Shaughnessy, founder of the Catholic 
League for Social Justice, received a letter from Henry
• ^ R i c h a r d  Dana Skinner to FDR, August 3, 1932, and 
FDR to Skinner, December 27, 1932, President's Personal File, 
Box 229, The Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Hyde Park, N. Y.
^Richard Dana Skinner to Louis Howe, June 13, 1933, 
Official File, 76-B, Box 4, Roosevelt Papers. Thomas 
Corcoran says that members of the administration were all 
aware of the encyclical, interview with author, July 15,
1965.
1 6Quoted in NCWC News Service, August 14, 1933.
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Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, in which the latter spoke
of having read Quadragesimo Anno and of being very impressed
with it. Wallace said that he had discussed the encyclical
1 7with others in the administration. The editor of America,
Father Wilfrid Parsons, wrote of also having discussed
Quadragesimo Anno with President Roosevelt. At the time,
according to Parsons, Roosevelt had said that the encyclical
18was "too radical for him." Donald Richberg, legal counsel
of the National Reconstruction Administration in 1932, had
19also made a study of the program outlined by Pius XI.
On a number of occasions, members of the President's 
official family publicly associated the New Deal with the 
Papal encyclicals. Henry Wallace was the most prominent 
and persistent exponent of the idea that Roosevelt was only 
putting into practice the age-old social ideas of the 
Church.^ In a speech before the World Alliance for
^ America, July 1, 1933, p. 292. Wallace admitted a 
familiarity with the encyclical in a letter to the author, 
January 23, 1964.
^ America, June 2, 1934, pp. 174-76.
19Leo J. Hassenauer to Rev. John A. Ryan, April 11, 
1934, Ryan Papers. Hassenauer was a business associate of 
Richberg's .
^ T h e  Brooklyn Tablet, June 2, 1934, p. 10.
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International Friendship in New York City, in 1934, Wallace
made a point of the identity between the New Deal's attempt
to balance agricultural and industrial prices and the ideas
21expressed by Pius XI. The Secretary reiterated this theme 
in a speech to the National Conference of Catholic Charities 
in Cincinnati, October, 1934. He remarked that the New 
Dealers "are traversing ground in detail which has been 
described in more general terms in certain of the Papal 
encyclicals."22
Despite all this public notice and comment, not all 
American Catholics subscribed to the idea that the New Deal 
was merely the Papal encyclicals in native terms. It was 
pointed out that the New Deal was the program of one politi­
cal party, but that the Church could never be found on only 
one side of the political fence. Furthermore, before anyone
committed the Church to an endorsement of the New Deal, it
¥
should be considered that Roosevelt's plans may very well 
fail. Where, suggested some observers, would this leave the 
Church?23
2^The Brooklyn Tablet, December 15, 1934, p. 3; The 
Monitor, December 22, 1934, p. 1.
2^NCCC Proceedings, October 7-10, 1934, p. 66.
23The Monitor, May 5, 1934, p. 1.
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The most persistent and sophisticated critic of the 
New Deal encyclical analogy was F. P. Kenkel, editor of 
Central-Blatt and Social Justice, the official journal of 
the Catholic Central Verein. Kenkel pointed out that the 
resemblance of the New Deal to the Pope's plan was "only 
superficial." Both plans called for control of industry, 
but the question of how this was to be executed, and who was 
to exercise control, remained unclear in the encyclical. 
Furthermore, the Pope called for self-government by the 
economic groups and rejected over-centralization. These con­
cepts hardly seemed to be reflected in the National Industrial 
Recovery Act. Kenkel also felt that the New Deal and the 
Pope had different ideas on the protection of the consumer, 
with the former being little concerned with this aspect of 
the economic problem. These reflections led Kenkel to con­
clude that the tendencies in the New Deal were leading, not 
to the Christian utopia of the encyclical, but to "the bitter 
end of State Socialism."24 It must be said, however, that 
Kenkel's views were those of a decided minority of Catholic 
editors in 1933.
^4Central-Blatt and Social Justice, XXVI (June, 1933), 
80-81; and XXVIII (June, 1935), 78.
CHAPTER V
CATHOLIC REACTION TO ROOSEVELT, 1933
During 1933 there was a spirit of cooperation and 
support exhibited by American Catholics for the New Deal 
which went beyond platitudes on the supposed similarity of 
the movement with the teaching of the Church. Priests and 
laymen appraised the President and his program and found 
both praiseworthy. On his part, Roosevelt demonstrated an 
acute awareness of his Catholic backers and managed to 
solidify this support through his cordial relationship with 
the American hierarchy, his availability to the Church, and 
his patronage policies.
Significant elements of the American Catholic hierarchy 
welcomed Roosevelt's ascent to office in glowing terms, and 
before he even had an opportunity to merit such praise.
William Cardinal O'Connell of Boston, dean of the hierarchy, 
praised the President in a speech to the local St. Vincent de 
Paul Society in April, 1933. After remarking on the great 
intelligence and deep religious outlook of Roosevelt, the
81
Cardinal asked his congregation to pray for their new leader. 
Afterwards, at a public news conference, O'Connell called 
FDR a "God-sent" man who was willing to sacrifice all for the 
good of the country. By November, 1933, the Cardinal was 
writing of the "wonderful degree of success" Roosevelt had 
achieved in restoring confidence to the American people.^
Patrick Cardinal Hayes of New York was an old 
acquaintance of the new President. Before the inaugural the 
Cardinal had dined with the Roosevelts as a guest of James 
Farley and had discussed the problems of Mexican Catholicism, 
the spread of communism, and the independence of the Philip­
pines. After the inauguration Hayes spoke glowingly of FDR 
as "crystallizing the sentiments of the country in meeting 
the grave problems [of the depression]." Roosevelt's radio 
address on the banking crisis left the Cardinal deeply 
"moved." The following year, Hayes, speaking at the 
Manhattan College Commencement in James Farley's honor,
^-William Cardinal O'Connell, Recollections of Seventy 
Years (Boston, 1934), p. 370; The Boston Pilot, May 6, 1933, 
p. 1; The Brooklyn Tablet, April 8, 1933, p. 2.
^James Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 34; New York 
Times, March 22, 1933, p. 19; Farley says that Hayes also 
probably wanted to reassure the President on the Church's 
cooperation, even though Smith had lost out. Interview 
with author, March 20, 1965, Washington, D. C.
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lauded the work of the Postmaster General and praised the 
President for his "spirit" and "vision." The Cardinal con­
cluded that "we ought to rejoice that everything he [Roose­
velt] tries to do . . . will come to a happy success."'*
George Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago, one of the few 
American bishops with the "red hat," was an early and 
enthusiastic supporter of Roosevelt. The President made 
contact with Mundelein in characteristic fashion. Senator 
David I. Walsh of Massachusetts had remarked to Roosevelt 
that Mundelein was an avid autograph hunter and would 
greatly prize adding the President's to his collection. 
Roosevelt took the occasion of the Cardinal’s feast day to 
send him a short note of congratulations. Mundelein was 
truly touched by this bit of thoughtfulness by "the busiest 
man in the land" and called the note "the finest gift I could 
possibly receive." He requested a private visit with the 
President to pay his respects for the fine achievements 
already made during FDR's first month in office.^ The
~*New York Times, June 13, 1934, p. 19.
^FDR to George Cardinal Mundelein, April 22, 1933, 
and Mundelein to FDR, April 26, 1933, Selected Materials 
from the Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt Concerning Roman 
Catholic Church Matters, microfilmed at the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N.Y., June, 1955, 3 reels, 
Louisiana State University; hereafter cited as Sel. Mat.
83
Catholic press duly reported the fact that the Cardinal did 
visit the White House in May.^
Cardinal Mundelein's role as an apologist for the New 
Deal was to expand throughout the 1930's, and he came to play 
an important role in soliciting support for the international 
diplomacy of Roosevelt before World War II. In 1933, however, 
the Cardinal concentrated upon urging cooperation with the 
President's domestic program. In an address delivered before 
the Chicago Council of Catholic Women on October 12, 1933, 
the Cardinal praised FDR for showing "more friendly sympathy 
to the Church and its institutions than any occupant of the
gWhite House in half a century." This type of sentiment 
seemed to be shared by the Vatican. Bishop J. M. Gannon of 
Erie, Pennsylvania, reported that in a private conversation 
the Pope had expressed to him high praise for President
7Roosevelt and his deeds.
Archbishop Edward J. Hanna of San Francisco, chairman
5The Brooklyn Tablet, May 20, 1933, p. 2.
^Quoted in NCWC News Service, October 13, 1933; see 
also The Brooklyn Tablet, October 21, 1933, p. 4; Rosenman, 
Public Papers, II, 22-23. Thomas Corcoran admitted being a 
courier from FDR to Mundelein in the period preceding World 
War II, Interview with author, July 15, 1965, Washington, D.C.
7New York Times, August 12, 1933, p. 12.
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of the Bishops1 Administrative Committee of the NCWC found 
great satisfaction in the spiritual tone of Roosevelt's 
inaugural address. Speaking for the Catholic hierarchy of 
the United States, Bishop Hanna proclaimed Catholic support
Qfor the President's recovery efforts. Roosevelt acknowl­
edged the statement by Hanna, which had been forwarded to 
the White House through Reverend Michael J. Ready of NCWC,
Qand thanked the Bishop for his sentiments of support.
To Bishop Karl J. Alter of Toledo, Ohio, Roosevelt's 
inaugural address was "one of the great moments in American 
history." Not only did the Bishop agree with Roosevelt's 
interpretation of the causes of the depression--namely the 
moral corruptness of industrialists— but he found much to 
praise in the President's "moral tone." According to this 
Bishop, Roosevelt's statement "breathes the spirit of Our 
Holy Father's recent encyclical 'Quadragesimo Anno.'" This, 
said the Bishop, augured the acceptance by America of 
Catholic social teaching.1^
^Clipping of The Echo (Buffalo, New York), [n.d.] in 
Reel 3, Sel. Mat.; Colonel P. H. Callahan to Louis Howe, 
March 20, 1933, Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
^Catholic Action, April, 1933, p. 17.
lOprinted statement of Bishop Karl J. Alter, March 7, 
1933, Toledo, Ohio, in Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
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In September, 1933, over the national facilities of 
the Columbia Broadcasting System, American Catholics heard 
Bishop Bernard J. Mahoney of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 
praise the New Deal. The Bishop, pointing to Roosevelt's 
preinaugural visit to Church with his cabinet, concluded 
that "Christ will not fail one who made such a conspicuous 
profession of faith. . . ."1 ‘̂ At the same time, the Most 
Reverend William A. Hickey, Bishop of Providence, Rhode 
Island, told the Catholics of his diocese to help the New 
Deal. He added: "I have been profoundly impressed with the
evidence of God's hand in the unfolding and execution of our 
President's economic program." The Bishop gladly offered 
whatever influence he had to solicit support for the adminis­
tration because its policies were "absolutely in harmony with
19the best economic and religious and patriotic principles."
William Cardinal Dougherty of Philadelphia, late in 
1933, also had occasion to express his regard for President 
Roosevelt. Dougherty's sentiments, however, grew more out 
of concrete political matters than from general principles.
^Quoted in NCWC News Service, Chicago, September 11,
1933.
17Quoted in NCWC News Service, Providence, Rhode 
Island, September 8, 1933.
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The Cardinal was concerned over what he considered a dis­
criminatory clause in the administration's new revenue act.
The bill would, according to the Cardinal, single out certain 
religious congregations for taxation. He wrote Roosevelt of 
his displeasure and warned that "Catholics will resent" such 
a clause. FDR replied by suggesting that Dougherty forward 
his objections to the chairman of the Ways and Means Com­
mittee of the House. The objectionable clause was eventually 
eliminated and the Cardinal attributed this to FDR's inter­
vention . 13
Throughout the United States, the hierarchy commented 
favorably on the new President. Archbishop MaNicholas of 
Cincinnati called upon his parishioners to pray for Roosevelt. 
Archbishop Michael J. Curley of Baltimore said the people 
were looking forward to the New Deal. Bishop Henry P.
Robiman of Davenport, Iowa, commenting on his visit with Pope 
Pius XI, said that the Pontiff had praised the President's 
efforts on behalf of the poor and unemployed in the United 
States.14
^ W i l l i a m  Cardinal Dougherty to FDR, telegram,
December 23, 1933; FDR to Dougherty, January 11, 1934; 
Dougherty to FDR, March 2, 1934, Official File, 137-A Income 
Taxes, Box 19, Roosevelt Papers.
14The Brooklyn Tablet, March 11, 1933, p. 1; March 16, 
1933, p. 8; The Catholic Herald, April 3, 1934, p. 1.
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Various elements of the Catholic population reiterated 
the hierarchy's support for President Roosevelt. Reverend 
John A. Ryan remarked that the actions of FDR were "epochal," 
and that the inaugural address was inspiring.’*-5 Reverend 
Wilfrid Parsons, editor of America, wrote that President 
Roosevelt was pursuing a noble goal in trying to convince 
business to organize for the common good.^ Reverend James 
I. Corrigan, speaking on the Boston radio network, said that 
FDR's prayers had been heard and that "we are well on our 
way to national recovery."1  ̂ William C. Murphy, writing in 
Commonweal, pictured Roosevelt as a conservative politician. 
Rather than being the image-breaker pictured by his enemies, 
the President was fighting to prove the ability of democracy 
to face "any emergency."^® Perhaps the highest individual 
tribute to President Roosevelt was rendered by the Most 
Reverend W. D. O'Brien, who pointed out that the United
^Rev. John A. Ryan, Social Doctrine in Action; A 
Personal History (New York, 1941), p. 247; Broderick, Right 
Reverend, p. 213.
16Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, "The Church and the Modern 
World," The Catholic Mind, XXXI (June 8, 1933), 206.
^ The Boston Pilot, October 21, 1933, p. 1.
^®William C. Murphy, "The New Deal in Action," 
Commonweal, May 5, 1933, pp. 11-13.
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States always received God's help in time of crisis. Thus, 
in 1933, "Almighty God raised up FDR— the Apostle of the New 
Deal.1,19
Major Catholic organizations were also enthusiastic
in their support of the new President. The president of the
International Catholic Truth Society, Reverend Edward L.
Curran, wrote to Roosevelt praising his leadership and "high
20moral determination." When the National Catholic Alumni 
Federation, representing fifty Catholic colleges and univer­
sities in the United States, held its national convention in 
New York City from June 20th to 24th, Edward Dare, a high-
ranking member, transmitted to President Roosevelt copies of
21a resolution which praised and endorsed the New Deal. The 
Catholic Daughters of America, through their Supreme Regent, 
Mary C. Duffy, sent copies of their resolutions pledging 
assistance to the President and expressing their confidence 
in him. These resolutions were passed at the national
^9Rev. W. D. O'Brien, "The New Deal in Religion," 
Extension, May, 1934, p. 7.
^Rev. E. L. Curran to FDR, April 19, 1933, Reel 1, 
Sel. Mat.
^Edward Dare to FDR, July 21, 1933, Reel 3, Sel.
Mat.
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convention in Colorado Springs, July 7, 1933, by a group
opwhich claimed a membership of 200,000.
The list of Catholic groups supporting Roosevelt in
1933 is extensive. The Social Justice Bulletin, organ of the
Catholic League for Social Justice, spoke of the obvious
influence of Pius XI on the President in the actions under-
23taken by the New Deal. The Polish Roman Catholic Union 
expressed faith in FDR's attempt to improve the country.
Supporting remarks were made at the Union's triennial conven-
94-tion held in Springfield, Massachusetts. The Knights of
Columbus of Ironwood, Michigan, telegraphed to the President,
praising his "determined and decisive action in the present
25financial emergency."
The Catholic press was almost unanimous in its approval 
of Roosevelt's first hundred days in office. Commonweal 
expressed the predominant feeling when it said:
22Mary c. Duffy to FDR, telegram, July 7, 1933,
Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
^ Social Justice Bulletin, No. 8, August 16, 193 3, in 
Reel 1, Sel. Mat.
2^New York Times, September 15, 1934, p. 18.
25k . of C. Council to FDR, telegram, March 8, 1933, 
Official File, Box 1, Roosevelt Papers.
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. . .all Catholics who desire to give practical 
effect to the principles of social justice laid 
down by Pope Pius XI will see that . . . Roosevelt's 
opportunity to lead . . .  is likewise the Catholic 
opportunity to make the teachings of Christ apply
to the benefit of all. . . ,26
The Denver Catholic Register had much to say in support of
the New Deal. The editor pointed out that the alternatives
to Roosevelt's program were communism and chaos. The New
Deal should be supported because it had sprung from Catholic
sources. "The Register and other powerful mouthpieces of
the Catholic Church in this country," commented this editor,
"have made the NCWC social action program so insistent that
the government is now going to try it out, as the only real
cure."^ The Brooklyn Tablet called FDR's every action
"motivated by a Christian philosophy which moves forward in
2ftthe right direction." Extension magazine said that the 
new President had done more in his brief tenure than had
29most of his predecessors during their entire time in office.
26commonweal, November 16, 1932, p. 58.
^ Denver Catholic Register, June 29, 1933, p. 4; 
March 9, 1933, p. 4.
2^The Brooklyn Tablet, May 13, 1933, p. 9.
^ Extension, XXVII (May, 1933), 13-14. These same 
optimistic notes were also struck by the following Catholic 
newspapers: The Catholic Herald, March 23, 1933, p. 4; The
Boston Pilot, June 24, 1933, p. 4; The Catholic Transcript 
of Hartford, Connecticut, May 25, 1933, p. 4.
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Yet in the praise lavished upon President Roosevelt 
by the Catholic press, there were certain features which 
indicate that some editors had only a superficial awareness 
of the principles of the New Deal. The editor of America 
praised FDR's inaugural address but at the same time called 
for frugality in government, something Roosevelt had mentioned 
in the campaign. The editor of the Davenport Catholic Mes­
senger , who supported the New Deal, was most attracted by 
the President's plan to balance the budget. The NCWC News 
Service sent out cryptic stories indicating that the Demo­
cratic program giving great power to the President was "fore­
shadowing the curtailment of a number of Federal activities 
which have shown an unprecedented growth in the past two 
decades." The News Service pointed to FDR's governorship of 
New York as an indication that he was a strong believer in 
"the protection of States’ rights against Federal encroach­
ment." The Denver Catholic Register had perhaps the most 
farfetched interpretation of events. Its editor said that 
if the country was saved from economic disaster it would be 
because the Catholic Church had succeeded in "putting over 
her economic program." The Church had her best chance in 
history under Roosevelt. Furthermore, there was now "a real 
chance" for a large Federal spending program for relief
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because "A1 Smith is the power behind the throne and A1 has 
the Catholic slant.
Not all Catholic papers looked with favor on the New 
Deal. The Monitor of San Francisco, in particular, was a 
major critic of the administration. Its editor referred to 
the Brain Trust as communistic or fascistic in philosophy 
and described the "Hundred Days" as "cynically designed . . .
to exploit the American people and make them the slaves of a 
proud and conceited clique of psuedo-intellectuals." Yet 
such opinions were a minority.
Most Catholic spokesmen, as has been shown, were 
lavish in their praise of the New Deal and of President 
Roosevelt. The reasons for this praise are not readily 
apparent. The spokesmen themselves often pointed to contra­
dictory tendencies in the New Deal when finding things to 
praise. Certainly the similarity— imagined or real— between 
the economic measures of the New Deal and Catholic teaching 
played a part. But there were more concrete political
^America, March 18, 1933, p. 565; The Catholic 
Messenger, March 30, 1933, p. 2; NCWC News Service, February 
13, 1933; The Catholic Herald, March 16, 1933, p. 4; Denver 
Catholic Register, March 2, 1933, p. 4.
^ The Monitor, September 16, 1933, p. 10; November 11, 
1933, p. 10.
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considerations involved in Catholic motivation.
For one thing there was the appointment policy adopted 
by the new administration. Many American Catholics were 
hungry for recognition by appointment to a high post in the 
Federal government. One month before Roosevelt was elected, 
Catholics attending St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City 
heard the Reverend Henry F. Hammer complain that there was a 
conspiracy afoot to "keep Catholic men and women out of high 
national office." Father Hammer complained bitterly that a 
man could not "be a good Catholic and be a bad citizen." In 
December, 1932, one Catholic author had lamented the fact 
that there had been so few Catholics in past cabinets. But
he was optimistic because he felt the bitter experience of
321928 should have purged everyone of bigotry.
There was some justice in this charge of discrimi­
nation. To most Catholics, it seemed impossible that only 
four of their co-religionists had been qualified to serve in 
all Presidential cabinets from 1789 to 1932. Furthermore, 
only six Catholics had ever served on the Supreme Court. 
During the Republican role of the 1920's, only one lower
^ New York Times, October 17, 1932, p. 13; Richard J. 
Purcell, "Catholics in the President's Cabinet," America, 
December 17, 1932, pp. 252-53.
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judicial appointment out of every twenty-five had gone to a 
Catholic.33
Under Franklin Roosevelt these trends were to be 
sharply reversed. Two Catholics, James A. Farley and Thomas 
J. Walsh, were appointed to the cabinet. Catholics were 
given an average of one out of every four judicial appoint­
ments during FDR's entire term in office. As one historian 
has stated, under Roosevelt the Irish Catholic was given a 
chance to ascend from his vulgar role as local party boss to 
more glamorous positions with the Federal government.3^
The appointment of Farley as Postmaster General and 
Walsh as Attorney General was a source of pride to many 
Catholics. Of course, many expected Farley to receive an 
appointment because of his fine work during the nomination 
race and presidential campaign.35 Others speculated that
■^Ellis, American Catholicism, p. 149; Odegard, 
"Catholicism and Elections," p. 121; Lubell, Future of 
American Politics, p. 83.
Shannon, American Irish, p. 331. Shannon points to 
such men as Thomas G. Corcoran, John McCormick, Joseph E. 
Casey, James Farley, Edward J. Flynn, Joseph P. Kennedy, and 
Frank Murphy as representing a young generation of Irishmen 
who were brought to national prominence by Roosevelt. James 
Farley admitted a certain satisfaction in being the first 
Catholic in a Presidential cabinet in the 20th Century. 
Interview with author, March 20, 1965.
^shannon, American Irish, p. 372, says that Roosevelt 
started the tradition of giving the post of National Chairman 
of the Democratic party to an Irish Catholic.
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there might.even be more Catholics appointed to the cabinet.
When Roosevelt named Walsh as Attorney General, it was noted
that although he was a Catholic, there "was every reason
that he should be appointed" because of his progressive
record as a Senator and because of his prosecutor's role in
36the Teapot Dome Scandal.
The announcement of the Farley and Walsh appointments
provoked a favorable response from the Catholic press. The
NCWC wire service sent out a story by Thomas E. Kissling, in
which he pointed out that now, for the first time in the
history of the United States, two Catholics would serve
37simultaneously in a Presidential cabinet. Pictures of the 
two men were splattered all over the diocesan press. Colonel 
P. H. Callahan of Louisville, Kentucky, a prominent Catholic 
layman with a sharp political sense, made a survey of Catholic 
press reaction to the story. He forwarded to Louis Howe, 
presidential secretary, the news that most Catholic papers 
in the United States gave very favorable notice to the 
appointments.
36Tugwell, Democratic Roosevelt, p. 267.
■^NCWC News Service, March 4, 1932. This unique event 
failed to materialize when Walsh died unexpectedly before 
taking office.
38P. H. Callahan to Louis Howe, March 10, 1933, Reel 
2, Sel. Mat.; The Brooklyn Tablet, March 4, 1933, and The 
Boston Pilot, March 11, 1933, both carried front page 
stories. After Walsh's death, The Boston Pilot gave major
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The cabinet appointments were only one sign of 
increased Catholic recognition from Roosevelt. Equally 
satisfying to American Catholics were the diplomatic positions 
handed out. Two appointments were particularly important: 
that of Frank Murphy, Mayor of Detroit, as Governor-General 
of the Philippines, and that of Robert H. Gore as Governor of 
Puerto Rico. The Murphy appointment was a combination of 
diplomatic need and political reward. The Philippines were 
largely Catholic in population, which made the appointment of 
Murphy especially suitable. Furthermore, Murphy had worked 
long and hard for Roosevelt during the campaign. Roosevelt's 
brother-in-law, G. Hall Roosevelt, wrote to the President 
about Murphy’s loyalty, pointing out that apart from the 
Mayor's many qualifications, he also had "tremendous Catholic 
influence." Murphy's personal desire for the Philippine 
position was also a factor m  his selection.
The reaction of the Catholic press to the appointment 
was characteristic. Murphy's picture was printed on many 
front pages, and it was noted that he was the first Catholic
emphasis to the significance of a Catholic funeral being 
held in the State Chambers with prominent churchmen and the 
President being present. March 11, 1933, p. 1.
^9Lunt, "Frank Murphy," p. 66.
to hold the position. With the Murphy appointment, wrote 
one editor, "President Roosevelt has added another Catholic 
to the list of those already occupying conspicuous places in 
his administrative family."4("* The appointment of Robert 
Hayes Gore as Governor of Puerto Rico met a similar response 
Gore was a product of Catholic schools and had nine children 
This last fact was a source of ironic amusement to some 
Catholics, as the previous Puerto Rican Governor had been
41sympathetic to the planned parenthood group on the Island. 
Altogether, the editor of The Brooklyn Tablet felt that the 
Murphy and Gore appointments indicated that "days of fairnes 
as well as intelligence, are being inaugurated at Washing­
ton."42
Besides these appointments of prominent lay Catholics 
to public office, there was also the fact that a number of 
priests had been enlisted in support of New Deal projects. 
Most prominent of these were Reverend John A. Ryan and 
Reverend Francis J. Haas. Ryan was on the Advisory Council
40Quoted in NCWC News Service, April 10, 1933; The 
Brooklyn Tablet. April 15, 1933, p. 1.
4^America, May 20, 1933, p. 146; The Boston Pilot,
May 20, 1933, p. 11.
42The Brooklyn Tablet, May 13, 1933, p. 9.
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of the United States Employment Service, the Advisory Com­
mittee of the Subsistence Homestead Division in the Interior
Department, and the Industrial Appeals Board in the National
43Reconstruction Administration. Haas received a telegram
from Roosevelt on October 7, 1933, appointing him a member
of the National Labor Board. The priest had previously been
a member of the Labor Advisory Committee under the National
Industrial Relations Act. Later, Haas would serve as labor
representative on the General Code Authority, as a member of
the National Committee on Business and Labor Standards, and
as one of the three members of the Labor Policies Board of
44the Works Progress Administration.
Across the country, in the summer of 1933, the Catholic 
clergy swung their support behind the NRA. A number of 
priests served as members of regional boards of the NRA. 
Archbishop Edward J. Hana of San Francisco was chairman of a 
presidential committee to deal with longshoremen's strikes. 
This role of the clergy in the early days of the New Deal
^Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 213; Hon. Frances 
Perkins to Rev. John A. Ryan, August 5, 1933, Ryan Papers.
^Roosevelt to Haas, telegram, October 7, 193 3, and 
Roosevelt to Haas, December 18, 1935, Correspondence-personal, 
1932, and Miscellaneous, Haas Papers at Catholic University, 
Washington, D.C.; Reverend Michael J. Ready to Stephen Early, 
December 17, 1935, Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
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justified Father Ryan's statement in late 1934 that "there
are more Catholics in public positions, high and low, in the
Federal Government today than ever before in the history of 
45the country."
Whether Roosevelt made these appointments with an eye 
on the Catholic vote is really not the main consideration.
The important thing is that Roosevelt did begin a trend 
toward using Catholics at high levels of government and this 
trend was recognized by prominent Catholic spokesmen. It is 
not insignificant that Colonel P. H. Callahan could send to 
Louis Howe numerous clippings of diocesan papers praising 
Catholic appointments, that the Knights of Columbus of New 
York City and of New Hampshire should send congratulatory 
telegrams on the cabinet appointments of Farley and Walsh.
The NCWC News Service denied that there was any "substantial 
basis" for the assumption that religion played a part in 
FDR's appointments, but they also pointed out that "President 
Roosevelt has gone further than most, if not all, his
^Rev. John A. Ryan to James Moran, September 28,
1934, Ryan Papers.
^William Flynn to President Roosevelt, March 17,
1933, and Charles Doherty to Roosevelt, telegram [n.d.], 
Official File, Box 28, Roosevelt Papers; Col. P. H. Callahan 
to Louis Howe, March 10, 1933, Box 4, Official File, 76-B, 
Roosevelt Papers.
100
predecessors in nominating Catholics for important posts."47
The Brooklyn Tablet expressed pride in the fact that they
had predicted that Roosevelt would show more "regard1* for
Catholics and that the old policy of nonrecognition would be 
48discarded. A more hard-headed line was taken by The Michi­
gan Catholic, whose editor felt that Catholics should not 
act like children because they gained recognition in the 
presidential cabinet appointments. The new recognition was 
no more than just for a group representing one-sixth of the 
country's population. Yet this editor could not deny that 
FDR "deserves much credit" for changing the former policy of 
exclusion.4^
If President Roosevelt's appointment policy helped 
his image among American Catholics in 1933, of added signifi­
cance were the direct contacts he sought with the Church 
during his first year in office. His two most notable public 
contacts were his acceptance of an honorary degree from 
Catholic University in June and his speech at the annual 
meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Charities in 
October.
4?NCWC News Service, April 10, 1933; April 17, 1933.
4^The Brooklyn Tablet, December 30, 1933, p. 7.
4^The Michigan Catholic, ^March 2, 1933, p. 4.
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Roosevelt received his honorary degree on June 14, in 
50Washington, D. C. The major speech of the occasion was 
made by Patrick Cardinal Hayes, Archbishop of New York. The 
Cardinal prefaced his remarks with congratulations to a 
President who was "moving forward with courage and intelli­
gence" to combat the crisis of the depression. "Your actions," 
the Cardinal continued, "spring from but one motive, namely, 
the advancement of the Common Good." The remainder of 
Cardinal Hayes' speech was an elaboration on this theme of 
the "Common Good." He pointed out that while private associ­
ations might do much to curtail unfair competition and ruth­
less business practices, this was not enough. Something was 
needed which would represent the interest of all the people, 
and this was where the Federal government entered the picture. 
The government should protect individual rights and promote 
human welfare, for these were "activities which cannot 
adequately be carried on by private efforts." The extension 
of the government into many areas of society should be viewed
50This honor had been arranged by Reverend Maurice 
Sheehy and James Farley. Sheehy had approached Farley with 
the idea and the latter had urged FDR to accept the honor. 
Farley, interview with author, March 20, 1965. Later Sheehy 
and Archbishop James H. Ryan called on FDR and made a formal 
invitation. Sheehy letter to author, November 16, 1963.
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as a good trend, just as laissez-faire was a bad trend. 
Certain individual rights might be curtailed by this action, 
but such restrictions could be justified on the basis of the 
common good. Furthermore, in time of crisis, citizens should 
not expect the government to be bound by precedents, but 
should expect bold strokes of experimentation. Centraliza­
tion of power may be necessary, and "one clear, confident
51voice can save hundreds from panic."
President Roosevelt, who had not planned to speak,
was moved by the auspicious occasion to offer a few impromptu
remarks. He referred to the Cardinal as "my old friend and
neighbor from New York," and commented that his own presence
among the "great dignitaries of the Church, and the added
5 2fact that it was Flag Day made a "happy combination."
What appears as a rather dull academic gathering was, 
instead, for the Catholics who viewed the event, a moment of 
pride. FDR had been impressed with Cardinal Hayes' address 
and requested a copy. The Cardinal obliged two days later, 
and, in an accompaning letter, thanked the President for "the 
wonderful tribute you paid to the Catholic people of America
^Address on "The Common Good," by Patrick Cardinal 
Hayes at Washington, June 14, 1933, copy in Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
52The Catholic World, CXXXVII (July, 1933), 493.
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by your distinguished presence and kindly words."53 The
Catholic press was quick to echo these sentiments. Even the
banal remarks made by the President were recorded with
scriptual care. One editor remarked that Cardinal Hayes'
endorsement of the New Deal was seconded by all American 
S4Catholics. To some, PDR's appearance indicated "a change 
for the better in the public mind toward the Church." The 
President himself manifested "a splendid feeling of good 
will" toward the Church, in contrast to the isolation
C Csuffered from the last four presidents. One Catholic 
priest in Detroit felt that giving Roosevelt an honorary 
degree was inadequate. Reverend Charles E. Coughlin wrote 
the President that "a thousand such honors could never mani­
fest the gratitude which the American people owe you for what
ECyou have already accomplished."
The second public manifestation of Roosevelt's rapport
53Patrick Cardinal Hayes to President Roosevelt,
June 16, 1933, Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
54Pax, official organ of Benedictine Missionary 
Fathers, July, 1933, pp. 126-27; Commonweal, June 30, 1933, 
p. 227.
55The Brooklyn Tablet, June 24, 1933, p. 9.
5^Quoted in Peter Morris, "Father Coughlin and the New 
Deal" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1958), 
p. 24.
with the Church was in connection with the annual meeting 
of the National Conference of Catholic Charities, held in 
New York City during October, 1933. At the opening session 
of the meeting, Harry Hopkins addressed the gathering on 
"National Trends in Relief." More important, however, was 
the appearance of President Roosevelt to give the main 
address at the final dinner of the convention. Patrick 
Cardinal Hayes was again the first speaker of the evening 
and again he praised Roosevelt's leadership. Hayes called 
for a new social order of justice with a wider distribution 
of ownership, higher wages, and lower hours. The Cardinal 
declared the formation of trade associations to be a "major 
step forward," and commented that if these groups were just 
in their actions, the Federal government would not have to 
oversee them. But in any case, such justice must prevail. 
The Cardinal concluded his remarks with a strong statement 
on the responsibility of the government for the public wel­
fare :
In fact, the claims of the common welfare on owner­
ship are so strong that the State, though it enjoys 
no right to abolish the private ownership of property, 
is justified, with due regard to the natural and 
divine law, in adjusting this ownership and control­
ling its use so as to bring it into harmony with the 
interests of the public good.^7
5^Address of Patrick Cardinal Hayes, October 4, 1933, 
in Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
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After this speech, which seemed to endorse much of 
Roosevelt's efforts, Monsignor Robert Keegan, Secretary to 
Cardinal Hayes and a leader in the NCCC, introduced the 
President. Keegan spoke of FDR's "clear vision" and "accu­
rate appreciation" of the evils of laissez-faire capitalism. 
He ended his introduction by declaring, "we love him [Roose­
velt] for the man and friend he is."58
As Roosevelt spoke, he must have been aware that the 
speeches preceding his own indicated strong support for him 
from the NCCC. His speech stressed the need for continued 
relief work by private agencies; the Federal government 
could not carry the load alone. Furthermore, the success 
of relief work depended to a large degree on personal con­
tacts which were better achieved by small private associa­
tions. Private church relief was also important, because, 
said the President, the people believe "spiritual values 
count in the long run more than material values." Pursuing 
another theme, the President remarked that all attempts by 
governments to interfere with the right of religious worship 
had failed and would continue to fail, because such inter­
ference contradicted a basic human need. In conclusion, FDR
58Ibid.
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expressed optimism about the ability of the United States to
overcome its current difficulties. In terms undoubtedly
selected for his Catholic audience, Roosevelt remarked:
With every passing year I become more confident 
that humanity is moving forward to the practical 
application of the teachings of Christianity as 
they affect the individual lives of men and 
women everywhere.59
The President's speech was received enthusiastically
by many Catholics. Monsignor Keegan later wrote to FDR
thanking him for the "inspiration and encouragement" he had
given the NCCC. Father Keegan spoke of the great love that
6 0Catholics had for the President. Reverend Aloysius J.
Hogan, S.J., the President of Fordham University, felt that
there was growing evidence that "Catholics had given a soul
61to the New Deal." One editor considered FDR's mere pres­
ence at the NCCC meeting "a stirring tribute to the Church's
62efforts to help our fellowmen." Before a Council of 
Catholic Women meeting in Chicago, Cardinal Mundelein referred 
to Roosevelt's appearance at the NCCC in glowing terms. The
^Rosenman, Public Papers, II, 379-81.
^°Msgr. Robert Keegan to President Roosevelt, October 
9, 1933, President's Personal File, 628, Roosevelt Papers.
^Quoted in Columbia, November, 1933, p. 7.
6^The Brooklyn Tablet, October 7, 1933, p. 9.
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Cardinal called the President a physician who had prevented 
an uprising in the United States and who would cure the 
nation’s ills. Even Osservatore Romano, the Vatican news­
paper, praised Roosevelt's remarks on the necessity of 
religion in all social works.
As Roosevelt spoke in New York City, other members of 
the administration were also addressing Catholic groups on 
the New Deal. Brooks Hays, Stanley Reed, and Arthur J. 
Altmeyer of the Social Security Board addressed a gathering
of Catholics in Peoria, Illinois, and asked for support of 
64the New Deal. As 1933 drew to a close, it was obvious 
that Roosevelt had the support of a large segment of the 
leaders of the Church. It remains now to examine the 
specific measures of the New Deal and to determine the way 
these measures were interpreted by the Church.
^Cited by The Catholic Herald, October 25, 1933, 
p. 1. The New World of Chicago was even more enthusiastic. 
In an editorial entitled "Coming Into Our Own," the paper 
stressed the fact that FDR's appearance at the NCCC meeting 
was one more bit of evidence that Roman Catholics were no 
longer considered outsiders. The old idea of the Catholic 
Church as the prime defender of the status quo was being 
rejected. Roosevelt's appearance had indicated that "Cath­
olic social teaching is making headway far beyond what is 
commonly thought." The New World, October 13, 1933, p. 4.
^ The Brooklyn Tablet, October 12, 1933, p. 9.
CHAPTER VI
FINANCE AND AGRICULTURE
In their reaction to Roosevelt's approach to fiscal 
and agricultural problems, American Catholics exhibited at 
once a sense of radicalism and of nostalgia. Most Catholics 
welcomed the attempts by the administration to curtail the 
power of Wall Street and to regulate the currency. They 
showed a similar response to agricultural reforms, but for 
unique reasons.
American Catholics shared the relief experienced by 
their fellow citizens when Franklin Roosevelt began his term 
of office by closing the banks of the nation to prevent their 
internal collapse. They hoped that Roosevelt would have the 
courage to withstand the assault which, they felt, would soon 
be launched upon his policies by the "money powers."^ While 
the Banking Holiday and the subsequent Reform Act were viewed 
by some Catholics as authoritarian in tone, others praised 
the measures as steps necessary to curb the greed of wealth.
^Denver Catholic Register, March 9, 1933, p. 1.
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This was, wrote The Catholic Herald, a "New Deal in which
the cards are not stacked by greed and power against the
2people and their government."
When FDR attempted to relieve the depression by manip­
ulating the amount of gold content in the dollar, Catholics 
shared the confusion of most citizens. Some of them, how­
ever, felt that Roosevelt's measures of calling in gold and 
restricting the importing of it were mere "common sense."3 
A1 Smith condemned the currency manipulation as producing 
"baloney dollars," but Smith, for several reasons, failed to 
swing Catholic opinion against FDR's dollar policy. To 
begin with, Smith's defection on this issue was more than 
compensated for by the support the President received from 
Father Coughlin, the radio priest of Detroit. Coughlin
wrote to FDR in October, approving the stabilization of gold
4at $31.7 5 an ounce and the dollar at 65 cents. He fully 
supported FDR's attempts at manipulation. This support led
^The Catholic Herald, March 23, 1933, p. 4; Commonweal, 
March 22, 1933, p. 563; The Catholic World, CXXXVIII 
(December, 1933), 257-59.
3Extension, XXVIII (July, 1933), 21.
4Rev. Charles Coughlin to President Roosevelt, tele­
gram, October 4, 1933, Official File 229, Box 3, Roosevelt 
Papers.
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Coughlin to attack the ideas of A1 Smith. The priest chose
a November 27 rally in New York City to defend the President's
policy against the Smith charges. While expressing regret at
having to correct such a gentleman as Smith, Coughlin felt
that it was "Roosevelt or ruin" and that he had to take a
stand. In his public address, Coughlin implied that Smith
was attacking Roosevelt's monetary policies because the ex-
Governor wanted a loan from J. P. Morgan for the Empire State 
5Building.
While many Catholics shared Coughlin's doubts about 
the validity of Smith’s criticism, few liked his personal 
attack on the 1928 standard bearer. As one student of the 
period has noted, "a situation which disclosed the nation’s 
leading Catholic layman and its most widely known clergyman 
calling each other names was discomforting to many 
Catholics."^ Yet it was evident that Roosevelt's measures 
had support from others besides Coughlin. Some Catholics 
admitted that FDR's formula for recovery might be ineffective
^Dyson, "The Quest for Power," p. 20; Morris, "Father 
Coughlin," p. 42; Commonweal. December 8, 1933, p. 144.
6Dyson, "The Quest for Power," p. 20. See also 
Denver Catholic Register, November 30, 1933, p. 1; The 
Brooklyn Tablet, December 9, 1933, p. 11.
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but they quickly pointed out that "his objective is ethically 
sound, and sound in common sense."7 Father John Ryan thought 
the fears by some of excessive inflation were exaggerated. 
Although he did not mention Smith by name, Ryan announced 
that he was opposed to direct inflation but that he saw 
little in Roosevelt's program to indicate that this policy
Qhad any backing in the administration. This fear of infla­
tion was shared by Reverend John Burke, Secretary of the 
NCWC, who praised Roosevelt's decision to veto the Patman
QVeteran's Bonus Bill because it was inflationary.
One popular reaction to Roosevelt's fiscal policy was 
expressed by Commonweal magazine. After praising FDR's 
decision not to abide by the findings of the London Economic 
Conference, the editors announced that the central thesis of 
the New Deal's monetary policy was that there is to be 
"public control, through the government, of money and credit, 
rather than the system of banker's control." This particular 
policy, the editors continued, is "in line with the
7Commonweal, December 15, 1935, p. 170.
^Father Ryan to Ray E. Jones, February 17, 1933, Box 
3; Ryan to Dr. G. P. McEntee, December 13, 1933, Box 4,
Ryan Papers.
®Rev. John Burke to President Roosevelt, May 27, 1935, 
Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
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assumptions of Pope Pius XI, expressed in Quadragesimo 
Anno."10
Interesting, for the light it throws on Catholic 
thought, are the comments provoked by the Senate investiga­
tion of Wall Street pursuant to passage of legislation to 
regulate the stock market. The Securities Act, passed in 
May, 1933, gave the Federal Trade Commission more control 
over the issuing of new securities, required more information 
on the solvency of new stock, and made liability for mis­
representation more specific. The passage of this law was 
made easy by the public support engendered as a result of a 
Senate investigation of Wall Street which had been started 
by Hoover, and which was carried on with great zeal in 1933 
by its chief counsul, Ferdinand Pecora of New York.
The Administrative Committee of the NCWC, representing 
the views of the American hierarchy, supported the Pecora 
investigations and FDR's policy of policing Wall Street.^
The official organ of the Knights of Columbus also came out 
in support of the investigation and of Roosevelt's stand.
The magazine Columbia felt that the American press was trying
-1-QCommonwea 1, July 21, 1933, p. 297.
^ T h e  Catholic World, CXXXVIII (December, 1933), 3.
113
to "white wash" Wall Street. The editor expressed a note of
class feeling when he pointed out that J. P. Morgan got a
12better press because of his wealth.
Elements of the Catholic press joined the call for a 
correction of the evils revealed by the Pecora investigation. 
A cure was needed. Whether this cure took the form of infla­
tion, rejection of the gold standard, or a dose of "baloney
1 3dollars," was considered beside the point. When Congress
finally passed the Federal Securities Act, to control some
of the problems, one editor thought it would stand for some
time because it was based on "sound morality." By tnis he
meant that tne law put both the buyer and seller of securi-
14ties on common ground.
Finance, however, was only one of the major problems 
facing the New Dealers in 1933. Equally significant were 
the difficulties of the American farmer. Despite the fact 
that most of the Catholic population in the United States 
resided in urban areas, the Church had early addressed itself 
to the plight of the farmer who was suffering from the
•^Columbia, April, 1933, pp. 11, 13.
33The Catholic Herald, December 7, 1933, p. 4.
3^The Catholic Messenger, February 3, 1934, p. 2.
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depression. The main source of Catholic thought on agricul­
ture was the Rural Life Bureau of the NCWC, led by Reverend 
Edgar Schmiedeler. Schmiedeler, together with other Catholic 
priests and bishops, was to formulate the Church's attitude 
toward the farm problem. While not an elaborate or detailed 
plan, the philosophy behind Catholic thinking on agriculture 
was sufficiently unique to permit its isolation as a kind of 
Catholic Agrarianism.
As early as July, 1932, Schmiedeler had stated the 
aims of the Rural Life Bureau as being "the preservation and 
enrichment of the farm home."1  ̂ It was a recurring theme for 
many Catholic thinkers that farming afforded a better oppor­
tunity to lead a truly Christian life. Not that this idea
was unique because it had been popular with all kinds since
16the time of Thomas Jefferson. For these Catholics the 
chief benefit of rural living was the social stability it 
promoted. On the other hand, life in the city was conducive 
both to unstable personal relations and to atheism. An 
urbanite was more susceptible to atheism because of his 
"contact with brick and mortar, with concrete and steel--the
^Quoted in The Boston Pilot, July 30, 1932, p. 5.
^Paul R. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World (Ithaca, New 
York, 1959), p. 12.
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things of man— [rather]— than with nature, and nature's
beauties— the things of God." Thus spoke Reverend Dr.
Schmiedeler to a group of Catholic teachers in Kansas in 
171936. Another popular theme in Catholic discussions of 
rural life was the tendency to attribute the rise in birth 
control to the crowded living conditions in the city. Farm 
families, in contrast, were generally large. Using these 
ideas, some Catholics began to urge a "back to the land" 
movement.
Such a movement was endorsed by the Administrative
Committee of the NCWC in a statement on April 25, 1933, and
18by the Catholic Rural Life Conference in October, 1933.
The bishops on the Administrative Committee pointed out that 
the depression was, in part, a result of the Industrial 
Revolution, which had pushed people off the farm into crowded 
cities inadequate to support them. As a remedy, the bishops
^Quoted in Catholic Action, August, 1936, p. 5.
18NCWC News Service, October 19, 1933; Conkin, Tomor­
row, p. 28, says "never before in the history of the United 
States had back-to-the-land been so popular" as in 1932. The 
CRLC was started in 1923 and advocated "property as a right 
and a responsibility, denounced farm tenancy, advocated 
subsistence farming, and . . . attempted to guide the back- 
to-the-land movement." See ibid., p. 25; see also Raymond P. 
Witte, Twenty-Five Years of Crusading (Des Moines, Iowa,
1948).
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19called for a return to the independent life of the farm.
Other Catholics expressed the fear that the depression would
force more farmers into the city and thereby turn them into
20"aimless, drifting, proletariat." Some criticized the
ruthless capitalism and laissez-faire attitude of the govern­
ment as having contributed to the depression. But they also 
tended to categorize the "fostering of the drift of popula­
tion from the country-sides to the slums of great cities" and
the "denial to the farmer of a just and stable price for his
21products," as other evils of the existing economic system.
During the 1932 Presidential campaign, Catholics 
showed a distinct interest in the farm problem. F. P. Kenkel, 
director of the Catholic Central Verein of St. Louis,
Missouri, wrote that the American farmer should be acutely 
aware of the effect on him of future economic planning which
•^Huber, Our Bishops Speak, pp. 296-97. This state­
ment of the Administrative Committee was signed by the Arch­
bishop of San Francisco, Edward J. Hana; Archbishop of 
Cincinnati, John T. McNicholas; Archbishop of St. Paul, 
Minnesota, John G. Murray; Bishop of Cleveland, Joseph 
Schrembs; Bishop of Pittsburg, Hugh C. Boyle; Bishop of Fort 
Wayne, Indiana, John F. Noll; Bishop of Kansas City, Missouri, 
Thomas F. Lillis.
20The Catholic Herald, September 8, 1932, p. 4.
21James F. Murphy, Presidential Address at 18th Ses­
sion of NCCC, Proceedings, Omaha, Nebraska, September 25-28, 
1932, p. 6.
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2 2was being discussed in the campaign. Father John Ryan was 
impressed with the ideas set forth by Roosevelt in his speech 
at Topeka, Kansas, during the campaign. Here Roosevelt had 
promised to reorganize the Department of Agriculture, to 
lower taxes for farmers, and to pass laws for Federal financ­
ing of farm mortgages and for a voluntary domestic allotment
2 3plan to relieve surpluses. To Father Ryan the domestic
allotment plan looked like the best way to help the farmers
by obtaining "better prices for staple agricultural products."
He hoped that Roosevelt would support the idea if elected
and only regretted that the candidate had not been more clear
24in his advocacy of the plan.
Ryan had good reason to be disturbed by FDR's vague­
ness on the question. When Reverend W. Howard Bishop, 
President of the Catholic Rural Life Conference, wrote to 
the Democratic candidate, he enclosed a resolution of his 
organization which endorsed the domestic allotment plan as 
the best way to give needed relief to our farmers. Father
22 F. P. Kenkel, "The Farmer and Economic Planning,"
NCCC Proceedings, 1932, p. 200.
23jajnes M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and The Fox
(New York, 1956), p. 142.
^Rev. John A. Ryan to Professor W. L. Wilson, Septem­
ber 17, 1932, Ryan Papers.
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Bishop asked Roosevelt what his plans were in this matter. 
Roosevelt replied through his secretary that he was not as 
yet completely committed to a definite plan for agriculture, 
but he referred Father Bishop to the campaign speech at 
Topeka.^ ̂
After the 1932 election. Catholic agricultural thought 
still centered upon the domestic allotment plan. Some 
accepted it because they thought it would create the least 
disturbance in the world's prices. It was better than
surplus dumping, which might produce retaliatory trade
26measures by foreign nations. By January, 1933, Father
Ryan was supporting the idea of "parity payments" as being
27".by far the best method" of raising agricultural prices.
Others felt that no adequate adjustment of agricultural 
prices could be hoped for without a simultaneous plan to
provide work and better wages for the city labor expected to
28consume the farm products. It was also recognized, however,
25prank O'Hara, "The Voluntary Domestic Allotment 
Plan/' The Catholic World, CXXXVI (March, 1933), 641-48; The Catholic~Messenger, becember 1, 1932, p. 1.
^ Central-Blatt and Social Justice, January, 1933, p.
303.
^Father Ryan to D. P. Hughes, January 10, 193 3, Ryan
Papers.
^ T h e  Catholic Herald, February 9, 1933, p. 4.
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that the debt-ridden condition of the farmer had to be 
changed before any scheme to raise prices could be effective. 
Further, wrote one Catholic editor, "since Society and the 
State both sinned by permitting land to be treated as mere 
chattel, they should now provide for the reduction of farm
2Qmortgages
The Catholic hierarchy also made it clear that it 
supported immediate aid to the farmer. In June, 1933, a 
group of bishops meeting in Cincinnati came out for local 
and regional cooperation by farmers to offset the flux in 
world prices. They pointed out that a healthy rural economy 
was the foundation for any national recovery. In a state­
ment of first principles the bishops remarked: "The first
duty of the farmer is not to produce, but to live, and to 
live in a manner befitting his worth as a man and his dignity 
as a child of God."30
In order to live, however, the bishops realized that 
the farmer would need higher prices for his produce. A 
reform of the United States economic system was required to
29Central-Blatt and Social Justice, April, 1933, p. 11.
30Bishops of the Cincinnati Province, "Agriculture and 
Catholic Principles," The Catholic Mind, XXXI (July 8, 1933), 
252-60.
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produce this rise. The farmer must be protected against the 
instability of the open market. Going this far, however, the 
bishops clearly pointed out that they did not call for the 
industrialization or collectivization of American agriculture. 
Realizing that cooperation and government assistance would 
be necessary to relieve the farmer, the bishops were never­
theless vague on specific remedies. Actually their position 
presented them with a dilemma. On the one hand, they wanted 
to preserve at all cost the individualism and independence 
of the farmer. Yet they also saw the need for cooperation 
and State assistance if the independent farmer was to 
survive.^
This was the state of Catholic agrarian thought when 
the Congress approved the agricultural policies of the New 
Deal. The major agricultural measure was the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, passed on May 12, 1933, which curtailed pro­
duction and established parity prices. Farmers were granted
O I Ibid., passim; see also Catholic Action, July, 1933, 
p. 4. The bishops who signed this statement included; 
Archbishop John T. McNicholas of Cincinnati; Bishop James J. 
Hartley of Columbus, Ohio; Bishop Joseph Chartrand of
Indianapolis; Bishop Joseph Schrembs of Cleveland; Bishop
Michael J. Gallanger of Detroit; Bishop Francis W. Howard of
Covington, Kentucky; Bishop Alphonse J. Smith of Nashville;
Bishop John F. Noll of Fort Wayne, Indiana; Bishop Karl J. 
Alter of Toledo, Ohio.
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payments for voluntary reduction of crops. A tax on 
processors of farm products was the source of relief money. 
Farm mortgages could be refinanced through Federal Land Banks 
at lower interest rates. The entire law was to be carried 
out by an Agricultural Adjustment Administration under the 
Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace.32
Henry Wallace had strong support among important 
elements of the Catholic Church. Foremost among his backers 
was the Reverend Maurice S. Sheehy, a faculty member at 
Catholic University and a close friend of Father John Ryan. 
Sheehy had remarked that "few persons in American public
life know better and agree more completely with the Catholic
1 3conception of social justice than Mr. Wallace." The 
Secretary of Agriculture, said Sheehy, had quoted from the 
Papal encyclicals of Pius XI and Leo XIII on numerous 
occasions. Sheehy felt certain that Wallace was using the 
Papal teachings in his approach to the farm problem.3^
32Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 48, 51, 52.
33Rev. M. S. Sheehy, "Henry A. Wallace and the Papal 
Encyclicals," clipping from Daily Tribune, Dubuque, Iowa 
[n.d.], in Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
^Sheehy, "Henry Wallace," Reel 3 , Sel. Mat.; Sheehy 
was to support Wallace’s bid for the Vice-Presidency in 
1940, Sheehy, letter to author, November 16, 1963.
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Other Catholics watched the debate on the farm bill
with mixed emotions. The Commonweal was frankly confused as
to the theory behind the Agricultural Adjustment Act and
called it "a very good substitute for a jig-saw puzzle."
While deploring the "paternalism" it seemed to establish in
agriculture, the editor accepted it as an experiment and
admitted that something drastic had to be done in this 
35area. Father John Ryan felt the bill might help the 
farmer. When the processing tax feature of the act was 
attacked as being unconstitutional by Professor Edwin W. 
Kemmerer of Princeton, Ryan defended the administration's 
position. The priest had certain doubts about AAA but felt 
that Roosevelt's spirit of experimentation was to be 
applauded. William F. Montavon, Director of the Legal Action 
Department of the NCWC, called the AAA a good plan but was
afraid it imposed too heavy an administrative burden on
36President Roosevelt and Secretary Wallace.
A few Catholics took a more positive stand in support 
of the bill. Listeners of the weekly Boston radio program,
^Commonweal. April 5, 193 3, pp. 620-21.
•^William F. Montavon, "Constructive Work of the 73rd 
Congress," Catholic Action, August, 1933, pp. 7-10; Broderick, 
Right Reverend, pp. 212-13.
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The Catholic Truth Hour, heard Reverend Jones I. Corrigan,
S.J., announce that the AAA had "saved agriculture by
* 37substituting planned control for anarchy." The annual
convention of the Catholic Rural Life Conference, held in
Milwaukee on October 1 9 , 1933, adopted resolutions endorsing
the AAA and subsistence fanning. The CRLC also called for
38more speed in implementing farm relief. Reverend Edgar 
Schmiedeler, Director of the NCWC Rural Life Bureau, went on 
the radio in November, 1933, to praise the agricultural 
program of the New Deal. He called the AAA "a charter of 
economic equality with the city" for the farmer. He admitted 
that much was yet to be done, but he praised the results thus
far accomplished by Roosevelt as "a foundation whereon to
39build a rural life worthy of America."
Naturally there were elements in the Catholic popula­
tion that disagreed with Father Schmiedeler's praise of the 
AAA. Father Coughlin wrote to FDR in August, 1933, that the 
proposals of the AAA were "foolish" and embodied "puerile 
policy" and an "asinine philosophy."^0 In California, the
3?Quoted in The Boston Pilot, October 21, 1933, p. 1. 
3®NCWC News Service, October 26, 1933.
30Quoted in Catholic Action, November, 1933, p. 5. 
^°Morris, "Father Coughlin," p. 29.
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San Francisco Monitor applauded the New Deal's attempt to
relieve farm mortgages but felt the idea of paying rent for
unused land was "foolish." The editor was convinced that
AAA would mean the end of the American farmer. The rural
population would be forced into the city to be exploited as
41cheap labor by industry.
As the control policies of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration unfolded, there arose considerable opposition 
among certain segments of the population. Father Coughlin 
and others looked with disfavor upon the destruction of crops 
and pigs. Father Ryan, however, was more generous in his 
observations. To a friend's query about the moral obligation 
to use excess food to feed poor foreign nations, Ryan replied 
that for such a noble deed to have any effect it would have 
to be continued over a long period. He thought "it would be 
very difficult to prove the existence of such a moral obliga­
tion." Ryan did not think that American farmers were obliged 
to feed foreigners from their surplus.^2 The Catholic Farmer 
of Wisconsin also came to the defense of Wallace and the AAA.
^ The Monitor, September 16, 1933, p. 10 and April 16,
1933, p. 1.
^2Father John Ryan to Rev. Urban Baer, February 23,
1934, Ryan Papers.
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The editor of this paper defended both the Secretary and the
President against charges of excess waste in solving the
farm problem, but he did fear that the "radical farm bloc"
in Congress might force the administration into a more
totalitarian approach to the rural depression. It would not
do, he felt, to have the Government telling the farmer what,
and how much, to plant.^3
By the end of 1934, most American Catholics could echo
the sentiments expressed in November by the Catholic Rural
Life Conference at their annual meeting in St. Paul. The
Conference adopted a resolution which commended the efforts
of the New Deal "to bring debt relief to the American
farmer." But the CRLC also realized that other areas of the
44farm problem were still unresolved.
At the annual meeting of the National Conference of 
Catholic Charities, held in Cincinnati, October 7-10, 1934, 
the delegates heard Reverend Luigi Ligutti of Granger, Iowa, 
make an impassioned plea for the small farmers of the 
country. Ligutti insisted that the preponderance of large 
corporate farms over small family-owned farms was one of the
^3The Catholic Farmer (supplement to The Catholic 
Herald), June 14, 1934, p. 1 and December 13, 1934, p. 2.
^ Catholic Action, December, 1934, p. 19.
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main problems facing American agriculture. The large farms
permitted too much waste, said Ligutti, who called for "a
return to small farm ownership." How this would curtail the
problem of overproduction, he did not say. But he wanted
more people on farms and felt that the break-up of large
farms and extension of long-term Federal loans with low
interest rates to young independent homesteaders would
accomplish this goal. This theme of the need to return to
the small family farm was one of the recurring ideas of
45Catholic agrarianism. Earlier a Catholic editor had called 
the subsistence homestead movement "one of the sanest plans
ACLin our national reconstruction."
President Roosevelt had always favored the idea of 
subsistence homesteads as a means of relieving the farm prob­
lem. With FDR's support, Senator John Bankhead of Alabama 
incorporated an appropriation for the execution of such a 
scheme into the National Industrial Recovery Act.^ Father
^ NCCC Proceedings, October 7-10, 1934, pp. 265-66. 
Father Ligutti's interesting story is told in Conkin,
Tomorrow, pp. 296-301. He was a leader in CRLC "and one of 
the most influential of American agrarians and distribu- 
tists." See ibid.. p. 294.
46Penver Catholic Register, April 22, 1934, p. 1.
47Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 136.
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Ryan had been an early supporter of the Bankhead proposal.
"It seems to me," he wrote, "that this [subsistence homestead
idea] is a very meritorious project and deserving of the
support of all who would like to see some of the unemployed
48become self-supporting as farmers." Indeed, Bankhead's 
early proposal fitted perfectly with the Catholic idea of a 
"back to the land movement" and the advantages of rural life 
over urban. In fact, President Roosevelt also shared this 
idea of the advantages of rural living.
By 1935, Senator Bankhead had formulated a bill 
designed to aid tenant farmers and farm laborers in becoming 
genuine landowners. The bill, in the opinion of one his­
torian, "reflected the reformers^ faith in the Jeffersonian 
dream of the yeoman farmer."^® If this is true, then many 
American Catholics were enamored by this dream. The National 
Catholic Rural Life Conference, meeting in Rochester, New 
York, October 27-30, 1935, was quick to support the bill.
This organization spoke up for the New Deal's attempt at 
rural resettlement and for anything which would encourage an
4fi^°Father John Ryan to Rev. Howard W. Bishop, May 3, 
1933, Ryan Papers.
^Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 136.
5QIbid., p. 140.
128
urban to rural movement. The NCRL spelled out the advantages 
of the Bankhead bill as "enabling tenant farmers, their sons, 
and farm-minded city people to become independent proprie­
tors."51
Father Schmiedeler, director of the Rural Life Bureau, 
also spoke in favor of the bill. "We find," said Schmiedeler, 
"that the general principles underlying the Bankhead bill are 
in thorough accord with the Catholic attitude toward land 
ownership." He then went on to quote from the writings of 
Leo XIII, who favored as large a diffusion of land ownership 
as possible. The priest felt that if more laborers could
gain a share in the land, the gulf between vast wealth and
52deep poverty would be narrowed, 4
Members attending the 21st annual meeting of the NCCC 
at Peoria, Illinois, September 29 through October 2, 1935, 
heard a number of speakers endorse the Bankhead bill.
Reverend James M. Campbell, president of the National Catholic 
Rural Life Conference, called for an immediate program of 
land resettlement as an alternative to the dole system for 
combating chronic unemployment. He pointed out that
51Quoted in Catholic Action, December, 1935, p. 25.
52NCWC News Service, April 13, 1935.
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. . . a land resettlement program . . . that would
provide reasonable terms of repayment and low rates 
of interest, and that would assist the people to 
develop cooperative undertaking, would not fall very 
far short of a self-liquidating program.
Campbell concluded by warning the Church that she could not
afford to neglect the land resettlement program.^
The Roosevelt administration had its own advocate at
this meeting in the person of Brooks Hayes, Special Assistant
to the Rural Resettlement Administration. The RRA, headed by
Rexford Tugwell, had been set up in April, 1935, to promote
rural rehabilitation by loans to farmers for the tools of
their craft and by "massive resettlement and retraining of
exhausted farmers."^ Before his audience at the NCC meeting,
Hayes pushed the idea of resettlement by citing the work of
Reverend Luigi Ligutti of Granger, Iowa. Father Ligutti had
formed a sponsor group for resettlement in his area and had
succeeded admirably. Hayes used this example to make his
point about the need of "enlightened religious leaders" in
the fight for better opportunity for "economic exiles" such as
55tenant farmers.
53n CCC Proceedings, September 29-October 2, 1935, 
pp. 98-102.
^4Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New 
Deal (Boston, 1959), p. 370.
55NCCC Proceedings, September 29-October 2, 1935, p.
96.
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Important elements of the Catholic press also came to 
the support of the Bankhead bill. The Commonweal thought it 
merited "the strongest support of all Americans" because it 
would guarantee liberty, which was dependent upon "the pos­
session of really personal property in land by great numbers 
of individuals." The editor also quoted the statement of 
Leo XIII on the need for wide ownership of land, and the 
statement by Pius XI on the right of the State to "adjust 
ownership [of property] to meet the needs of the public
C C.good." The Jesuit magazine America echoed these sentiments
and called for support of the efforts of the Catholic Rural
Life Conference in its campaign for a wider distribution of
57land ownership. The Catholic Interracial Review also found 
support for the Bankhead bill in the teachings of Leo XIII. 
The idea of spreading private ownership of land widely among 
the people was clearly in line with Catholic teaching. The 
magazine recommended that Catholics should give "active 
support" to the bill.58
Many Catholics supported the agricultural policies of
5^Commonweal, April 26, 1935, pp. 719-20.
57Cited favorably by The Catholic Messenger, May 2, 
1935, p. 2.
58Interracial Review, VIII (May, 1935), 68.
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the New Deal in 1935 because these policies seemed to agree 
with the Church's teaching on the benefits of the family farm 
and on wide distribution of land. While many regretted the 
tight crop control and destruction of surplus, they also 
realized that it was impossible for the home market to absorb 
production. Some agreed with F. P. Kenkel, editor of Central- 
Blatt and Social Justice, who said,
We are living in a new world; we must take into
account the economic dislocation the world has 
experienced and the need for economic reorientation, 
such as many nations have been repeatedly forced in 
the course of centuries to adapt themselves to.^9
During 1936, the year in which the AAA was struck 
down by the courts, Father Ryan and Father Schmiedeler con­
tinued to support the New Deal agrarian measures. Father 
Ryan was appointed by President Roosevelt to a special 
committee on farm tenancy. The President wrote to Ryan out­
lining his hopes of "developing a land tenure system which 
will bring an increased measure of security, opportunity, and
well-being to the great group of present and prospective farm
tenants." Ryan replied by expressing his great interest in 
the problem and his hope for corrective legislation.*^ At
59Central-Blatt and Social Justice, XXVIII (April,
1935), p. 7.
^ Catholic Action, December, 1936, p. 16.
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the same time, Father Schmiedeler was urging farmers to co­
operate with and support both rural resettlement and rural 
electrification. But Schmiedeler realized that the cure of 
the agricultural problem was inexorably bound up with the 
industrial problem. Indeed, he felt that both areas demanded 
the same remedy— "the organization of society into occupation 
groups, . . .  a minimum of active help on the part of the 
government, . . . the moral reformation of the individual." 
These ideas were based largely on the philosophy expressed 
in Quadragesimo Anno. ^
At the annual meeting of the Catholic Rural Life 
Conference in Fargo, North Dakota, on October 10-14, 1936, 
Schmiedeler again urged close cooperation with and support 
for various New Deal agricultural agencies. He ended his 
remarks by specifically calling attention to the Bankhead- 
Jones bill which he felt deserved the support of the 
Conference.̂
6^-Rev. E. Schmiedeler, "Concern of the Encyclicals 
for Welfare of Agriculture," Catholic Action, May, 1936, 
p. 12 and August, 1936, p. 5.
^Ibid. , November, 1936, p. 24.
CHAPTER VII
N. R. A. AND AMERICAN CATHOLICS
To cope with the problems of industrial recession, the 
Roosevelt administration fashioned the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, passed on June 16, 1933. A polyglot measure 
based on self-regulation of industry, the act created the 
National Recovery Administration, which was to supervise the 
drawing of codes to govern each industrial and trade associa­
tion. These codes were to regulate all phases of an indus­
try’s operation, from production to market. Federal courts 
could issue injunctions against violators of the codes. As 
NRA administrator, Roosevelt chose General Hugh S. Johnson.
Across the United States Catholics reacted with 
genuine enthusiasm to NRA. The hierarchy set a tone of praise 
which was echoed by Catholic periodicals, newspapers, reli­
gious organizations, and finally by influential individuals.
Many members of the Eastern hierarchy made public 
statements in favor of NRA. Cardinal O'Connell of Boston, 
the first churchman in America by seniority, gave his full
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backing to NRA by declaring that, in order to push the 
President's plan, August 27, 1933, would be observed as 
"Rally Sunday" in every Catholic Church in the Boston Arch­
diocese. He directed the parish priests to enlist the 
support of their parishioners for the "Blue Eagle." The 
Cardinal also wrote a personal letter to Victor M. Cutting, 
chairman of the NRA for the Boston area, pledging his full 
cooperation with an endeavor which he felt closely resembled 
the plan outlined in the Papal encyclicals of Leo XIII and 
Pius XI. O'Connell also promised to urge his people to 
patronize stores which displayed the "Blue Eagle" sign.1
Joining in Cardinal O'Connell's sentiments was 
Cardinal Hayes of New York, who issued a statement that FDR 
had instituted NRA "to banish the want of recent years and 
to insure wider employment." The Cardinal went on to say 
that, "because the welfare of the entire country is involved,
the National Recovery Act merits the unqualified and whole-
2hearted support of every American." In Brooklyn, Bishop 
Thomas E. Molloy followed Cardinal Hayes' lead. On September 
11, 1933, in an address to religious teachers of his diocese,
^The Boston Pilot, August 26, 1933, p. 1.
^Quoted in Commonweal, September 29, 1933, p. 499.
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Molloy called NRA "one of the greatest acts toward the 
restoration of the economic well-being of a sorely tried 
people."3
Elsewhere in the East, the response was equally 
enthusiastic. In northern New York, Bishop John A. Duffy of 
Syracuse went even further than Cardinal Hayes in support of 
NRA. In an interview the Bishop said that FDR "has put into 
effect the principle announced by Pope Leo XIII forty-odd 
years ago, that government has not only the right but the 
duty to assist in the formation of economic units." He 
called NRA the most Christian-like plan of recovery yet 
devised.^ Finally, John J. Milan, Bishop of Hartford, 
Connecticut, also made a public statement urging support of 
NRA.5
In the Middle West, the Catholic hierarchy preached 
the same theme of full cooperation for, and support of, the 
NRA. Archbishop John T. MCNicholas of Cincinnati sent a 
pastoral letter to his flock urging tnem to buy from the 
"Blue Eagle." He wrote to Charles F. Williams, local
3Quoted in Columbia, October, 1933, p. 13.
4NCWC News Service, August 11, 1933; see also The 
Catholic Transcript, August 17, 1933, p. 1.
5NCWC News Service, September 15, 1933.
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director of NRA, and pledged the support of the Church. One 
year later the Bishop's ardor had not cooled. He admitted 
there were weak spots in the NRA but felt these were inherent 
in such an experiment. He prayed that the "old order" would 
never return, called for local responsibility as the key to 
success for NRA, and hoped it could be preserved in improved
7form.
Other Mid-western bishops who supported NRA in public 
statements included Bishop Joseph Schlarman of Peoria, Illi­
nois; Archbishop Samuel A. Stritch of Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Archbishop John J. Glennon of Erie, Pennsylvania; Bishop 
James A. Griffin of Springfield, Illinois. Schlarman called 
NRA the "Industrial Charter of 1933" and compared it to the 
Magna Charta of 13th-century England, because it broke the 
privileged chains of capitalism. He felt the measure would
Qprepare "the way for a better social order." Griffin, 
speaking at the installation of Ralph L. Hayes as Bishop of 
Helena, Montana, said: "The NRA does not go as far as Pope
^The Brooklyn Tablet, August 26, 1933, p. 1 and 
October 14, 1933, p. 3.
^Speech of Archbishop John T. McNicholas, NCCC 
Proceedings, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 10, 1934, pp. 65-66.
^The Brooklyn Tablet, September 9, 1933, p. 10.
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Pius XI leads in his encyclical . . . but the NRA is an
effort to do for the American people what the Catholic Guilds
did for the people of the Middle Ages." While lamenting the
fact that Catholic social teaching was so neglected in the
United States, the Bishop ended with: "Thank God our God-
sent President Roosevelt has studied the encyclicals of Pope
Leo XIII and Pope Pius XI." He felt that the NRA reflected
this study in its rejection of rugged individualism and
9adoption of the spirit of cooperation.
Further west, American bishops expounded the same 
theme as did their Eastern colleagues--full support of NRA 
as the incarnation of the Papal encyclicals. Among the 
Western bishops expressing public support for NRA were 
Francis Johannes of Leavenworth, Kansas; Bernard Mahoney of 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota; Philip G. Scher of Monterey- 
Fresno, California; and Daniel J. Geroke, of Tucson, 
Arizona.^-0 Bishop Johannes said that NRA was an attempt to 
"reconstruct the social order largely along the lines advo­
cated in the great encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII and . . .
^NCWC News Service, Helena, Montana, October 5, 1933.
i^The Catholic Transcript, October 5, 1933, p. 1; NCWC 
News Service, September 16 and 30, and October 5, 1933; 
clipping of Michigan Catholic, September 28, 1933, in Sel. 
Mat.
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Pius XI.m11 Bishop Scher also supported NRA because "in its 
broad outlines it follows the principles laid down by . . .
Leo XIII and Pius XI on industrial relations." He urged his 
priests to promote cooperation with the "Blue Eagle," because
it was aimed at "curbing greed, eliminating sweatshops," and
12at eliminatxng "that national disgrace, child labor." 
Following the script, Bishop Geroke expressed full confidence 
in President Roosevelt and called NRA a wonderful opportunity 
to spread the economic program of the Papal encyclicals. He 
requested his parish priests to devote a Sunday sermon to NRA 
and to set up local committees to cooperate.11 At the same 
time Bishop Mahoney felt sure that President Roosevelt's 
approach to the depression would be successful.1^
Editorial opinion in the Catholic press was also 
heavily weighted in favor of NRA. Many diocesan papers 
simply printed the "canned" editorials sent out by the NCWC 
News Service which reflected the bishops' idea that NRA was
11Quoted in NCWC News Service, Leavenworth, Kansas, 
September 30, 1933.
^Quoted in The Brooklyn Tablet, September 23, 1933,
p. 6.
^NCWC News Service, Tucson, Arizona, September 15,
1933.
14Clipping of The Michigan Catholic, September 28, 
1933, in Sel. Mat.
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1 sthe embodiment of Catholic social teaching. The editor of
Extension magazine expressed grave doubts about the principles
of NRA but concluded by saying, "Let us brush aside whatever
doubts and misgivings we may have, and repose our faith, our
hope and confidence, in the one man the nation has chosen as
its leader. . . ."I® The Catholic Telegraph of Cincinnati
called the critics of NRA the same "money-changers and
industrial barons whose greed and selfishness have been the
17main causes of the depression." The Milwaukee Catholic 
Herald cited favorably an article which had appeared in
L 1Illustrazione Vaticana stressing the great similarity
18between the NRA and the Papal encyclicals. The Brooklyn
Tablet urged Roman Catholics to buy from stores displaying
19the "Blue Eagle" emblem. Many Catholic papers relied 
heavily on the comments of Father John Ryan for their inter­
pretation of NRA, who always stressed the fact that the
^ Commonweal remarked that "so far as we are aware, 
the whole weight of the Catholic press has been thrown to 
the President." See August 11, 1933, p. 355.
i6September, 1933, p. 20.
•^November 30, 1933, p. 4.
18June 14, 1934, p. 4.
^November 4, 1933, p. 8.
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measure was in harmony with the principles of Quadragesimo 
Anno.
Many Catholic organizations and lay groups supported 
the President's recovery program. The two major lay affi- 
ates of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the National 
Council of Catholic Men and the National Council of Catholic 
Women, were enthusiastic in their support of NRA. At its 
annual convention in St. Paul, Minnesota, on October 7-11, 
1933, the NCCW passed a resolution expressing "joy and satis­
faction" at the achievements of NRA and "pledging fullest
support and cooperation to the government, to the end that
20social justice be established throughout the land." Ten
days later their male counterparts, the NCCM, met in annual
convention in Chicago and passed a similar resolution. The
NCCM noted that the crisis in the United States was the result
of a neglect of Christian social justice and that the NRA was
an attempt to reassert this justice. Because NRA conformed
"in part" with Catholic teaching, the NCCM pledged support
and urged "upon all Catholics, employers and wage earners
alike, active cooperation in accomplishing the success of the 
21act." Such public support did not go unrecognized by the
20Quoted in Catholic Action, November, 1933, p. 18. 
21Ibid., p. 27.
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Federal government. Louis J. Alber, chief of the Speakers 
Division of NRA, wrote Very Reverend Doctor John J. Burke, 
general secretary of NCWC, that the latter1s organization 
and its affiliates were giving the NRA "splendid coopera­
tion. " ̂
Another powerful organization of Catholic laymen, the 
Knights of Columbus, also threw its support behind NRA. At 
their annual convention in Chicago, August 15-17, 1933, the 
Knights heard their Supreme Secretary, William J. McGinley, 
move that the organization take a pledge to cooperate and 
support President Roosevelt in carrying out the plans of NRA. 
The motion was seconded by Mayor Edward Kelly of Chicago and
was passed by the convention amid numerous speeches praising
2 2Roosevelt's leadership as "unparalleled and courageous."
Local chapters of the Knights also swung their weight 
behind the President. The editor of the Knights of Columbus 
Journal, Philadelphia chapter, praised the concern of the New 
Deal with insuring a living wage to labor. The paper rejected 
the charge that NRA was "regimentation," pointing out that
^ Catholic Action, October, 1933, p. 16. 
^Columbia, October, 1933, p. 10.
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the government must act vigorously or face revolution.^ In 
Augusta, Georgia, the local Knights sponsored a radio speech 
by the Reverend Harold J. Barr, who drew parallels between 
NRA and the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI. Barr said 
that Catholics should support a plan so obviously patterned 
after the encyclicals. "There is no group of citizens more 
confident of the success of the NRA or more enthusiastic 
about its possibilities than we Catholics," he went on, "for
there is none more convinced of the soundness of the princi-
25pies upon which it is based."
Another important source of support for NRA was the 
Catholic Conference on Industrial Problems. This organiza­
tion was started early in the 1920's by the NCWC as an 
attempt to bring Catholic principles to bear on society at 
the diocesan level under the auspices of the local bishop. 
Regional conferences were held under the auspices of this 
organization and nationally known speakers were supplied by 
NCWC. During the depression these regional conferences
^Clipping Knights of Columbus Journal, September, 
1933, Official File, 28, Roosevelt Papers; the Roosevelt 
Papers contain many copies of resolutions pledging support 
from local chapters of the Knights of Columbus throughout 
the United States.
^5Quoted in NCWC News Service, August 11, 1933.
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adopted a radical outlook on what should be done to save the 
country. Reverend John Ryan, Reverend Raymond A. McGowan, 
and other reformers usually held the spotlight. All during 
the depression these conferences called for national action
to combat the crisis. It was only natural that they should
26support the NRA. To cite one instance, Arthur D. Maguire,
chairman of the Detroit regional meeting of the Catholic
Conference on Industrial Problems, held December 4-5, 1933,
was happy to write to the White House that
. . . the whole trend of the conference was favor­
able to NRA, and this moral support of the President 
and his policies, and the publicity given to this 
support has had a tremendous and beneficial effect 
. . . throughout the country.27
The NRA even evoked support among Catholic college 
students. A college convention of members of the "Sodality 
of Our Lady," representing some seventy-five colleges and 
universities, and totaling over 500 delegates, did not think 
it out of place at their meeting to comment on current 
affairs. The students, who praised President Roosevelt as 
"a leader who is employing Christian principles in govern­
ment," passed resolutions supporting NRA, old age pensions,
^Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 200.
^Arthur D, Maguire to Marvin McIntyre, December 7, 
1933, in Reel 1, Sel. Mat.
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abolition of child labor, and unemployment insurance.^®
This organizational support for Roosevelt's industrial 
recovery program was augmented by the efforts of many dis­
tinguished individual Catholics, whose public support could 
only enhance the attractiveness of the plan to their co­
religious- NRA was, of course, supported by the social 
reformers connected with the NCWC. Father Ryan went about 
the country making speeches in which he praised NRA,
presented its major features in laymen's terms, and dispelled 
2 9many fears. Ryan's colleague and assistant in the Social 
Action Department of NCWC, Reverend Raymond A. McGowan, wrote 
and spoke to the same effect. He declared NRA to be "in line
with the program of Catholic Action" and pointed out that
3 0Catholics were "proud" of the similarity. Reverend Doctor 
Francis J. Haas, who was working for NRA, called the princi­
ples behind the program correct in their approach. Haas 
spoke along these lines before a mass meeting of the
^®NCWC News Service, July 10, 1934.
OQWashington I. Cleveland to Father Ryan, October 26, 
1933; Father Ryan to Rev. P. H. Burkett, S.J., November 28, 
1933, Ryan papers.
■^^Rev. Raymond A. McGowan, "Legislative Trends and 
Effects on Industrial Life," NCCC Proceedings, New York 
City, October 1-4, 1933, p. 561.
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Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. At a later date he
also urged American Negroes to support NRA because it offered
better conditions for all labor.31
Other distinguished leaders of American Catholicism
also supported NRA. At South Bend, Indiana, Reverend John
P. O'Hara, acting president of Notre Dame, came to the defense
of NRA after it had been attacked by the United States Chamber
of Commerce. O'Hara pointed out that business could not go
its merry way unregulated, for that policy had produced the
depression. "There must be invoked a power that will free
business from its own defiance of economic and moral laws,"
32he added. Mary G. Hawks, president of the NCCW, addressed 
the 13th annual convention of that organization on the duty 
of Catholics to support NRA. She urged the NCCW to use its
far-flung organization to explain the provisions of NRA and
33to invite cooperation with the "Blue Eagle." At the same 
time, members of the Commonwealth Club of California heard 
Roy A. Bronson, vice-president of the National Catholic
31NCWC News Service, Troy, New York., May 3, 1935;
The Brooklyn Tablet, September 16, 1933, p. 5.
32Quoted in The Catholic Transcript, November 30, 1933.
33Mary G. Hawks, "The Catholic Duty in the Present 
Crisis," Catholic Action, October, 1933, p. 7.
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Alumni Federation, say that the philosophy behind NRA was 
the same as that behind Quadraqesimo Anno.
Among the prominent Catholic laymen who took a hand 
in evoking Catholic support for NRA was the Postmaster 
General of the United States and prominent Knight of Columbus, 
James A. Farley. Farley, speaking to the annual convention 
of the National Conference of Catholic Charities, called NRA 
a great success which had already justified its existence. 
Another layman, John E. Morris, former president of the 
Catholic Laymen's Retreat Association, wrote an article in 
which he said that NRA was both Catholic and constitutional
■1Cin principle.
Members of the clergy across the country expressed a 
deep commitment to the industrial recovery program. Reverend 
Doctor Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., vice-president of Georgetown 
University, spoke over the radio and called NRA the last 
stand of democracy in the United States. Father Walsh, who 
led the Catholic opposition to FDR's plan to recognize
3^NCWC News Service, San Francisco, California,
August 10, 1933; see also The Catholic Transcript, August 10, 
1933, p. 1.
^^NCCC Proceedings, New York City, October 1-4, 1933, 
pp. 94-100.
36The Monitor, February 10, 1934, p. 1.
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Russia, felt that it was the public duty of all citizens to 
37support NRA. ' Reverend Jones I. Corrigan, speaking from a 
Boston radio station, called NRA "the most progressive and 
skillfully devised plan for national recovery enacted in any 
nation."^® In Denver, participants in the annual Catholic 
Action Week, March 11-17, heard Right Reverend Monsignor 
William O'Ryan praise PDR as one who would lead the nation 
out of the present crisis and compare NRA with the Papal 
encyclicals. J In Chicago, radio listeners heard Reverend 
J. W. L. Maguire attack the Chicago Tribune and the Daily 
News for their attempts to "blackjack the NIRA.
Prom the foregoing, it seems clear that the NRA had 
strong support among American Catholics. Less clear, how­
ever, are the reasons for this support. Certainly, in seek­
ing motives, one should give much weight to the very
■^Quoted in The Brooklyn Tablet, November 18, 1933,
p. 1 1 .
Quoted in The Boston Pilot, October 21, 1933, p. 6 .
^ Catholic Action. April, 1934, p. 19. 
anRev. J. W. L. Maguire, "Blackjacking the NIRA," 
November 8 , 1933, Box 8 8 , Frank P. Walsh Papers. Consider­
able additional evidence of "grass-roots" Catholic support 
for Roosevelt exists in the form of telegrams and letters 
from pastors of small parishes in such places as Fort Smith, 
Arkansas; Bridgeville, Pennsylvania; Aurora, Illinois; and 
Grand Rapids, Michigan; see Sel. Mat.
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desperation of the times. Many people were willing to 
accept any scheme which gave hope of ending the depression.
It is conceivable that Catholics would have been just as 
sympathetic to a program radically different from NRA.
Another motive to be considered, and one which was expressed 
at the time, was the fact that there was really no alterna­
tive to NRA except a return to the "devil take-the-hindmost, 
every-man-for-himself type of industrialism, the failure of
which has brought the nation to its present frightful con- 
41dition."
Yet as Catholic thinkers appraised the NRA in more 
depth, certain other themes seemed to predominate their 
interpretation. There were those who liked the plan on its 
own terms. Others saw in it a recognition of Catholic social 
teaching, some feeling that the proposal was based squarely 
on the Papal encyclicals.
In August, 1933, the National Catholic Alumni Federa­
tion passed a resolution in which they heartily endorsed the 
NRA's plan to set up trade associations and to organize the 
economy. They did stress, however, that labor, the consumer, 
and the government should share in controlling these
^ Commonweal, August 4, 1933, p. 335.
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associations with business. The Federation did not favor a
system promoting monopoly unless concrete gains for all
4 2society were forthcoming.
Visitors to the Catholic Industrial Conference held 
in Detroit during December, 1933, were surprised to hear 
Reverend Frederic Siedenburg, ex-dean of Detroit University, 
praise President Roosevelt as "still a champion of capital­
ism." Reverend Siedenburg felt that NRA revealed Roosevelt 
as a man trying to "control and humanize" capitalism to meet 
the needs of the people during the depression. To this 
priest, NRA represented a conservative attempt to save 
capitalism from failure and real regimentation. This same 
idea--that the NRA was an attempt to help capitalism rid
itself of its vices--was also expressed by William F.
4 3Montavon, Secretary of the Legal Division of NCWC.
Meanwhile, in Boston, Reverend Jones I. Corrigan, S.J., 
was telling his radio audience on_the Catholic Truth Hour 
that NRA was good because it prevented ruinous competition.
^National Catholic Alumni Federation, "A Program of 
Social Justice," The Catholic Mind, XXXI (August 8 , 1933), 
281-88.
43The Brooklyn Tablet, December 16, 1933, p. 4;
William F. Montavon, "73rd Congress," Catholic Action,
August, 1933, pp. 7-10.
Regulated cooperation had replaced competition in industry; 
and the results, felt Corrigan, would be more economic 
stability and fuller employment. Both labor and capital 
would benefit from NRA because "it will remove the ruthless 
antagonism between them." Corrigan concluded that "the only 
way that men can be set free is by imposing restraints on 
the abuse of freedom," and he felt that "the Recovery Act 
must be read in the light of this principle.1,44 The editor 
of The Catholic World applauded the ideas expressed by 
Corrigan and went further in condemning capitalism. The 
Roman Catholic Church, insisted this editor, has a "definite 
socialistic bias," and no one should try to lay the albatross 
of capitalism on the Church's shoulders. "If the National 
Recovery Act means anything," wrote the editor, "it is an 
announcement to the world that in the U. S. . . . unregulated
competition is henceforth taboo."45 Another commentator 
insisted that NRA "must succeed and shall." The emphasis on 
industrial codes in NRA was viewed as "hastening the day when 
we shall see a new spirit of social justice in accord with 
Pope Leo XIII's encyclical on labor and Pope Pius X I 's
44Quoted in The Boston Pilot, October 21, 1933, p. 6 .
45The Catholic World, CXXXVIII (October, 1933), 1, 3.
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encyclical on the reconstruction of the social order.1,48
As already indicated, a theme stressed by a large
number of commentators was the NRA1s attempt to apply the
Papal social encyclicals to the American depression.
Reverend Francis J. Haas felt that NRA was "a start" in
applying the remedy of Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno
47to the crisis. Michale 0'Schaunessy, in his Social 
Justice Bulletin, remarked that the encyclicals of Pius XI 
"had a determining influence on the President and his ad­
visors, in formulating the measures being taken. . . . "  The 
St. Francis Home Journal of Pittsburgh also expressed the 
idea that NRA meant the government had finally recognized 
the wisdom of Catholic social principles.48 According to the 
Jesuit weekly America, NRA recognized the "excellence" of the 
ideas of Leo XIII and Pius XI. The editor pointed out that 
for years Catholic social teaching had been ignored in 
America, but now, suddenly, both Catholics and non-Catholics 
were turning to these principles. He concluded that "the
4 8Pax, September, 1933, p. 199.
4^Catholic Action, May, 1935, p. 3.
48Clipping of Social Justice Bulletin. No. 8 [n.d.]; 
St. Francis Home Journal [n.d.], in Official File, 76-B,
Box 4, Roosevelt Papers.
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scene has been set for the recognition of many of its 
fQuadragesimo Annol principles by the new American adminis­
tration. 1,49
These superficial comments linking NRA with the Papal 
encyclicals received considerable support in more scholarly 
analyses. Reverend R. A. McGowan of NCWC set out to test 
the particular aspects of NRA against Catholic teaching.
First, seeking points of similarity between NRA and the Pope's 
program, McGowan noted that both schemes defended the idea 
that government should act to relieve the country of economic 
disaster. That is, both rejected the laissez-faire theory 
of the state and would substitute industrial order in place 
of unlimited competition. Both plans condemned the old 
system of cut-throat competition and disregard of the common
good. Likewise, the idea that industrial groups should be
50formed and directed by the government was a common goal.
Father McGowan also pointed to the similar approach to labor 
by the Papacy and by Roosevelt. The NRA, in Section 7a, 
recognized labor's right to organize and bargain collectively.
4 9America, September 16, 1933, p. 553; September 23, 
1933, p . 278.
^°NCWC News Service, Denver, March 23, 1934; Rev. R.
A. McGowan, "Testing the NRA by Catholic Teaching-I,"
Catholic Action, October, 1933, p. 23.
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These same rights were stressed in Quadragesimo Anno.5^
There was a congruence also in that both the Pope and the 
President advocated a minimum wage and maximum hour law for 
labor.52
Father John Ryan also saw points of similarity between
NRA and the Pope's plan. For one thing, Ryan felt that the
system of industrial codes being drawn up, forming what Roose
velt called modern guilds, were quite similar to the "voca-
53tional groups" called for in Quadragesimo Anno. Ryan felt
that "in so far as all the participants in each industry are
brought under a code of fair practice and in so far as each
association exercises a considerable measure of industrial
self-government," there was a convergence of intent between
54Quadragesimo Anno and NRA.
A student of Catholic social thought has remarked 
that few Catholic leaders denied "the NRA's resemblance, 
superficially at least," to the vocational group system
51Rev. R. A. McGowan, "The National Industrial 
Recovery Act," Catholic Action, July, 1933, p. 6 .
^2 Ibid., p. 13.
^Father Ryan to Rev. P. J. Connelly, S.J., June 30, 
1933, Ryan Papers.
54Rev. John A. Ryan, "Pope Pius XI and a New Social 
Order," Catholic Action, June, 1934, pp. 14, 15.
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55outlined m  the Pope's encyclical. Certainly the remarks 
of Reverend Francis J. Haas and Reverend John LaFarge help 
to substantiate this observation. Haas saw NRA as "essen­
tially a bargain" between government and employers, in which 
the latter received immunity from antitrust and price-fixing 
laws in return for accepting the government's ideas on 
minimum wages and maximum hours. The idea of a worker- 
employer-government partnership was, he felt, in close 
harmony with the theme of Quadragesimo Anno. LaFarge was 
especially interested in the similarity between the Pope's 
call for the formation of "vocational groups" and the 
President's desire that the codes form "modern guilds." He 
also pointed out that both the Pope and the President called
c 7for a minimum wage for labor.
According to The Brooklyn Tablet, there were three 
areas in which NRA ran parallel to the Papal encyclicals.
The President's insistence that the formation and cooperation 
of industrial groups was fundamental to recovery found an 
echo in Quadragesimo Anno that "the aim of social legislation
55Abell, American Catholicism, p. 248.
^ The Brooklyn Tablet, August 5, 1933, p. 1.
^Rev. John LaFarge, S.J., "Doing the Truth," Inter­
racial Review, VI (August, 1933), 151.
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must be the re-establishment of occupational groups."
Secondly, both NRA and the Papal encyclicals stressed the
fact that membership in these groups or guilds should be
strictly voluntary. Finally, the Pope's emphasis on the need
for a living wage for labor had received due consideration in
Section 7a of NRA. It seemed clear that FDR had patented NRA
after principles he had quoted from Quadragesimo Anno in his
Detroit speech during the election campaign. The editor
concluded that NRA "deserves the hearty endorsement and loyal
58support of all Catholics."
Other Catholic newspapers joined the chorus linking
NRA with the Papal encyclicals. The Catholic Messenger told
its readers that NRA would not destroy individualism but
only curb its excesses. Both the Pope and the President,
through NRA, wanted industry and labor to cooperate to produce
59a better standard of living for society. While admitting 
that the NRA was "not entirely parallel" with Quadragesimo 
Anno, the Denver Catholic Register did comment on the 
"remarkable similarity" in the two programs. The Pope called 
for the control of business and industry for promotion of the
58The Brooklyn Tablet, June 24, 1933, p. 8 .
59The Catholic Messenger, June 22, 1933, p. 2.
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common good, and this was also the guiding spirit of NRA.^® 
The editor of this paper was so convinced of the 
soundness of NRA that he even criticized A1 Smith when that 
Catholic hero came out against the measure. Smith thought 
that government control of industry was a dangerous trend, 
thereby disagreeing with Pope Pius XI who wrote that "free 
competition and still more economic domination must be kept 
within just and definite limits, and must be brought under 
the effective control of the public authority. . . ,"^1
Rather than being dangerous, NRA was, said the Denver editor, 
in many ways parallel to the Pope's program. Both Roosevelt 
and Pius would protect private property while at the same
time trying to distribute the goods of the earth more
6 2equally. Finally, in Washington, the NCWC News Service
spread the word that
. . . under the direction of General Hugh Johnson 
. . . the far-reaching experiment of molding 
national economic policy to social requirements, 
foreshadowed in the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII 
and his successors, is gradually being put to the 
test.63
^Denver Catholic Register, May 2, 1933, p. 1. 
^Quoted in ibid., August 10, 1933, p. 1.
^3NCWC News Service, June 19, 193 3.
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A few perceptive prelates even argued that the Papal 
program was more radical than President Roosevelt's scheme.
The most pronounced difference, which was pointed out by 
Father Ryan and Father McGowan, and others, was that the NRA 
did not provide for as much active participation by labor as 
Pius XI desired. Labor was not given an active role in con­
structing and executing the various industrial codes; and the 
fact that business was not interpreting Section 7a of the law 
as permitting the closed union shop meant that labor's right 
to organize and bargain collectively was jeopardized. This 
also meant there was little hope of achieving, under NRA,
64Pius's goal of labor sharing ownership with the employer.
While both the President's and the Pope's program sought
increased purchasing power for the masses, NRA would rely on
high wages to achieve this, while Pius asked for profit-
sharing and a wider ownership of property to gain the same 
6 6result. Another discrepancy,which made clear the Pope's
^ A l l  of the following argued that the Pope was more 
radical than FDR: Rev. John A. Ryan, "Pope Pius," pp. 14, 15;
Rev. Joseph F. Thorning, S.J., "Principles and Practices of 
NRA," The Catholic Mind, XXXII (October 8 , 1934), 361-68;
Rev. R. A. McGowan, "The Natioanl Industrial Recovery Act," 
p. 13; Rev. John A. Ryan, Social Doctrine, p. 249.
6 ^Rev. R. A. McGowan, "Testing the NRA by Catholic 
Teaching-II," Catholic Action, November, 1933, pp. 28-29.
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plan was more radical than NRA, was that the occupational
groups called for in the encyclical posited a much closer
association of labor and management than that provided for
66under the industrial codes of FDR's plan.
Perhaps the most cogent presentation of the differences
between NRA and the Papal plan was that given by Father
McGowan, who found three major areas of divergence. First,
in NRA only employers directed an industry while labor
remained "an outside bargaining body." In the Pope's plan
for vocational groups, all aspects of industry were in joint
control. Secondly, under NRA "each industry stands separate
from every other industry" and from the government. The
vision of the encyclical was the joining together of all
industry to promote the common good, "separate, but not
independent of, government." Thirdly, in the encyclical all
occupations and professions, including agriculture, were
considered groups to be organized, whereas NRA was interested
6 7only in urban industry, banking, and trade.
Admitting these deficiencies in NRA, Ryan and McGowan,
^Address of Father John Ryan before Catholic Confer­
ence on Industrial Problems, Detroit, in New York Times, 
December 5, 1933, p. 8 ; America, March 17, 1934, p. 557.
6 ^Rev. R. A. McGowan, "Testing NRA by Catholic 
Teaching-Ill," Catholic Action, January, 1934, pp. 12, 31.
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who were the two most consistent students of the act, still 
saw it as a progressive piece of legislation. While the 
minimum wage might be too low, it was still established as a 
principle. While cooperation of all elements of the economy 
could have been closer, NRA was still the first step toward 
a more rational national planning of the economy. While 
labor could have had more power allotted to it, still the 
right to organize and bargain collectively was on the statute 
books even if weakened by the open-shop interpretation of 
Section 7a. Both Ryan and McGowan were optimistic about NRA.
Ryan felt that it could easily evolve "into the kind of
68industrial order recommended by Pope Pius XI." McGowan 
likewise viewed NRA as a first step "towards the social order 
of 'vocational groups,' . . .  of Guilds, which the encyclical 
of Pius XI advocates. . . Clearly, to many Catholic
social thinkers NRA marked the beginning of a period of ful­
fillment for the Church's social teaching in the United 
States.
As usual, however, there was a vocal minority in the 
Church who took a more critical view. An extreme position
6®Ryan, Social Doctrine, p. 249. 
^^McGowan, "Testing NRA-III," p. 11.
was taken by F. P. Kenkel, who labeled NRA as the beginning 
of "State Socialism." Kenkel lamented the fact that the 
measure would surely destroy the middle class in America:
"It [NRA] gives great power to big companies and will drive 
the little fellow to the wall." As for the idea that NRA 
was similar to the guild system advocated by the Popes,
Kenkel felt there was little basis for such comparison.
The liberals behind NRA looked toward socialism rather than
7 f)toward any 18th-century guild system for their model.
Another author who disliked NRA was L. S. Herron. 
Writing in Central-Blatt and Social Justice, Herron remarked 
that NRA would surely "strengthen the position of capital­
istic industry and still further intrench monopoly." The 
codes gave big business an unfair advantage over small. The 
NRA, according to Herron, was "essentially the national- 
planning scheme, seized upon by big business and pushed 
through Congress in the guise of an emergency measure."
Herron felt that NRA was a hinderance to social cooperation
and real economic reform because it legalized "the unfair
71and monopolistic practices of big business. . . . "
^®F. P. Kenkel, "New Deals, Past and Present," 
Central-Blatt and Social Justice, XXVII (July-August, 1934), 
112, 117, 241.
^1L. S. Herron, "Codes Threaten Growth of Cooperation, 
ibid., XXVI (March, 1934), 385-88.
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On the West Coast, disenchantment with NRA was also 
expressed by The Monitor of San Francisco, whose editor felt 
that certain Catholics were only fooling themselves by 
praising NRA as being based on the Papal encyclicals. He 
pointed out that the Roosevelt plan contained as many 
parallels with Marxism and Kantism as it did with Catholi­
cism. "The NIRA," he insisted, "can very deftly be turned 
into an American brand of Communistic state." To this 
editor, the brain trusters who conceived this bill were
advocating an alien philosophy and should be watched care-
*  11 72fully.
There were other Catholics who criticized NRA not
because they thought it was leading to state socialism but
because it was failing in its job. Many recognized that one
of the main weaknesses of NRA was the failure of business to
live up to the codes. Employers were reluctant to "make any
sacrifice at all for the common good. . . ."73 others
regretted that NRA lacked a "strong set of teeth" with which
74to force the rugged individualist to conform. In Detroit, 
7^The Monitor, July 29, 1933, p. 1; August 19, 1933,
p . 1 .
73columbia, November, 1933, p. 13.
7^The Catholic Herald, March 1, 1934, p. 4.
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Father Coughlin agreed that the NRA would fail because only 
a minority of American industrialists "had honestly sub­
scribed to the codes of NRA."^ Even pro-NRA men such as 
McGowan and Ryan insisted that, in order to work properly, 
NRA had to give more power to labor. Ryan further feared 
that NRA was "placing too much faith in automatic methods of 
r e c o v e r y . T h e  fact that the American Negro had not
received much benefit from the act was another short-coming 
77mentioned.
Despite these criticisms, the majority of American 
Catholics probably agreed with Reverend John Ryan when he 
praised the program as a step in the right direction. Ryan 
felt that the only alternatives to NRA were socialism, 
communism, or fascism. He told his audience at the annual 
meeting of the NCCC that, by backing the NRA, Catholics had 
a great opportunity for "putting into effect the Catholic 
conception of a social order reconstructed upon the
^5Morris, "Father Coughlin and the New Deal," p. 29.
?^Columbia, August, 1933, p. 13; Quoted in New York 
Times, March 26, 1935, p. 8 .
77Justin McAghon, "The Negro Under the New Deal," 
Interracial Review, VIII (March, 1935), 38-39.
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principles of social justice."78
Public criticism of the NRA reached its apogee with 
the publication of the Darrow Report in 1934. After many 
charges by small businessmen that they were being discrimi­
nated against because of NRA's tendency to favor monopoly, 
Roosevelt decided to investigate. In March, 1934, he 
created the National Recovery Review Board, headed by 
Clarence Darrow, the famous defense attorney, to study these 
charges. After a brief investigation, Darrow reported that 
"giant corporations dominated the NRA code authorities and 
squeezed small business, labor, and the public.*'78
Catholic reaction to the report was mixed. The Jesuit 
weekly, America, felt that if the report was correct, the 
basic purpose of NRA was being defeated. The solutions 
offered by Darrow, however, would probably lead to even 
worse results.88 F. P. Kenkel felt that the Board's findings
justified his complaint that NRA was strangling the American 
81middle class. Other Catholics viewed the report with
78Rev. John A. Ryan, "Shall the NRA be Scrapped?" 
Catholic Action, November, 1934, p. 4.
79Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 67.
8 ^America, June 2, 1934, p. 169.
8 ^-Central-Blatt and Social Justice, May, 1935, p. 48.
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skepticism. Some felt that Darrow was exaggerating in order 
to attract attention, and that such a large undertaking as
OONRA was bound to "have some rough spots.
The members of the National Catholic Alumni Federation 
applauded Hugh Johnson who spoke to them on May 31, 1934, 
denouncing the Darrow Report. Johnson, with his usual exag­
geration, said the NRA was the personification of the golden
rule in business and called its opponents "scribes and 
83pharisees." When talk arose of forming a small review
board to hear the specific complaints of small businessmen,
Reverend Maurice S. Sheehy told General Johnson that "since
we had the biggest communist and atheist in the country at*
the head of the other board," it would be wise to put someone
Q Alike Father Ryan in charge of the new board.
The strong Catholic support for NRA which did exist 
was not limited to mere written and spoken praise. Many 
Catholic priests and laymen played an active role in adminis­
tering the various facets of NRA. The two most prominent of 
such priests were Reverend Francis J. Haas, Director of the
^2Penver Catholic Register, June 3, 1934, p. 4.
®^Quoted by New York Times, June 1, 1934, p. 6 .
®4 Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy to Rev. John A. Ryan, June 
28, 1934, Ryan Papers.
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National Catholic School of Social Service, and Reverend 
John A. Ryan. Haas had been asked by Roosevelt to serve on 
the Labor Advisory Committee of NRA, was later appointed to 
the National Labor Board, and finally served as Labor Repre­
sentative on the new General Code Authority of NRA.®5
Father Ryan played his most active role as one of the 
three members of the Industrial Appeals Board, formed to hear 
complaints of small businessmen against NRA. Precipitated 
by the Darrow Report, the Appeals Board lasted ten months 
and heard approximately seventy cases. Ryan later remarked 
that few businessmen claimed discrimination by NRA. Rather, 
the majority requested "exemptions from compliance with the 
minimum wage rates" fixed by the codes. Ryan had little 
sympathy for these petitions. He would prefer to "let the 
small businessmen perish" rather than reduce wages for 
thousands of workers.
There were other Catholics who played minor roles in 
the functioning of industrial reform. Reverend Doctor George 
Johnson, director of the NCWC Educational Department, was
®^The Boston Pilot, October 14, 1933, p. 1; October 
13, 1934, p. 1; Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, p. 216.
®^Broderick, Right Reverend, pp. 217-18; Ryan, Social 
Doctrine, pp. 249-50.
appointed to the four-man NRA committee of the American 
Council of Education. Miss Mary G. Hawks, national presi­
dent of the NCCW and Mrs. Nicholas F. Brady, distinguished 
New York Catholic, were members of the Committee for Mobili­
zation for Human Needs and the National Committee for Child 
Health. Most Reverend Thomas K. Gorman, Bishop of Reno, 
Nevada, served on a regional recovery board for the rehabili­
tation of the industrial system. William G. Bruce, prominent 
Catholic publisher, was named to the Wisconsin State Advisory 
Board of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public 
Works. Right Reverend Monsignor C. J. Donohoe was appointed 
chairman of the Davenport, Iowa, Adjustment Board of the NRA. 
Reverend Frederic Siedenburg was named director of the 
Detroit Regional Labor Relations Board by President Roose­
velt. In the deep South, Reverend Peter M. H. Wynkoven of 
New Orleans, Louisiana, was chairman of one of the twelve 
regional United States Labor Boards. Elsewhere in the 
country, prominent Catholics served on NRA boards and on 
various labor dispute boards. Altogether, the involvement 
of American Catholics with the industrial recovery program 
of the New Deal was extensive.®^
®^Catholic Action, January, 1934, p. 13; October,
1933, p. 14; The Brooklyn Tablet, August 12, 1933, p. 1; NCWC 
News Service, Davenport, July 31, 1934 and Detroit, September 
17, 1934; The Catholic Messenger, December 28, 1933, p. 1.
167
This involvement helps explain the rather keen re­
action produced among American Catholics when the NRA was 
declared invalid by the Supreme Court on May 27, 1935. In 
1933, the Legal Committee of the National Catholic Alumni 
Federation said that NRA was constitutional and would 
"probably be upheld . . .  at least in its broad outlines
OQ. . . during the period of emergency." When the measure 
was struck down by the Court, many Catholics attempted to 
rationalize the decision. In Chicago, The New World admitted 
that there was little hope of resurrecting the project 
because of the unanimity of the decision. Trying to look 
on the bright side, however, the editor pointed out that NRA 
had made certain definite gains such as elimination of sweat­
shops, restricting child labor, and— most important— stirred 
the people to the possibilities of a better social order. 
Certainly such a project was not to be condemned because it 
did not fit the Supreme Court's view of the Constitution.
The Constitution was not, the editor insisted, "intended to 
handicap Americans in the pursuit of life, liberty and 
happiness, which, in the present instance, means a fearless 
. . . effort to bring about a better social order." The
88The Catholic Herald, July 20, 1933, p. 4.
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Constitution, he concluded, is "the bulwark of our
liberties," not "a millstone on our n e c k s . T h e  editor of
America was just as disturbed but more optimistic about the
decision. He felt that all was not lost by the Court's
decision because the NRA had already served a noble purpose.
It had educated the people of the United States to the
"doctrines of social justice, as preached by Leo XIII and
Pius XI," and this gain could not be erased by the Court's 
90action.
Commonweal likewise regretted the passing of NRA and 
took issue with those who applauded the Court's decision.
The editor felt that the industrial codes "were definite 
achievements" as moving toward "the vertical, cooperative 
organization of industrial society which alone seems a 
feasible idea." Yet the magazine admitted that NRA had 
evolved into "an organic conception, which tended evidently,
to blur the edges between private custom and law, adminis-
91tration and legislation." In this same vein The Boston
^ T h e  New World, October 5, 1934, p. 4; June 7, 1934,
p . 4.
^America, June 8, 1935, p. 194.
91Commonweal, June 7, 1935, p. 142; June 14, 1935,
p. 169.
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Pilot felt that the test case before the Court had appeared 
"too frivolous and unimportant to merit consideration." But 
the Court1s reasoning seemed sound and NRA had served its 
purpose. It fitted a gap and "established standards that
Q Omight well be followed by private industry." While 
applauding the Supreme Court's defense of the Constitution, 
the Catholic Central Verein warned that it "must not be 
accepted as a command to return to the old economic system,
to the laws of the jungle." Laissez-faire economics was not
93the answer and a new unique system must be established.
Individual Catholics also spoke out on the Court's 
decision. Father McGowan regretted both the decision and 
the Court's tendency toward a strict interpretation of the 
Constitution. He felt it essential that the Court change 
its viewpoint "if the federal government . . . [is to do its]
duty to the economic welfare of the people." More attention 
should be paid, said the priest, to the constitutional 
clause calling on the government to promote the general wel­
fare.^ In Denver, Hubert A. Smith, editor of the diocesan
^ The Boston Pilot, June 6, 1935, p. 4.
^Cited by The Catholic Herald, June 6, 1935, p. 4. 
94Quoted in ibid., June 13, 1935, p. 4.
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newspaper, felt the Court's decision was a calamity. He 
advised the Roosevelt administration to continue the fight 
by passing a constitutional amendment giving the government 
the powers outlined in NRA. Smith felt that NRA had pre­
vented revolution in America, but feared what would happen 
now that it had been declared void.9^ To Reverend James 
Gillis, editor of The Catholic World, the issue was simple. 
The removal of NRA meant that all hope of social ana eco­
nomic reform was gone. But, Gillis insisted, "if we don't 
get reform, we shall get revolution." Tnese sentiments 
were shared by Father John Ryan. Upon hearing of the invali­
dation of NRA, Ryan issued a public statement that "some 
other way must be found . . .  to subordinate wealth and 
business to the common welfare of the country." Ryan feared
that, with NRA gone, the standard of living would drop,
97wages would be cut, and hours would be lengthened.
In order to unite Catholic opinion against any such 
reactionary trend, Ryan and Father McGowan composed a state­
ment of Catholic principles relevant to the economic crisis.
9 5 p e n v e r  Catholic Register, May 30, 1935, p .  1;
June 9, 1935, p. 1.
96The Catholic World, CXLI (July, 1935), 385-86.
9^Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 219.
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McGowan had been working on such a statement before NRA had 
been struck down. The text was now revised by Ryan to incor­
porate this latest development. In its final form the state­
ment, "Organized Social Justice," called for a new NRA, under 
a constitutional amendment, to include farmers and profes­
sional men in a system of "occupational group organizations" 
providing freedom of economic behavior and collaboration 
with the Federal government. Any return to the old system 
or failure to construct a new NRA would mean communism or 
fascism for the United States. The statement declared that 
"had NRA been permitted to continue, it could readily have 
developed into the kind of industrial order recommended by
qpthe Holy Father."
Father Ryan worked assiduously to get a cross section 
of Catholic businessmen and industrialists to sign the state­
ment. Many of his correspondents refused because they feared 
an increase in the power of the Federal government which 
would follow a constitutional amendment as suggested in the 
Ryan statement. Although Ryan's correspondence indicates 
his discouraging experience, the priest still insisted that 
at least eighty per cent of those to whom the document was
^®Quoted by New York Times, December 5, 1935, p. 28; 
Broderick, Right Reverend, pp. 220-21.
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sent were willing to sign it. Altogether, 131 distinguished 
Catholics finally signed the manifesto, most of them out­
spoken liberals. Among the signers, besides McGowan and 
Ryan, were Frank P. Walsh, Assistant Secretary of Labor, 
Edward F. McGrady, Reverend Haas, Reverend Gillis, and 
Dorothy Day, editor of The Catholic Worker. No member of 
the hierarchy signed. Originally, two bishops, Robert E. 
Lucey of Amarillo, Texas, and Aloysius J. Muench of Fargo, 
North Dakota, signed the statement, but their names were 
blocked out of the published edition in order to avoid 
embarrassing them by their uniqueness. It seems clear that 
"Organized Social Justice" failed in its purpose to present 
a truly representative statement of Catholic social teaching 
because its support was limited to that element already
QQcommitted to the New Deal.
^Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 221; Clipping of 
Baltimore Sun, December 5, 1935, in Ryan Papers; Abell, 
American Catholicism, p. 251.
CHAPTER VIII
LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY
From what has been written concerning the major 
provisions of NRA, it should be apparent that for the most 
part American Catholic spokesmen were pro-labor. This 
support of labor had historic roots in a Church made up 
primarily of the lower classes and immigrants. Father Ryan, 
of course, was a long-time advocate of a "living wage" for 
labor and had been praised by Secretary of Labor Frances 
Perkins for his forward-looking ideas. Besides being a 
public advocate of labor's rights, Ryan was constantly 
writing fellow priest and laymen on the advantage of good 
labor legislation.'*'
In his struggle for better labor laws, Ryan was joined 
by Reverend Francis J. Haas. When this priest was appointed 
to the Labor Policies Board of the Works Progress
^Ryan, Social Doctrine, p. 279; Bishop Francis C. 
Kelley of Oklahoma City to Ryan, January 7, 1933; Ryan to 
Rev. Philip H. Burkett, November 9, 1935, and many other 
letters in the Ryan Papers.
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Administration, many Catholics saw the action as a vindica­
tion of the Church's stand for a living wage, for labor's 
right to organize, and for shorter hours. Haas gave strong 
support to Secretary of Labor Perkins' program to improving 
work conditions. He was radical enough to declare it the 
duty of every worker to join a union and to actively assist 
Sidney Hillman's attempt to recruit members for the Amalga- 
mated Clothing Workers of America.
Elsewhere, Reverend McGowan of NCWC also praised the 
work of Secretary Perkins as being in accord with the ency­
clicals of Pius XI. In 1932, Dorothy Day founded the 
Catholic Worker Movement in New York City. In 1937,
Reverend John P. Monaghan established the Association of 
Catholic Trade Unionists. Both of these movements were 
attempts to keep the loyalty of the Catholic laborer who 
might be attracted by the advantages of Marxism.4
2 Rev. Haas to Hon. Prances Perkins, March 14, 1934, 
Correspondence-general, 1933, Haas Papers; The Brooklyn 
Tablet, August 3, 1935, p. 9.
3Rev. Haas to Rev. William C. Keane, Director of 
Catholic Charities of Albany, New /ork, May 8 , 1934, Haas 
Papers; Rev. John Ryan to Edward Keating, November 9, 1933, 
Ryan Papers.
4 Ellis, American Catholicism, p. 144; Dorothy Day,
The Long Loneliness (New York, 1952), p. 219; NCWC News 
Service, June 29, 1935.
175
How some Catholics felt about the labor problems 
facing America during the depression is indicated by their 
reaction to the 1933 proposal of Senator Hugo Black of 
Alabama for a thirty-hour work week. The Black bill, which 
Roosevelt refused to support because he felt it was uncon­
stitutional and negative in its approach, was supported by 
over one thousand students at Notre Dame University in a
5petition sent to the House Labor Committee. Father Ryan 
was enthusiastic in his support of the proposal. He wrote 
to Frances Perkins in April, 1933, that he was glad it had 
passed the Senate and felt "it is a good sign for the Presi­
dent's program that this revolutionary measure got through 
so fast by such a wide margin."*’ He also wrote to Senator 
Black, remarking that he had made a speech in favor of the 
thirty-hour week some six months earlier in the Town Hall 
Meeting in New York City. He referred to the Senator's bill 
as "able and comprehensive," and was surprised at what a 
good argument could be made by using the powers in the Inter- 
state Commerce clause to establish mininum hours for labor.
5Catholic Action, June, 1933, p. 26.
6Rev. John A. Ryan to Hon. Frances Perkins, April 7, 
1933, Ryan Papers.
7 Rev. John Ryan to Senator Hugo L. Black, April 7, 
1933, Ryan Papers.
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Indeed, Ryan even requested an opportunity to testify in
favor of the bill before the House Committee on Labor- He
wrote to Congressman W. P. Connery, chairman of the committee,
that it was a "great disappointment" when he was denied an
□opportunity to appear.
Catholic priests took an active part in securing 
labor's rights under NRA. Ryan's role has already been 
mentioned. A few of the more prominent prelates who served 
as mediators in the labor disputes in 1933 and 1934 include: 
Archbishop Edward J. Hanna, Chairman of the National Long­
shoreman's Board; Reverend Haas, as Federal mediator in the 
Minneapolis Truck Driver's strike; and Very Reverend John 
W. R. Maguire, Chicago Regional Board and mediator in the 
Kohler Wisconsin strike. Other priests served on local and 
regional NRA boards— Reverend John 0 'Grady on the NRA 
National Sheltered Workshop Committee; Reverend James F. 
Cunningham, Los Angeles Advisory Board, Dress Code Authority; 
Monsignor P. M. H. Wynhoven, Chairman of the New Orleans 
Regional Labor Board; Reverend John P. Boland, Chairman of 
Buffalo Regional Labor Board; and Reverend Frederick Sieden- 
burg, Chairman of the Detroit Regional Labor Board.
®Rev. John Ryan to Hon. W. P. Connery, May 3,.1933,
Ryan Papers.
177
Not only were Catholics involved in the labor policies 
of the New Deal, but many even criticized these policies 
because they were not radical enough. As has been seen, 
some regretted the neglibible part labor had played in form­
ulating the NRA codes. There was also dissatisfaction with 
the contents of Section 7a. One Catholic spokesman, Ernest 
F. Dubrul, told the annual meeting of the NCCC in October, 
1934, that it was against Catholic teaching to force a man
Qto join a union. But voluntary unionism was not what 
Father Haas and other Catholic liberals wanted. In fact, 
Section 7a was criticized by more progressive Catholics 
precisely because it seemed to support such rights as Dubrul 
argued were necessary according to the teachings of the 
Church. One editor felt that labor had been shortchanged by 
NRA because "this administration does not support, and never 
did, an interpretation of Section 7a which would have helped 
l a b o r . A n o t h e r ,  who was critical of the collectivist 
tendencies of NRA, complained that it was setting up company 
unions and thereby leading to disaster for the working
^Ernest F. Dubrul, "NRA and Collective Bargaining," 
NCCC Proceedings, Cincinnati, October 7-10, 1934, pp. 287- 
93.
^America, May 11, 1935, p. 97.
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m a n . ^  In Brooklyn an editor expressed fear that the right
of collective bargaining spelled out in Section 7a would be
undermined by a weak interpretation or by simply ignoring it 
12in practice. Father Haas publicly called for the estab­
lishing of independent unions over the company unions. He 
wrote to William Green, President of the A. F. of L., 
expressing hope that the administration would not act rashly 
on the labor provisions of NRA, as this was the "all impor­
tant matter. Another source felt that Section 7a was too
weak because the interpretation of it by government and
industry "have been turning collective bargaining and the
14right to organize into an insulting delusion."
Such Catholic impatience with NRA‘s labor policy was 
well founded. It is clear that neither FDR nor other New 
Dealers like Johnson and Richberg looked upon Section 7a and 
the NRA as a means of building up industrial unionism in the 
United States.1  ̂ Yet when NRA was invalidated by the
^ T h e  Monitor, September 9, 1933, p. 1.
^2|Fhe Brooklyn Tablet, September 2, 1933, p. 6 .
^ Ibid., August 26, 1933, p. 1; Rev. Haas to William 
Green, November 11, 1933, Haas Papers.
14America, March 24, 1934, p. 582.
^Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 108.
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Supreme Court, Roosevelt was already supporting the Wagner
Labor bill.^ Senator Robert Wagner of New York had been
trying to get his bill through Congress since 1934 but had
failed to receive administration support. As passed in
July, 1935, the act set up a National Labor Relations Board
. . . as a permanent independent agency empowered
not only to conduct elections to determine the 
appropriate bargaining units and agents but to 
restrain business from committing "unfair labor 
practices" such as discharging workers for union 
membership or fostering employer-dominated com­
pany unions.1?
Many Catholics were attracted by the proposals out­
lined in the Wagner bill. When it was being debated in the 
Senate Committee on Education and Labor in 1934, the Bishops' 
Administrative Committee of the NCWC drafted a statement for 
presentation before this body. The statement was a vigorous 
defense of labor's right "to organize freely into associa­
tions of their own choice." Portions of Pius X I 's ency­
clical Quadragesimo Anno were placed in evidence as favoring 
the bill. In a letter to David I. Walsh, chairman of the 
House committee, Reverend John J. Burke, General Secretary
16Burns, Roosevelt, p. 226, points out that FDR
supported the Wagner Act before NRA was declared invalid.
1 7'Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 151.
of NCWC, urged that the Bishops' statement be given strong 
consideration.
The Bishops' statement stressed that the Wagner bill 
would "protect the worker's right to self-organization."
The prelates also liked the idea of establishing an indus­
trial tribunal for "the adjudication of industrial contro­
versies." They remarked that both of these ideas "are in 
complete accord with and are required by the Catholic social 
program enunciated by Pope Leo XIII in 1891 and by the 
present Holy Father, Pope Pius XI in 1931." Labor's right 
to organize unions and to bargain collectively were "inherent 
rights." A tribunal of adjudication was necessary to
"resolve the conflicting claims" of both labor and management
19Anything less would be "chaos and anarchy."
Father Ryan, actively supporting the Wagner bill, felt 
it was "probably the most just, beneficient, and far-reaching 
piece of labor legislation ever enacted in the United States. 
He made public statements endorsing the bill and sent many 
letters to Congressmen urging their help in its passage. He
1®Huber, Our Bishops Speak, p. 305.
^Quoted in Commonweal, April 27, 1934, p. 701.
20Quoted in Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 220.
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wrote to Senator David I. Walsh, giving his full backing to 
Wagner's proposals. In this letter, Ryan included a copy of 
a statement by Reverend John J. Burke and the NCWC1s Adminis­
trative Council supporting the measure. Ryan himself favored 
the bill because, like the bishops, he thought it was in 
accord with the wishes of both Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius
XI. He pointed out that the act was needed to make the NRA
21codes effective. Ryan's stand was echoed by the Denver 
Catholic Register, which felt that the bill, if constitu­
tional, would put labor and capital "on somewhat of a 
22level."
A dissident note, however, was raised by the Jesuit 
weekly, America. The editor of this magazine doubted that 
the bill could be enforced after the Supreme Court's decision 
in the Schechter case. If the National Labor Relations 
Board could not "go into the states, and compel employers to 
recognize the right of workers to organize and bargain 
collectively, the Wagner bill is nothing more than a 
gesture." But such power could not be delegated to the NLRB 
by Congress under the existing interpretation of the Supreme
2-*-Catholic Action, May, 1935, p. 17.
^ Denver Catholic Register, June 20, 1935, p. 4.
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Court. The Interracial Review, on the other hand, feared 
that the clause in the bill which provided that a majority 
vote would decide the exclusive bargaining representatives 
for any labor unit might be used to exclude the Negro. It 
was recognized, however, that such a clause was a neces­
sity.23
From the foregoing, it would appear that a significant 
element of the Catholic Church was vigorous in supporting the 
more radical labor policies of the New Deal. Yet when one 
approaches the question of child labor, the eradication of 
which was a goal sought by the New Deal, a striking amount 
of opposition is revealed on the part of the Church. Federal 
child labor legislation had begun as early as 1916, with the 
Keating-Owen Act, but the Supreme Court had seen fit to 
declare invalid this and subsequent acts. In 1924, a child 
labor amendment to the Constitution was submitted to the 
states by Congress, but by 1932 it still lacked the needed 
support of at least ten states. It was against this amend­
ment that much of the Catholic opposition was directed. The 
amendment provided, first, that "Congress shall have power 
to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under
23America, July 13, 1935, p. 313; Interracial Review. 
X (May, 1937), 6 8 .
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eighteen years of age"; second, that "the power of the 
several states is unimpaired by this article except that the 
operation of state laws shall be suspended to the extent 
necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by Congress." 
Altogether it did not seem a radical proposal. Yet Catholic 
opposition to the measure was widespread.
Reverend Michael J. Ahern, S.J., one of Cardinal 
O'Connell's bright young men, gave the most elaborate 
explanation of Catholic opposition. Speaking over the 
Boston radio, Ahern pointed out that he, of course, did not 
approve of child labor, but this had nothing to do with 
Catholic opposition to the amendment. Catholics were opposed 
to the amendment because it invested too much power in Con­
gress. Because it gave Congress such unlimited power, 
Catholics thought it "dangerous and un-American." Limita­
tions to the measure had been suggested to Congress before 
its submission to the states, but all were rejected. Friends 
of the amendment urged that the people depend upon a reason­
able interpretation by Congress. Ahern stressed that "we 
much prefer to have this reasonableness written into the 
Constitution, than to have it left to the vagaries of 
political opinion." As it stood, Congress could use the 
power granted to "regulate, limit, and even prohibit the
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education of these young people." This was not expected, 
but why not make such things clear in the amendment? "It 
seems to us," he continued, "that under this amendment as it 
now stands Congress could regiment all children and youths 
under eighteen years of age, as they have been regimented in 
some communistic and fascist countries." The priest went on 
to note that the amendment had other weaknesses of omission, 
such as the failure to distinguish between harmful and non­
harmful child labor. Furthermore, he insisted, child labor 
was no longer a major problem and President Roosevelt had 
already admitted that he needed no amendment to eradicate 
what was left.^4
Much of this argument appears fantastic now, but it 
should be made clear that a number of Catholic bishops and 
much of the Catholic press expressed oppositipn to the amend­
ment along the lines mentioned by Ahern. Besides the 
hierarchy, the Catholic Daughters of America and various 
local Holy Name Societies also came out against the proposal. 
The CDA argued that the amendment would "substitute for the 
authority of the parent, the authority of Congress."^5
^4Quoted in The Boston Pilot, February 27, 1937, p. 6 .
^^Quoted in New York Times, February 23, 1936, II, 1* 
February 8 , 1937, p. 5.
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In Massachusetts the amendment ran into the opposi­
tion of Cardinal O'Connell. The Cardinal's representative 
at the Massachusetts Legislative Committee dealing with 
ratification of the amendment, Reverend Jones I. J. Corrigan, 
surprised his congressional audience by asserting that 
"nothing redder ever came out of Red Russia" than the amend­
ment in question. He argued that the ratification of the
amendment would be to "Russianize American parents and
2 6nationalize American children." This remarkable outburst 
prompted a reply by John J. Cummings of Boston, a Catholic 
and former legislator, who insisted that the Cardinal was 
really too old to know what the amendment said. He also 
pointed to such prominent Catholics as Ryan, Haas, and P. H. 
Callahan, who favored the amendment, as evidence that it was 
not communistic in nature.
The Cardinal, however, was to have his way as the 
Massachusetts legislature failed to ratify the amendment 
both in 1936 and 1937, despite a personal broadcast plea by 
President Roosevelt. Roosevelt was assisted in the prepera- 
tion of his plea by Bishop Frances Spellman of New York, who 
was a former assistant to Cardinal O'Connell. The
26Quoted in The Boston Pilot, February 23, 1935, p. 1.
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Massachusetts action caused Michael Flaherty, secretary of 
the Boston Painters Union, to charge that the Church
obviously must own some sweatshops and that the Cardinal was
27running the legislature.
Other states also witnessed Catholic opposition to
the amendment. In Connecticut, Bishop McAuliffe of Hartford
sent a representative to oppose the amendment before the
2 8state legislature. In Texas one state senator remarked
that ratification of the proposal was being hindered by
pressure from the Catholic Church "which has been pouring
2 9letters and telegrams into the Senate." At the same time, 
however, Texas was the home of the most outspoken friend of 
the child labor amendment in the American hierarchy. Robert 
E. Lucey, Bishop of Amarillo, did his best to promote ratifi­
cation. He wrote to the Governor endorsing the latter’s
stand for the amendment. Lucey also quelled the opposition
3 0organized by the state council of the Knights of Columbus.
2?R0bert I. Gannon, The Cardinal Spellman Story (New 
York, 1962), p. 154; New York Times, February 20, 1937, p. 18.
^Columbia, April, 1937, p. 3.
2 9 Claude C. Westerfeld to Marvin McIntyre, February 
22, 1937, Official File, 58-A, Box 5, Roosevelt Papers.
^°Robert E. Lucey, Bishop of Amarillo, to Frank P. 
Walsh, January 23, 1937, Box 136, Frank P. Walsh Papers.
The Frank Walsh Papers in the New York Public Library are a 
rich source of information on this whole question.
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But the Bishop seems to have been alone among the hierarchy 
in publicly supporting the amendment.
In New York state the opposition reached its apogee. 
All eight New York bishops came out in opposition to ratifi­
cation by the state legislature. Bishop Gibbons of Albany 
appeared in person before the legislative committee to 
oppose the amendment. Cardinal Hayes of New York City 
asserted that "authority over the lives of children rests in 
their parents" and not in any removed governmental agency.
Bishop William Turner of Buffalo also spoke out against the 
 ̂1amendment.
Throughout the struggle for ratification, which 
occurred off and on from 1935 through 1937, President Roose­
velt was aware of the opposition of the Catholic Church to 
the amendment. Charles C. Burlingham wrote to him, asking
him to intercede in New York to overcome the hierarchy's 
32resistance. Roosevelt himself remarked to Harold Ickes 
that the Catholic opposition to the amendment could prove 
very harmful to the Church because it might provoke
^Commonweal, March 5, 1937, p. 509; Catholic Action, 
February, 1935, p. 21.
22Charles c. Burlingham to President Roosevelt, 
January 24, 1935, Official File, 58-A, Box 5, Roosevelt 
Papers.
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■5 OProtestant reaction. This same thought was expressed by 
Irving Brant, editor of the St. Louis Star-Times, to Father 
John Ryan. Brant felt that the hierarchy's action would 
lead to "a new kind of anti-Catholicism and anti-clerical­
ism." In his reply, Ryan emphasized that only a small 
minority of bishops were involved in the controversy while 
most were silent.34
President Roosevelt, after being re-elected in 1936, 
decided to give the amendment his support in New York. He 
wrote to Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia of New York City, reminding 
him of the Presidential plea made to the Governors that rati­
fication "be made one of the major items in the legislative 
program in their states." Roosevelt added, "I sincerely 
hope that my own state will be among those to ratify."3^ A 
few days later he wrote the same sort of message to Governor 
Herbert H. Lehman, trusting "that the assembly will take 
. . . favorable action as quickly as possible" and that his
3 3Ickes, Diary, II, 8 6 .
34Irving Brant to Rev. John A. Ryan, April 22, 1937, 
Ryan Papers.
3-*President Roosevelt to Fiorello LaGuardia, telegram, 
February 4, 1937, in Rosenman, Public Papers, VI, 34.
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"own home state will be very prompt in ratification."38
In the words of Reverend Wilfrid Parsons, editor of
America. the Catholic press was "overwhelmingly against the 
37amendment." The Jesuit weekly did indeed oppose the pro-
38posal. Other Catholic sources also came out against it, 
but none more strongly than The Boston Pilot and The Brooklyn 
Tablet. The Boston paper supported Cardinal O'Connell's 
opposition with editorials, pointing out that "it is the 
solemn duty of [the Cardinal] to safeguard these children 
from any menace to their sacred and essential inheritance as 
Americans and as Catholics." The amendment under considera­
tion was "another invasion into the private rights of the 
individual." The editor regretted the President's support
of the measure which so endangered parents' rights over
39their children. The Brooklyn Tablet opposed the measure 
for various reasons, one of which was the fear it "would 
result in new Federal snooping and a million-dollar enforce-
3 fi-^President Roosevelt to Hon. Herbert H. Lehman, 
February 22, 1937, in Rosenman, Public Papers, VI, 92.
37Rev. Wilfrid Parsons to Mrs. G. F. Zimand [n.d.], 
copy in Ryan Papers, 1937.
38America, March 10, 1934, p. 535.
39The Boston Pilot, February 17, 1934, p. 4; January 
23, 1937, p. 4; February 27, 1937, p. 6 .
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ment bureau with all the graft that went with national pro­
hibition." The editor felt the amendment was designed to 
regiment adolescents and argued that boys fifteen and over 
should be allowed to work if their family needed the addi­
tional income.2*0 The official publication of the Knights of 
Columbus also came out against the proposal because it meant 
a further encroachment "upon local self-government." The 
Catholic Central Verein concurred in this judgment that the
measure would mean the Federal government would assume more
4.1state power.
Against this formidable array of opposition was 
pitted a group of influential Catholics determined to see 
the amendment ratified. As might be expected, foremost in 
this group was Father John Ryan. His early support took the 
form of letters addressed to members of state legislatures 
where the amendment was being considered. In this vein, on 
November 3, 1933, he wrote to w. W. Burke, chairman of the 
Missouri Child Labor Committee, who had requested the 
priest's assistance in promoting the passage of the amendment
40The Brooklyn Tablet, February 24, 1934, p. 8 ;
December 1, 1934, p. 8 ; January 19, 1935, p. 8 .
4^Columbia, April, 1935, p. 12; The Boston Pilot,
February 17, 1934, p. 4.
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in that state. Ryan was glad to write that he supported the
amendment and wished it were law.42 A similar statement
went to Victor A. Olander, Secretary of the Illinois State
Federation of Labor, who was pushing ratification of the
amendment in his state.43 Ryan sent his endorsement to the
Illinois Legislature, as well as to those in Nebraska, Idaho,
Massachusetts, and Indiana. In many of his letters Ryan
liked to quote the late Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana,
who had said that the amendment was subjected to "selfish
and pernicious propaganda." The priest felt that Catholics
had fallen prey to this propaganda and were misguided in
44their opposition. The fears that Congress would set the 
minimum age for working at eighteen were, he believed, 
unfounded. Furthermore, the amendment did not give Congress 
any exhaustive power in education. Indeed, the states 
already had more power over children's education than did the
42Father Ryan to W. W. Burke, November 3, 1933, Ryan
Papers.
^Father Ryan to Hon. James Boyle, June 14, 1933,
Ryan Papers.
44Francis Downing, "American Catholicism and the 
Socio-economic Evolution in the United States," in Church 
and Society; Catholic Social and Political Thought and 
Movements, 1789-1950, ed. Josephy N. Moody (New York, 1953), 
p. 875.
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Federal government. Why, asked Ryan, were the states so 
much safer than the Federal government?^5 In all of his cor­
respondence concerning the measure, Father Ryan was careful 
to point out that the National Catholic Welfare Conference 
had "taken no formal position either for or against the 
Federal Child Labor Amendment," but that he personally sup­
ported it.^5
One group dedicated to the ratification of the con­
stitutional amendment, and one attracted by Ryan's statement, 
was the National Child Labor Committee. The committee 
secretary, Courtenay Dinwiddie, was very desirous of enlist­
ing some prominent Catholics for his group, in view of the 
outspoken opposition of some of the bishops. With this in 
mind he wrote to Reverend Francis Haas asking him for a 
public statement in favor of the amendment. Haas replied 
that he was "in complete accord with the stand of the NCLC" 
and felt that some Catholic criticisms of the amendment were 
"positively stupid." He regretfully declined, however, to 
make a public statement in favor of the amendment because he
^5Father Ryan to Ethel Van Benthuysen, January 20, 
1934, Ryan Papers.
46Father Ryan to Cranston Brenton, August 23, 1935, 
Ryan Papers.
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feared it might "affect my opportunity of service to the 
National Labor Board.
Sometime later, Dinwiddie tried again. He telephoned 
to Father Ryan, suggesting that the priest organize a com­
mittee of Catholics in favor of ratification. After dis­
cussing the matter with Father McGowan, who also favored the 
amendment, Ryan replied that a committee was a good idea but 
that it could not be connected with the NCWC or the Catholic
Conference on Industrial Problems. Furthermore, he would
48join but could only lend his name to the cause.
While Ryan was reluctant to sponsor such an organiza­
tion, Frank P. Walsh, New York attorney, was not. On 
February 17, 1936, Walsh announced the formation of a Catholic 
Committee for Ratification of the Child Labor Amendment.
Walsh made a public statement that he was "especially dis­
tressed by the opposition on the part of many Catholics" to 
the amendment. This opposition was, in Walsh's opinion, 
"influential in blocking the ratification of the amendment in
^Rev. Francis Haas to Courtenay Dinwiddie, February
12, 1934, Correspondence-general, 1934, Haas Papers.
^®Father Ryan to Courtenay Dinwiddie, November 5,
1935, Ryan Papers.
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4.0certain of the state legislatures." He went on to stress 
that his committee felt the amendment was necessary for the 
elimination of child labor in the United States. He listed 
as charter members such prominent Catholics as Father Ryan, 
Father McGowan, Reverend J. W. R. Maguire, Professor Carlton 
J. H. Hayes, Professor David A. McCabe, Grover Whalen, Rose 
J. McHugh, Dorothy Day, and Theodore A. Thomas.50 Walsh 
later added the name of Michael O 1Shaughnessy to his list of 
supporters. O 'Shaughnessy was convinced of the need for the 
amendment by FDR's statement that child labor had increased 
since the invalidation of NRA. He wrote that "the present 
evil over shadows the possible evil of congressional inter­
ference with education to the detriment of religion."5  ̂
Naturally the Walsh Committee came in for some 
criticism from Catholic sources. The Brooklyn Tablet
assailed both the leader and the cause for going against the
52wishes of the hierarchy. The Boston Pilot also felt that
49Quoted in Commonweal, February 28, 1936, p. 495.
50New York Times, February 16, 1936, XI, 2.
51Michael O 'Shaughnessy to Frank P. Walsh, January 4, 
1937, Box 136, F. P. Walsh Papers. The Walsh papers have 
two big boxes dealing with the work of this committee.
5^New York Times, February 17, 1936, p. 19.
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Walsh's efforts were misguided and pointed out that ratifica­
tion was not really a Catholic issue but touched all men who 
did not want to surrender control over the education of their 
children to Congress.5"* S. A. Baldus, editor of Extension 
magazine, criticized the Walsh group because they had failed 
to consult proper ecclesiastical authority before dragging 
the Church into politics. This was "at least embarrassing 
to the official representatives and spokesmen of the Church."
CAHe felt that the group should not be supported by Catholics.
This discussion of the debate on the child labor 
amendment reveals a definite paradox in Catholic labor 
thought during the first term of President Roosevelt.
During Roosevelt's first term, most Catholic spokesmen 
argued for a wider role for labor under the NRA, and later 
supported the benefits of the Wagner Labor Relations Act, 
because they felt that freedom to join a union and collective 
bargaining were both part of the Papal program. At the same 
time, however, elements of the hierarchy vigorously opposed 
the ratification of the amendment. While some Catholics 
called for a more radical interpretation of NRA to permit
5^The Boston Pilot, February 29, 1936, p. 4.
54Extension. May, 1936, clipping in Box 136, F. P. 
Walsh Papers.
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the growth of occupational groups, others opposed the child 
labor amendment because it would mean a decrease in state 
power. How clergymen, who in 1933 could call for a strong 
assertion of Federal power in combatting the depression, 
could only a few months later work against the child labor 
amendment because they feared that under its provisions this 
same Federal government would bolshevize their children is a 
paradox difficult to explain.
If American Catholic opinion on labor had its 
ambiguous aspects, no such division was evident in its atti­
tude toward social security. The Wagner-Lewis or Social 
Security Act, signed by President Roosevelt on August 15, 
1935, was one of the most important relief measures fostered 
during the New Deal. As enacted, the law created a coopera­
tive Federal-State system of unemployment compensation. It 
levied a tax on employers, and authorized grants to the 
states to finance the administration of unemployment insur­
ance. It provided a tax for old-age and survivor's 
insurance to be levied in equal amounts upon employers and 
employees. It further provided cash grants to states to 
subsidize old-age pensions allowed under state laws and 
■various other forms of relief to the destitute and infirm.
In connection with the administration of the new law,
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President Roosevelt addressed a personal letter to the
clergymen of America. In this note of September 23, 1935,
he stressed that he was "particularly anxious that the new
social security legislation . . . shall be carried out in
keeping with the high purposes with which this law was
enacted." He wanted the clergymen in America to write to
him about the conditions in their communities and suggest to
55him how the government could help.
Catholic support for the new law was swiftly evident. 
Harry Hopkins, Federal Relief Administrator, spoke in sup­
port of the law to the members of the New York Catholic 
Committee of the Laity. He was followed to the platform by 
Cardinal Hayes who also endorsed the measure. The Cardinal 
said, "the security program of our President is . . taking
into consideration the preservation and conservation of
those principles of action so vital to man's liberty and
56man's happiness here on earth."
At the annual meeting of the National Conference of
Catholic Charities, Katherine F. Lenroot, Chief of the 
Department of Labor's Children's Bureau, hailed the Social
'^Rosenman, Public Papers, IV, 370.
^NCWC News Service, New York City, May 6, 1935.
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Security Act as an important step toward protecting the 
family. She further stated that the foundation for the act 
could be found in both Pope Pius X I 's encyclical and the 
statements of the American bishops. The next speaker, Right 
Reverend R. Marcellus Wagner, called for "a new deal in 
social justice." President Roosevelt honored the meeting 
with a personal letter in which he stressed that the NCCC and
similar organizations were necessary "to complete the struc-
57ture of our national security. . . ."
Other leaders of Catholic welfare work joined in the 
support of the social security measure. Mary L. Gibbons, a 
director of the New York Catholic Charities Bureau, called 
it only a first step but a good beginning. She warned, how­
ever, against an optimism which might lead to the belief that 
passage of the act would remove the necessity for a continu­
ation of direct Federal relief. After all, she pointed out, 
the Federal government only entered the field when it became 
obvious that local resources were inadequate to meet the
egneeds of the depression.
5^Quoted in New York Times, September 30, 1935, p.
15; Catholic Action, November, 1935, p. 14.
5®Mary L. Gibbons, "The Future of Public Relief," NCCC 
Proceedings, Peoria, Illinois, September 29-October 2, 1935,
p. 80.
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At the Cincinnati meeting of the Catholic Conference 
on Industrial Problems, Doctor Edwin E. Witte, ex-director 
of the President's Committee on Economic Security, urged the 
promotion of social insurance laws. He made a point of 
thanking Church leaders for their support of the social 
security program. After praising the encyclical of Pius XI, 
Quadraqesimo Anno, he called President Roosevelt's economic 
program "a major step in achieving for Americans the ideals
CQof social justice set forth in that document."
At the 1936 meeting of the NCCC, a formal statement 
was made on social security. The executive committee, which 
drew up the statement, endorsed the idea that the Federal 
government was responsible for promoting social security.
The statement submitted to the conference, which was largely 
the inspiration of Right Reverend John 0 'Grady, secretary, 
accepted the government's role as protector of the individual 
against injuries from a complex and depersonalized industrial 
economy.^ At the same meeting, Right Reverend Thomas J.
O'Dwyer, ex-director of the Los Angeles Catholic Welfare 
Bureau, pointed out that there was much room for expansion
59NCWC News Service, Cincinnati, March 25, 1935. 
6C*The Boston Pilot, May 23, 1936, p. 7.
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in the Roosevelt social security system. It was, however,
"a very substantial beginning and is one of the most signifi­
cant governmental actions in history."^
The 1935 convention of the National Conference of 
Catholic Women also went on record as favoring the new social 
security law. A resolution was passed which called for 
vigorous state action along the same lines to provide assist­
ance for unemployment insurance and pensions for the aged.62
Many distinguished individual Catholics also threw 
their support to the social security measure. Father Ryan 
was whole-heartedly in favor of the measure. He called it a 
great document which "brings the United States up to date
with Europe on the question of social insurance in one bold
6 3stroke.' As a matter of fact, Father Ryan played a part 
in constructing the legislation. He worked as a member of 
Frank P. Graham's general advisory council on social 
security.6^ Joining Ryan, in support of the new law, was
6^NCCC Proceedings, Seattle, Washington, August 2-5, 
1936, pp. 126-31.
62Catholic Action, December, 1935, p. 24. The annual 
convention was held in Fort Wayne, Indiana, from November 17- 
20.
63Rev. John A. Ryan, "Social Justice in the 1935 
Congress," Catholic Action, September, 1935, pp. 7-9. In 
this same article Ryan endorsed the Labor Disputes Act.
^Broderick, Ricrht Reverend, p. 219.
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the influential Jesuit author, Reverend John LaFarge. La-
Farge was "entirely in sympathy" with the measure and feared
that without it "we should be facing chaos."85
Significant elements of the Catholic press also gave
their endorsement to social security. The Brooklyn Tablet
felt that the act pointed in the direction of the Papal
66encyclicals was was a "major accomplishment." The Boston 
Pilot called the principles behind the bill "commendable."
The editor liked the idea of both State and Federal govern­
ment sharing this responsibility. His only criticism was
that the act did not provide enough funds for the aged and 
67unemployed. The Denver Catholic Register supported the 
new law and applauded the decision of the Supreme Court which 
upheld its constitutionality. The editor felt that the law
was "in accord with the spirit of Quadraqesimo Anno of Pope
68Pius XI." The two influential Catholic periodicals, 
Commonweal and America, were not as headlong in their endorse­
ment as was the editor of the Denver Catholic Register. The
Quoted in New York Times, September 26, 1935, p. 2.
88August 24, 1935, p. 10, but one year later, July 18, 
1936, the same editor felt the bill had been "poorly drawn."
^April 27, 1934, p. 4; January 26, 1935, p. 4.
68June 6, 1937, p. 4.
editors of Commonweal felt that almost everyone was in 
sympathy with the aims of the measure but, in the same edi­
torial, lamented that inefficient government pump-priming 
was leading the President nowhere.^ The editor of the 
Jesuit weekly was also behind the aims of the bill, but 
remarked that "social insurance is not a goal itself but 
only the indication of a deeper evil in our society." He 
also felt that the law would have a difficult time passing 
the test of constitutionality. "From the standpoint of
constitutional law," he remarked, "the . . . act seems to be
7 0an example of doing the right thing in a wrong way."
^December 13, 1935, p. 171.




During Roosevelt's first term in office, foreign 
affairs took a back seat to the more pressing domestic 
economic problems. When Catholics took any interest in 
the foreign policy of this period, they were generally in 
complete harmony with the feelings of the majority of their 
fellow citizens. Most Americans were primarily interested 
in keeping the United States out of European affairs and 
neutral in any international quarrel.^ The Catholic 
attitude was just as disinterested with two notable excep­
tions. The first dealt with the question of the United 
States recognizing the Soviet Union. The second concerned 
our diplomatic dealings with Mexico during a period of anti­
clericalism there. Because these two questions produced 
some uniquely Catholic reactions, they must be examined in 
some detail.
^Burns, Roosevelt, pp. 247-49; see also Robert A. 
Devine, The Illusions of Neutrality (University of Chicago, 
1962), pp. 57-81.
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Catholic opinion seemed to be divided on the merits 
of Roosevelt's decision to follow a policy of economic 
nationalism. Those individuals who represented Catholic 
thought at its most parochial level, the editors of Catholic 
diocesan newspapers, generally applauded the decision in 
terms reminiscent of the Populists. Other Catholics, who 
dealt in a wider arena of thought, were not enthusiastic 
about economic nationalism.
When Roosevelt seemed to repudiate the efforts of the 
London Conference by his message of July 1, 1933, the 
managing editor of The Brooklyn Tablet applauded the decision. 
He felt this demonstrated that the United States was no 
longer going to permit "international bankers” to run her 
economy. This meant we were going to worry about our own 
problems rather than those of Europe.4 In San Francisco the 
local editor called FDR's move toward economic nationalism 
''decidedly sane," for "it places the President in line with 
DeValera and Mussolini in taking care of his own country 
first and freeing it from the control of the Bank of England 
and the fiscal agents of that bank in the United States."^
4July 8, 1933, p. 9.
^The Monitor, October 28, 1933, p. 1.
Samuel A. Baldus, editor of Extension magazine had already 
criticized Secretary of State Hull's international views as 
representing "a santa claus complex." Baldus rejected the 
idea of pushing international trade and wanted the United 
States to stop being concerned with the problems of the 
entire world.®
Even Father John Ryan, who usually took a more cosmo­
politan approach to economics, seemed to favor economic 
nationalism. Speaking at the annual conference of the 
Catholic Association for International Peace, he seemed to 
give praise to the isolationists by stressing the reasons 
why the United States should give priority to internal 
economic self-sufficiency over the expansion of foreign com-
7merce. Later Ryan clarified his position by pointing out 
that this did not mean the United States should practice 
economic isolation. He wrote a friend that the "buy America 
idea "is about the silliest that has been exploited in the 
United States in a good many years." Any such move on our 
part, felt Ryan, could only be expected to kill American 
export trade because foreign nations would quickly retaliate
6Extension, XXVII (May, 1933), 19.
7Catholic Action, May, 1934, p. 15.
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Excessive imports had little to do with causing the depres-
Qsion, according to Ryan.
A general report issued by the Catholic Association 
for International Peace in 1934, prepared by Father Ryan, 
Doctor Parker T. Moon, and Father McGowan, took a broad view 
of our trade policies. The report stressed that tariffs 
should be reduced because they were both morally and econom­
ically wrong. Furthermore, the report went on, before any 
recovery could be achieved, the question of war debts should 
be settled. While at one time such debts were just, they no 
longer obliged the debtee to pay, because of the emergency
Qof the depression.
At the same time, Father McGowan went on record as 
favoring international economic cooperation. He warned that 
the failure of the United States to take part in a world-wide 
effort to solve the depression could only prolong it.*^
While McGowan and others might call for international 
cooperation for economic reasons, it became readily apparent 
that this spirit of internationalism did not extend, in
®Rev. John A. Ryan to G. M. Breen, March 13, 1933,
Ryan Papers.
^The Catholic Herald, February 8, 1934, p. 1.
^The Catholic Transcript, November 30, 1933, p. 1.
208
Catholic opinion, to our dealings with the Soviet Union. 
Woodrow Wilson had severed diplomatic dealings with Russia 
after the overthrow of the Kerensky provisional government 
in 1917. The Republicans who followed Wilson in power during 
the Twenties looked askance at Russia1s attempts to con­
fiscate all private property, her repudiation of inter­
national debts, and her emphasis on world revolution.
Although the Soviet Union sought on a number of occasions to 
discuss the points of dispute with the United States, com­
munist propaganda in the form of diatribes on the evils of 
capitalism did not help to promote understanding between the 
two countries.1 "̂
During the 1932 presidential campaign, the question 
of Russian recognition was hardly the most topical one. Yet 
it did arise. In an interview published in the October 
issue of Soviet Russia Today, Roosevelt was asked his 
position on the question of recognition. His answer was 
adroit but noninformative. He pleaded that domestic affairs 
were so pressing that he had taken little time to inform him­
self in this matter. Actually there is evidence to indicate 
that Roosevelt did oppose the current nonrecognition policy
■^Robert Browder, The Origins of Soviet-American 
Diplomacy (Princeton, New Jersey, 1953), pp. 18, 22.
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12as being a mere "futile gesture.' But there was little 
political sense in pushing a topic which could only alienate 
some Catholic voters and really did not relate to the major 
issue of 1932— the economic crisis. J
Roosevelt's equivocation, however, failed to satisfy 
the Reverend Edmund A. Walsh, vice-president of Georgetown 
University and a leading Catholic authority on Communism. 
Father Walsh, who opposed recognition, demanded that Roose­
velt make his position as clear as Hoover had, when the 
latter stated that he would continue the policy of non­
recognition. The excuse of being uninformed on the subject 
was hardly adequate to Walsh who warned, in an address to the 
New York Civic Federation, that Russia desperately needed
United States recognition because of her floundering 
14economy.
After Roosevelt's victory in November, however, it 
became increasingly clear that the administration was 
seriously contemplating a revision in American policy toward
^Travis Jacobs, "America Recognizes Russia: A
Conspiracy?" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 
1960), p. 70.
13Ibid., p. 71.
3^New York Times, October 15, 1932, p. 9.
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the Soviet Union. There were various rumors as to why Roose­
velt should sponsor recognition. Some commentators pointed 
out that the United States could hardly assume world leader­
ship— a position which seemed to be thrust upon her by the
world-wide depression— and ignore the existence, of Soviet 
15Russia. Others speculated that the recognition would be 
only a part of a new foreign policy aimed at curtailing the 
power of Germany in Europe and halting the Manchurian pene­
tration of the Japanese. Even more popular was the theory, 
held by A1 Smith and William Borah, that Russian trade would 
help lift the United States out of the depression. Finally 
there was the belief that recognition would do much to help 
restore international good will.^
Yet members of Roosevelt's official family were by no 
means united on the question. In the Cabinet, Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull, Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, 
and Postmaster General James Farley opposed recognition.
Hull's reasons for opposition are not clear. According to 
Henry Morgenthau, Hull wanted the Russians to permit religious 
freedom for American nationals, but also believed that
^^NCWC News Service, May 22, 1933.
•^Ibid., January 9, 1933; Jacobs, "America Recognizes," 
pp. 81, 83.
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recognition would only antagonize large elements of Catholic 
Democrats because of the anti-Christian attitude of Moscow.^ 
Yet other factors entered into Hull's decision. He was also 
concerned with the communist repudiation of the Tsarist debt 
and the subversive activities of the Third International. 
Wallace opposed recognition because of the harsh policies of
collectivization then being practiced under Stalin. He
18expressed his opposition to both Hull and Roosevelt.
Farley, on the other hand, agreed with Hull and disliked the 
anti-Christian tendencies of the Bolsheviks. He was 
skeptical of any promise by the Russians of religious free­
dom, and tried to convey this skepticism to Roosevelt, but
19without success.
This internal opposition was not all that Roosevelt 
had to cope with on the recognition question. The Catholic 
Church had been expressing vigorous opposition to communism 
and Russia long before the 1932 campaign. Recognizing the 
militant atheism of the Russian leaders as a direct assault
l^John M. Blum, ed., From the Morgenthau Diaries:
Years of Crisis, 1928-1938 (New York, 1959), p. 56.
18Wallace, letter to author, South Salem, New York, 
January 23, 1964.
l^Farley, interview with author, March 20, 1965.
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on the very foundations of the Church, priests and laymen 
united in resisting the advance of bolshevism. This opposi­
tion was directed primarily at the philosophical basis of 
communism, but as the Russian state practiced a vigorous 
anti-Christian campaign the antagonism naturally shifted to 
the existential exponents of the philosophy, namely, Soviet 
leaders and their government.
The rumors that President Roosevelt was planning to 
recognize Russia soon after taking office produced a signif­
icant reaction from American Catholic spokesmen. The 
Catholic press was virtually unanimous in its opposition to 
such a move. The Brooklyn Tablet started campaigning against 
recognition as early as December, 1932, and carried on right 
up to November 16, 1933, when official recognition was 
extended. In 1932, the editor expressed shock that Roosevelt 
was even considering such a course and pointed out that 
recognition would be approving "the godless policy" of 
Russia.^® A few months later the paper printed front-page 
headlines calling for Catholics to awaken to the insidious 
campaign afoot to promote recognition. The writer, warned 
the administration that such recognition would be looked
2QThe Brooklyn Tablet. December 10, 1932, p. 10.
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upon as treason by twenty million Catholics.2-*- A few months 
later, after Roosevelt sold some surplus cotton to Russia, 
the managing editor warned that "dealing with Russia . . . 
is a blunder materially, morally, and patriotically."22
In New England, The Boston Pilot kept up a continuous 
barrage against any proposal to deal with the Soviets. 
Attacking the argument that recognition would be good for 
trade, the editor reminded his readers that England had not 
experienced any increased trade after extending recognition. 
Furthermore, commerce should be secondary when discussing a
nation which not only denied every human right but also per-
23secuted religion. As for the propriety of Catholics
sponsoring mass rallies to oppose recognition, this editor
could only say that "the honor of every human being in our
24Republic is at stake in the settlement of this issue."
Many other Catholic diocesan papers also came out 
against any dealings with Russia. The San Francisco Monitor 
compared the American offer of friendship to Russia to a man
2-*-Ibid. , March 25, 1933, p. 1.
22Ibid., July 8, 1933, p. 9.
23The Boston Pilot, March 4, 1933, p. 4.
24Ibid., May 27, 1933, p. 4.
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that "has clasped to his bosom a viper more deadly than 
death."25 The Catholic Telegraph of Cincinnati, Ohio, 
admitted Roosevelt's "sincerity and honesty of purpose," but 
said that "only insatiable greed" could prompt such a mis-
2 f.taken course as Russian recognition. The Catholic Herald
of Milwaukee was against any dealings with Russia. The
editor insisted that the Russian attempt to destroy democracy
should be the main consideration in this debate, and not
27trade advantages. In Chicago, The New World, which was
usually liberal, insisted that the United States would lose
face by dealing with Russia and gain nothing in the way of 
28commerce. The Catholic Messenger of Davenport, Iowa, 
argued that recognition of Russia would only stimulate com­
munist agents in the United States to greater acts of 
subversion. The editor warned that Roosevelt, by treating 
with the Soviets, might lose all the good will he had gained. 
Before even sitting down with the Russians, said this editor, 
Roosevelt should insist upon recognition of the Tsarist debt
^August 12, 1933, p. 8; this editorial view was 
endorsed by The Western Catholic.
26August 3, 1933, p. 4; November 2, 1933, p. 4.
2^The Catholic Herald, May 11, 1933, p. 4.
2®April 21, 1933, p. 4.
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and an end to subversion by the current masters of Russia.^9
The hatred of religion exhibited by the Soviet leaders was
the main factor in turning the editor of the Denver Catholic
Register against attempted negotiations. He insisted that
"many will ask whether the price we must pay by closing our
eyes to moral filth is not too great."
Catholic periodicals joined the diocesan papers in
their campaign against dealing with Russia. The Central-
Blatt and Social Justice magazine felt that recognition would
only strengthen a monster and push forward "the day when the
resurrected hordes of Jengis Khan will put an end to European 
. . . 31civilization." Commonweal attacked the ideas that recog­
nition would mean more trade with Russia, and that she was 
an honest customer. Russia's presumed repudiation of inter­
national law, her opposition to religious freedom, and her
ignorance of basic human rights, were in this magazine's
32eyes enough cause for refusing recognition. The Jesuit
^October 5, 1933, p. 2; June 8, 1933, p. 2.
3®October 29, 1933, p. 4; The Michigan Catholic and 
Our Sunday Visitor of Huntington, Indiana, were other 
Catholic papers opposed to recognition.
3^Central-Blatt and Social Justice, XXVI (April,
1933), 11.
32April 12, 1933, pp. 647-46; August 4, 1933, p. 337.
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journal, America, was also against recognition, chiefly 
because of Russian persecution of the church.^ Columbia, 
the official journal of the Knights of Columbus, insisted 
that the Russian government "does not merit the recognition 
of any civilized people." The question of trade benefits 
could not possibly make up for the loss of national honor 
which would follow our dealing with "such atheists."^4 In 
The Sign, a national Catholic magazine. Reverend Harold 
Purcell, editor, published articles condemning the recogni­
tion of Russia. Purcell wrote "in the hopes of doing the 
little within our power to give a true picture of Soviet 
Russia and do what we can to prevent our Christian Government
from entering into diplomatic or trade relations with the
3 5anti-Christ and anti-God Bolsheviks."
The opposition of the Catholic press was augmented by 
the efforts of various distinguished individual Catholics 
and by religious organizations. Prominent Catholics who 
expressed public opposition to the idea of the United States 
dealing with Russia included Father Charles Coughlin, Father
"^November 4, 1933, p. 97.
34January, 1933, p. 17; April, 1933, p. 11.
3^Quoted in NCWC News Service, March 31, 1933.
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John LaFarge, Father James Gillis, Father Jones I. Corrigan, 
professor at Boston College, and Bishop Joseph Schrembs of 
Cleveland. But undoubtedly the most vigorous voice in oppo­
sition belonged to Father Edmund A. Walsh, vice-president of
36Georgetown University.
A number of Catholic organizations also came out 
publicly against any change in relations with the Soviet 
Union. The National Council of Catholic Men passed a resolu­
tion stressing the fact that a nation which denied the 
existence of God could hardly be expected to abide by an 
international agreement.37 In Detroit, two hundred repre­
sentatives from the Holy Name Societies of the city started
a campaign to oppose recognition on the grounds that the
38Soviets were opposed to both democracy and religion. The 
Long Island Chapter of the Knights of Columbus, stressing 
the fact that religious persecution was going on in Russia, 
denounced any dealings with that nation. This group also
36Rev. John LaFarge, "Shall We Recognize Russia," 
America, February 18, 1933, pp. 472-73; The Brooklyn Tablet, 
February 25, 1933, p. 3; May 20, 1933, p. 1; Jacobs, "America 
Recognizes," p. 16; Commonweal, November 10, 1933, p. 29.
37The Catholic World, CXXXVIII {December, 1933), 357.
3^The Michigan Catholic. May 18, 1933, p. 1; also 
NCWC News Service. Detroit, February 11, 1933.
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pointed to the communist attempt to spread world revolution
as another factor which should prevent us from dealing with 
39them. In Massachusetts a petition against recognition 
gained over 600,000 signatures and was presented to the Roose­
velt administration by Senators David Walsh and Marcus A. 
Coolidge. The petition seems to have attracted little notice 
in the press, however, and there is every indication that it 
did not reach President Roosevelt.^® From Vatican City came
unofficial comments expressing hope that recognition of
41Russia by the United States could be prevented.
Not all Catholics, however, were so certain that the 
United States should ignore the Soviet Union. The Catholic 
Association for International Peace, during its annual con­
vention in 1933, attempted to draw up a comprehensive report 
on Russia, but was unable to make much headway because of 
the varied opinions represented in the organization.
^ The Brooklyn Tablet, April 1, 1933, p. 1.
^^When queried on it, Steve Early wrote that it 
probably went to the State Department and that he had not 
shown it to FDR. Steve Early to Mrs. J. C. Gray, August 2, 
1933, Official File 220-A, Russia miscellaneous, Box 4, 
Roosevelt Papers.
^Clipping of Washington Post. October 22, 1933, in 
Russia, 1933, Box 18, Papers of R. Walton Moore at Roosevelt 
Library, Hyde Park, New York.
2X9
Nevertheless, a tentative report was drawn up which embodied 
all of the different views expressed at the convention. One 
statement said that Russia was so important from an economic, 
political, cultural, and religious standpoint that "if it is 
at all possible to deal with her, such should be undertaken." 
Another comment was that Russia's communistic system made 
her a threat to world peace and impossible to deal with; 
thus, rather than recognition, action short of war should be 
taken to assist the Russian people in overthrowing the 
Bolsheviks. Finally, one group proposed that after recogni­
tion the United States should undertake by propaganda and 
diplomatic action to secure a change in the Russian attitude 
toward religion. This preliminary report, which revealed 
both an awareness of the complexity of the problem of recog­
nition and a divided mind on the solution, was signed by 
Father McGowan and other prominent prelates.^
Elsewhere Catholics were shocked to read that A1 Smith 
had advocated recognition of Russia in an appearance before 
the Senate Finance Committee. Smith expressed the opinion 
that he did not know "any reason for not doing it." He 
pointed out that, although the Tsars owed us money, we had
^Report of Catholic Association for International 
Peace, Washington, D. C., in Box 88, F. P. Walsh Papers.
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kept troops in Russia while technically at peace with her 
and that this occupation had caused some damage. More 
importantly, Smith stressed the fact that we already had 
clandestine trade with Russia, so why not bring it out in 
the open? He did not personally like the Soviet system, but 
felt that communism was no threat to the United States.4  ̂
These comments by Smith were enough to cause the Jesuit 
weekly America to wonder if there was not "a dent in the 
brown derby.1,44
Another prominent Catholic layman who supported the 
idea of recognition was Frank P. Walsh of New York City.
Walsh received a letter from Albert Coyle in which the latter 
sought assistance in his campaign to become American ambas­
sador to Russia. Coyle pointed out to Walsh that "your
i
office should logically get a very substantial amount of the
legal business that is certain to follow recognition of the
45Soviet Union." While this does not mean that Walsh was 
motivated by material gains, it is true that he favored
4^Paul Boiler, Jr., "The Great Conspiracy of 1933," 
Southwest Review, XXXIX (1954), 99.
44America, March 11, 1933, p. 543.
4^Albert Coyle to F. P. Walsh, November 9, 1933, Box 
88, F. P. Walsh Papers.
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recognition. When Roosevelt finally did establish relations^ 
with Russia, he received a telegram from Walsh assuring him 
that the deed would receive "a high place in the record of 
your splendid achievements."^6
Smith and Walsh, however, represented a distinct 
minority in Catholic opinion. Most Catholics agreed with 
Father Gillis, Father Walsh, and others, who vigorously 
opposed recognition. There was some optimism generated in 
group during 1933 that Roosevelt would back off from recog-
i
nizing Russia. In his invitation to an international confer­
ence in Washington during April to discuss the world-wide 
depression, the President ignored the Soviet Union— a fact 
looked upon by some as a sign that all plans of recognition 
had been shelved. Roosevelt's remarks to the National 
Conference of Catholic Charities in early October promoted a 
similar conclusion. At the conference, Roosevelt had made 
the remark that a nation could not ignore God and survive. 
This was interpreted as a direct slap at the Soviet Union.
Yet other Catholics realized that recognition of the Russian 
government really had little to do with the President1s
^ Mr. and Mrs. F. P. Walsh to President Roosevelt, 
telegram, November 18, 1933, Official File 220-A, Russia 
miscellaneous. Box 4, Roosevelt Papers.
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feeling on communism. It was reported that the whole question
"is being weighed as a practical one." Neither approval nor
disapproval of the regime was associated with diplomatic
recognition, which merely indicated "a working arrangement
with a de facto authority which will facilitate commercial 
47intercourse.
In October, however, Roosevelt took a step which dis­
pelled much of the false optimism occasioned in Catholic 
circles by his speech to the NCCC. On October 10, 1933, the 
President made public a letter which he had addressed to 
Mikhail Kalinin, President of Russia. In the letter Roose­
velt requested that the Soviet Government send a representa­
tive to the United States to discuss all outstanding 
differences between the two countries in hopes of settling 
them. In response to this invitation, Maxim Litvinov, Com­
missar for Foreign Affairs, left Russia for the United States.
With this development, many Catholics turned to 
Reverend Edmund Walsh for advice. Walsh was the first and 
foremost critic of recognition. Right after the 1932 
election, Walsh addressed a Women's Club of Holyoke, Massa­
chusetts, on the eternal conflict between the Russian and the
4^NCWC News Service, April 10, 1933 and "Washington 
Letter" of October 9, 1933.
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American view of life. Its dedication to world revolution
was the one thing that made Russia unique and made dealing
with it different from dealing with any other nation.48 A
few days later, in Brockton, Massachusetts, Walsh continued
his campaign against Russia, but said hopefully, "I doubt
very much that a Democratic administration will repudiate a
national policy initiated by Woodrow Wilson and continued by
49three Republican administrations."
As rumors of impending recognition grew stronger in 
1933, Walsh increased the pace of his campaign. He saw 
Russia's withdrawal from the League of Nations as a diplo­
matic move to promote United States recognition in exchange 
for Soviet pressure against Germany and J a p a n . I n  reply to 
Smith's statement favoring recognition, Walsh asserted that 
the New Yorker was really missing the main point of the dis­
pute. The questions of trade and repudiation of debts were 
really secondary to the fact that the two civilizations were 
"diametrically opposed in their principles, their practices,
48The Boston Pilot, November 19, 1932, p. 5.
49Quoted in The Brooklyn Tablet, November 26, 1932,
p. 6.
58The Brooklyn Tablet, March 18, 1933, p. 1.
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and their objectives. . . . "51 Commonweal added that Father 
Walsh was opposed to recognition primarily because "he is 
bitterly and justly opposed to the war upon religion, to the 
suppression of fundamental rights of the Christian conscience, 
wnich prevails there.
Walsh himself presented the most detailed statement 
of his argument against recognition before a mass meeting 
held in Washington on April 18, J.933, and attended by repre­
sentatives from the AFL, the American Legion, and other 
groups opposed to dealing with the Soviet Union. Once again 
the priest stressed the ideological aspects of the problem. 
His basic premise was that Russia was trying to destroy 
democracy via the Third International. Furthermore, the com­
munist ethic recognized no legal or moral law. Also the 
Bolsheviks could not even lay claim to complete sovereignty 
of Russian territory because of daily revolts by her enslaved 
people. Walsh concluded that only by abandoning the Third 
International and the aim of world revolution could Russia 
demonstrate a sincere desire to live in the community of 
nations. Strangely, Walsh made no mention in his speech of
S^The Boston Pilot, April 29, 1933, p, 12.
^ Commonweal, May 5, 1933, p. 4.
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Russia's persecution of the Church or of tne militant
53atheism of the Communist Party.
While Father Walsh was the most persistent opponent 
of recognition, he had valuable support from other sources. 
The Most Reverend Joseph Schrembs, Bishop of Cleveland, and 
Episcopal Chairman of the Department of Lay Organization of 
the NCWC, gave a public interview on October 23, 1933. In 
his statement the Bishop expressed the hope that the adminis­
tration would demand that "Russia promise liberty of con­
science and of religious worship to its citizens and that it 
cease from its active communistic propaganda" as a prerequi-
C  Asite of recognition. In Rome, Bishop Michele d'Herbigny, 
President of the Pontifical Commission for Russia at the 
Vatican, called on President Roosevelt to demand religious 
liberty as a requirement for United States recognition of 
Russia.^ Other sources indicate that even the Pope wished 
Roosevelt would use recognition as a leverage to get some
53Copy of address by Rev. Edmund Walsh in Congres­
sional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., in Official File 
220-A, Russia miscellaneous, Box 4, Roosevelt Papers;
Browder, Origins, p. 39.
^ N C W C  News Service, Cleveland, October 23, 1933.
55Jacobs, "America Recognizes," p. 13.
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guarantee of religious freedom from Russia.56
Behind the scenes it appears that President Roosevelt
was noting this Catholic opposition and talcing steps to
ameliorate it. On the same day that he sent his letter to
President Kalinin inviting discussion of the outstanding
differences between the two countries, Roosevelt met with
Father Walsh to discuss the whole question at the White
House. Walsh was later convinced that recognition was
already a fait accompli, and that Roosevelt suggested the
talk simply to find out the priest's reaction. Walsh later
stated that the President seemed to have a rather cavalier
attitude toward the issue. "In reply," said Walsh,
. . . to certain observations I had made respecting 
the difficulty of negotiating with the Soviets, he 
answered with that disarming assurance so character­
istic of his technique in dealing with visitors,
"Leave it to me, Father; I am a good horse dealer."
Perhaps to impress Walsh with the importance he attached to
religious freedom, the President asked him to prepare a report
on the state of religion in Russia which could be used when
serious discussions were undertaken.5  ̂ Despite Walsh's
later misgivings, it appears that he was convinced enough of
66Gannon, Cardinal Spellman Story, p. 98.
67Rev. Louis J. Gallagher, S.J., Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., 
A Biography (New York, 1962), p. 93.
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Roosevelt's sincerity to promise not to make any public 
statements which "would embarrass" the President in his 
talks with the Russians. This was a rather substantial con­
cession for a man who had taken such a public stand against
corecognition.
Indeed, other sources exist which seem to indicate 
that Roosevelt had succeeded in converting Walsh into an 
ally after their talk of October 10. On October 15, 1933, 
Walter G. Hooke of New York City wrote to Marvin McIntyre 
that Father Walsh had authorized him to say "that he [Walsh] 
was prepared to place the AFL, the American Legion, the 
Bishop Freeman Committee (Protestants), and the Catholics 
squarely behind the administration's program for Russia, 
solely on economic grounds, and with reasonable protection 
of our own interest." Admitting that this was an exaggerated 
view of Walsh's influence, it still represents a rather 
startling new position for the priest. In the same letter, 
Hooke requested that McIntyre arrange a conference for Walsh 
with the President because the priest was "anxious to 
furnish certain information."^9
^®Jacobs, "America Recognizes," p. 89.
^9Walter G. Hooke to Marvin McIntyre, October 15,
1933, Official File 220-A, Russia miscellaneous, Box 4, 
Roosevelt Papers.
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After the meeting, which occurred on Friday, October 
20, 1933, Walsh wrote to McIntyre to thank him for arranging 
it. The priest also said that he was "preparing the memo" 
requested by the President. He enclosed a copy of a press 
release he had made on October 21, "which I trust," he said, 
"will contribute something to the tranquility of mind needed 
for the forthcoming negotiations." The priest also mentioned 
that he had canceled a scheduled lecture in Providence, Rhode 
Island, on Russia and was substituting one of capitalism 
instead.60
The October 21 press release that Walsh referred to 
is a revealing document. In it the priest declared that 
President Roosevelt should not be restricted in his dealings 
with Russian diplomats by public debate among American 
citizens. "The President," said Walsh, "should not be ham­
pered, or annoyed, or embarrassed, as he undertakes to fulfill 
his constitutional duty and exercise his constitutional pre­
rogative in the conduct of our international relations."
This seemed a rather remarkable statement for someone who had 
engaged in vigorous public debate on the question of
60Rev. Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., to Marvin McIntyre., 
October 21, 1933, Official File 220-A, Russia, Box 4,
Roosevelt Papers.
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recognition for almost twelve months. Now when the issue 
reached its most critical stage, Walsh called for silence. 
Elsewhere in the statement, Walsh said he was not convinced 
that the President's letter to Kalinin insured that recog­
nition would take place. According to the priest, FDR 
simply wanted to discuss the outstanding problems between 
the two countries. Walsh said that if these difficulties 
could be resolved, he would be first to support recognition. 
He promised to refrain from making public comments until the 
conference between Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov was over.6^
How can this remarkable turnabout in Walsh's outlook 
be explained? It should be recalled that Walsh had con­
stantly attacked the inherent conflict between the Russian 
or communist philosophy of life and American democracy. 
Another subject of his attack was the subversion practiced 
by the Third International.62 He had given little discussion 
to the question of religious freedom in Russia or to the 
persecution of the Church. Instead, he had concentrated on 
the conflict of systems of government and philosophy. How he
61New York Times, October 22, 1933, p. 25; this press 
release seems to contradict Gallagher's observation that 
Walsh already accepted recognition as an accomplished fact.
62Jacobs, "America Recognizes," p. 89.
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expected a conference of diplomats to resolve this conflict 
is difficult to understand. Probably he did not expect any 
resolution to the problems he had raised in his speeches, 
but now realized that, in Walter Hooke's words, "the Presi- 
dent has the cards in his hands and he knows it."
It seems clear, however, that the President had con­
vinced Walsh that his best course of action, if he really 
wanted to assist his country in the forthcoming negotiations, 
would be to submit a private memorandum specifying in detail 
the particular grievances of the Church against Russia and 
citing cases and individual names. This would be worth more 
than public speeches filled with bitter generalities which 
could only weaken Roosevelt's hand in his talks with the 
Russians.
Before Walsh could present his memorandum, however, 
there were other developments. The priest had called Marvin 
McIntyre on October 30 and promised delivery of his memo on 
the following day. At the same time, he requested another 
private conference with President Roosevelt. In McIntyre's 
words, "certain embarrassing complications had come up" and 
Walsh felt that "we were going to run into opposition but
^Hooke to McIntyre, October 15, 1933, Official Pile 
220-A, Russia, Box 4, Roosevelt Papers.
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that it could be straightened out."^4 What complications he 
referred to were not stated, but it should be noted that 
Bishop Joseph Schrembs of Cleveland had recently made a 
public statement in which he listed certain demands which 
the United States should make as a prerequisite to recogni­
tion of Russia. Naturally, religious freedom was one of the 
Bishop's demands. Furthermore, the Catholic press had not 
ceased discussing the question. Reverend Wilfrid Parsons, 
S.J., editor of America, wrote an "Open Letter to M. Litivi-
C Cnov," in which he stressed the point of religious liberty.
The memorandum that Walsh finally sent to President
Roosevelt, on October 31, discussed the entire question of
religious liberty in Russia. The priest began by asserting
that "the attitude of the Soviet Government toward Religion
is entirely different from any other government in the
world." To prove this thesis, he used illustrations from
the pages of history and concluded by saying:
. . . Communism, which is the political, social and 
economic force controlling the Soviet Government, 
undertaken to abolish religion itself, the "God idea," 
in its every form and manifestation.
Marvin McIntyre to President Roosevelt, confidential 
memo, October 30, 1933, Official File 220, Russia, Box 1, 
Roosevelt Papers.
^ America, November 4, 1933, p. 107.
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Walsh then went on to sketch the history of religion under
the Communist party in Russia. Atheism was, said Walsh, an
integral part of a movement both international in design and
militant in attitude. This being the case,
. . . the anti-religious content of Soviet foreign 
policy, inasmuch as it visualizes the entire world, 
is as inadmissible by other foreign states as is 
the Third International. One is directed against 
our political sovereignty, the other against our 
religious institutions. Both are sponsored by the 
Soviet Government, no matter what the evasions or 
pretexts may be.
Once having said this, Walsh went on to make clear that he
did not favor extending diplomatic recognition to Russia.
If, however, recognition were extended, he hoped that the
following objectives might be supported by the United States:
1. Complete liberty of conscience for all, 
whether citizens of Russia or nationals of a 
foreign jurisdiction residing on Soviet territory, 
be they Catholics, Orthodox, Protestants, Jews or 
Mussulmans.
2. Private and public exercise of their religious 
beliefs for all by such external forms as appertain 
to their respective worship without discrimination 
arising from adherence to such religious beliefs.
3. Release of prisoners— Bishops, priests, other 
ministers of religion, and laymen— now in confine­
ment under charges connected with religion.
Walsh admitted that "conventional guarantees custom­
arily alleged are useless and sterile." This made it even 
more imperative that Roosevelt take a strong stand, because
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the United States was "the last government in a position to
effectively implement such guarantees." This could be done
"by requiring appropriate and explicit clauses to be inserted
in any proposed agreement— and published before recognition
or at least simultaneously." Walsh insisted that "the unusual
circumstances and the extraordinary importance of the issue
justify unusual and extraordinary measures." Certainly the
priest realized that if the United States did recognize the
Soviet Government without the aforementioned guarantees, such
action could not be interpreted as meaning that Roosevelt or
his administration favored the religious policies of the
communists. Nevertheless, he insisted that "recognition
without [such guarantees] would have the practical effect of
helping to perpetuate conditions that are a matter of public
record." Although pessimistic, Walsh could only hope that
Russia might "now be prepared to do something concrete in
amelioration of religious persecution in order to secure what
66they most need from the United States."
A few days later, Walsh sent in a supplement to his 
original document. In this letter, dated November 7, the
^Edmund A. Walsh, "Memorandum on Religion in Soviet 
Russia," presented to President Roosevelt, October 31, 1933, 
Washington, D. C. Copy in author's possession.
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priest pointed out that in several conferences he had with 
ex-Senator S. W. Brookhart of Iowa on Soviet recognition, a 
certain Boris Skvirsky, the unofficial Soviet representative 
in the United States, had entered into the talks and had 
relayed their substance to Moscow. According to Walsh, 
Moscow's reply was "Let Walsh specify who is in prison on 
account of religion and where. We will consider his proposi­
tion." Father Walsh suggested to Roosevelt that this answer 
was "valuable as indicating at least a tendency on the part 
of the Soviets to listen to the recommendations outlined in 
the memorandum,— and which we all devoutly hope you can per­
suade Mr. Litvinov to accept." Walsh also included for 
Roosevelt copies of editorials from Commonweal and America.
He described the views expressed therein as representing the 
feelings of the majority of American Catholics and what he 
himself would have said "had I not deemed it more helpful 
to rest our case on the arguments submitted in my private 
memorandum of Oct 31st."6^
What most Catholics would demand as preconditions for 
any dealings with the Soviet Union is not surprising.
®^Rev. Edmund A. Walsh to President Roosevelt,
November 4, 1933, Official File 220-A, Russia miscellaneous, 
1933, Box 4, Roosevelt Papers. The editorials will be 
discussed below.
Certainly a cessation of religious persecution was high on 
the list of priorities. Other sources spelled out the pre­
conditions in more detail. The Vatican, it seems, had asked 
Cardinal Hayes of New York to represent to Roosevelt its 
desires that he raise the question of religious persecution 
in his forthcoming talks with Litvinov. Cardinal Hayes sent 
Monsignor Robert F. Keegan to the White House to transmit 
this desire on the part of the Catholic Church. On November 
1, Keegan presented to President Roosevelt a memorandum on 
four topics: freedom of conscience for Russians and
foreigners? freedom of worship, public and private; libera­
tion of those imprisoned for their faith; and cessation of
fiftpropaganda against God.
Keegan must have been very eloquent in his presenta­
tion, for on November 2, Cardinal Hayes wrote a confidential 
note saying: "The President conferred with the Monsignor
for more than one hour . . . and substantially [accepted] 
the points of the memorandum."
During this same period, Bishop Francis Spellman of 
Boston also got into the act. He received a letter from
68Gannon, Cardinal Spellman, p. 425, fn. 2, who cites 
the Spellman Papers, a source open only to a select few.
69Ibid.
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Count Enrico Galeazzi which told of the Pope's desire to 
have the President insist upon religious freedom as a pre­
requisite for recognition of Russia. After recognition was 
extended to Russia, Bishop Spellman wrote in his diary,
"Jack Kelly and Mr. Galeazzi, whose names will never appear 
in history, did much to get President Roosevelt to insist 
that American citizens at least should worship God as they 
wished in Russia."7® Count Enrico Galeazzi was the official 
Vatican architect and Pius X I I ■s "closest lay adviser." 
According to Reverend Robert I. Gannon, Galeazzi and John C. 
Kelly gave FDR a picture of the religious situation in 
Russia "and the deep concern of all religious people outside 
of Russia."7'1'
While these oblique negotiations between Catholics 
and the administration over the terms of Russian recognition 
were going on, an incident occurred which indicates that 
Walsh, Keegan, and Spellman did not represent all American 
Catholics in this matter. The Bishops of the Administrative 
Council of the NCWC were scheduled to meet in Washington on
70Excerpts from Cardinal Spellman's Diary, November 7, 
1933 and November 10, 1933, cited in Gannon, Cardinal Spell­
man, p. 98.
71Rev. Robert I. Gannon, letter to author, May 6,
1965.
237
November 15, 1933, with Bishop Jcimes Ryan of Catholic Univer­
sity as host. Before the meeting opened, Reverend Maurice S. 
Sheehy of Catholic University wrote a letter to Marvin 
McIntyre, presumably with the knowledge and concurrence of 
Bishop Ryan, in which he made a number of interesting pro­
posals. Sheehy felt that the meeting of the bishops during 
the turmoil of debate on the recognition of Russia presented 
an opportunity to "render some service to the President, to 
whom we are unutterably indebted." One must speculate that 
this indebtedness was due to Roosevelt's appearance at 
Catholic University earlier in the year to receive an honorary 
degree. The question of Russian recognition, Sheehy con­
tinued, had disturbed many of the American bishops and they 
had, in turn, asked Bishop Ryan for guidance. Finally 
coming to the point, Sheehy suggested that the President 
might want to address the bishops "on the service religion 
can render to the Government in the present crisis." If this 
were not feasible, the priest recommended a formal statement 
by FDR that "the interests of religion were properly safe­
guarded in all international dealings." Sheehy's purpose was 
obvious— he wanted to forestall any statement by the bishops 
that might, as Walsh had earlier warned, hamper the President 
in his negotiations with Litvinov. It is strange that Sheehy
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should not have been aware of the negotiations already in 
progress between Walsh and Roosevelt, but there is no indi­
cation that he was. Sheehy ended his letter with a revealing 
statement:
The press and the educational institutions of 
the Catholic Church have been solidly behind Presi­
dent Roosevelt in his every move. We are concerned 
to insure that there be not the slightest break in 
this united front back of the President's program.
The priest feared that the negotiations with Russia might 
produce such a break and desperately wanted to head it off.
He need not have had any fears, for, as has been seen, other 
sources were already making arrangements with the adminis­
tration. Sheehy's own efforts, however, came to naught,
primarily because McIntyre felt the proposal too explosive
7 2and did not even acknowledge receipt of the letter.
It appears that only certain elements of the Church 
were aware of the administration’s willingness to listen to 
Catholic objections to recognition. These elements included 
Walsh and Cardinal Hayes. Despite this limited awareness, 
the Catholic press shifted its stand on the entire question
72 Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy to Marvin McIntyre, November
3, 1933, Official Pile, 220-A, Russia miscellaneous, Box 4,
Roosevelt Papers. McIntyre sent the letter to Miss LeHand 
with a memo saying, "maybe I am unduly cautious, but I am
not even acknowledging this letter."
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soon after Roosevelt sent his letter to President Kalinin of 
Russia on October 10. Editors no longer ruled out recogni­
tion completely, but instead concentrated on insisting that
the negotiations consider the question of religious freedom
73and persecution. Most editors agreed that Roosevelt him­
self was dedicated to such principles and would press for 
them more vigorously if public manifestations were made.
The Monitor of San Francisco now agreed to recognition “if
Russia is willing to recognize free religious organization 
74in Russia." The Michigan Catholic urged a joint statement 
by all Catholic organizations demanding, as a prerequisite
to diplomatic relations, “definite guarantees against reli-
7 5gious persecution and war on our government." The Brooklyn 
Tablet made similar demands, as did America.7^ In the latter 
publication, Father Parsons wrote an article entitled “Open 
Letter to M. Litvinov" in which he demanded religious freedom 
for Russia, but significantly stated that Catholics should 
stand behind the President in the discussions. Addressing
7^pax, November, 1933, p. 55.
740ctober 28, 1933, p. 1.
7^November 2, 1933, p. 4.
7^The Brooklyn Tablet, October 28, 1933, p. 1;
America, November 4, 1933, p. 97.
240
himself to Litvinov, Parsons warned, "you may be sure at the
outset that the President has our confidence and support in
7 7these d i s c u s s i o n s Commonweal echoed the sentiments of
Bishops Schrembs of Cleveland that Roosevelt should make
Russia "promise liberty of conscience and of religious wor- 
78ship." Extension magazine realized that the United States 
could not conduct international diplomacy on moral platitudes, 
but was still against recognition of Russia because in doing 
so we would "lose our shirts in any loan and buy trans-
7 Qaction. . . ."
In this atmosphere, after nine days of discussion, 
Roosevelt and Litvinov formally exchanged notes on their 
conversation on November 16. The notes contained a number 
of salient features. First, Russia promised to curtail sub­
versive activity in the United States. Second, the Soviets 
agreed to permit to American citizens in Russia free exercise 
of their religion. Third, both nations promised to negotiate 
a settlement of mutual claims. This exchange of notes 
represented the extension of full diplomatic recognition to
^America, November 4, 1933, p. 107.
7 8Quoted in Commonweal, November 10, 193o, p. 30.
^December, 1933, p. 17.
241
the Soviet Union by the United States. Clearly the question 
dealing with religious freedom played a significant part in 
the negotiations. William Bullitt even described Litvinov as 
becoming exasperated with Roosevelt's preoccupation with 
religion while important trade matters were yet to be dis­
cussed.®^
This emphasis on religion, however, was not due solely
to the pressure of American Catholics. It should be recalled
that Roosevelt himself had a high regard for the role of
religion in any society. His remark to the NCCC that nations
must recognize God in order to survive, was not mere political
window-dressing. Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor under
Roosevelt, was convinced that it was the President's personal
convictions, rather than "Roman Catholic pressure," which
caused him to stress the religious guarantees in the talks
with Litvinov. "It seemed to him," she wrote, "a natural
81moral guarantee." x Furthermore, Roosevelt frequently took 
pleasure in describing how he lectured Litvinov on the 
importance of religion, even going so far as to predict that 
the Russian would himself return to God before he died.
Gannon, Cardinal Spellman, p. 175.
81Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, pp. 142-43.
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Roosevelt related that at this, "Max got red and fumbled and
Opseemed embarrassed and just didn't know quite what to say."
Of course, recognition of Roosevelt's religious sincerity
*
does not preclude recognition of his political sensitivity. 
Here was one occasion when, by serving one, he also "served 
the additional purpose of placating some of the vigorous 
opposition to recognition . . .  by the Catholic Church."8^
As other observers have pointed out, most Americans 
were quite satisfied with the terms of recognition worked 
out by Roosevelt and Litvinov. Before Litvinov sailed for 
home, he was given a farewell dinner in New York City. Many 
prominent American businessmen attended, but it was noted
84that "no Cardinal or other Catholic official was present." 
This did not mean, however, that American Catholics were 
displeased with President Roosevelt's actions. Indeed, 
evidence indicates that the President emerged from the affair 
with an even higher reputation among Catholics than he had 
possessed before it started. Monsignor Robert F. Keegan,
82Quoted in ibid., p. 143.
83Tugwell, Democratic Roosevelt, p. 346. Tugwell 
observes that FDR "felt very strongly" about freedom of 
religious worship.
84°^Boller, "Great Conspiracy," p. 111.
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Cardinal Hayes's Secretary, congratulated Roosevelt on his 
achievement. "The masterly fashion," wrote Keegan, "in which 
you championed the vitally sacred principles which we Ameri­
cans hold so dear is clear." Keegan also spoke of the 
Cardinal's satisfaction over the terms of recognition.®5 
The President replied that "we have really accomplished much 
in regard to the difficult question of religion in Russia," 
and asked for official Catholic sentiment on the terms.86
Official Catholic sentiment on the terms of recogni­
tion was not difficult to discover. Individual Catholics 
did not hesitate to comment on the proceedings. Father 
Walsh, the most articulate opponent of recognition, issued a 
statement in Washington on November 23. He felt the agree­
ment meant the end of the Third International. Acceptance 
of the President's terms, said Walsh, meant "a significant 
abandonment of the previous Soviet policy." But Walsh was
careful to point out that much depended upon an honest ful-
87fillment of the terms by the Soviet Union. Reverend Joseph 
F. Thorning, S.J., one of America's editors, emphasized that
85Msgr. Keegan to FDR, November 18, 1933, President's 
Personal File, Box 628, Roosevelt Papers.
®6FDR to Msgr. Keegan, November 22, 1933, ibid.
®70uoted in The Boston Pilot, November 25, 1933, p. 12.
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the chief aspect of the entire agreement was that the inherent
spiritual nature of man had been recognized by Russia. The
talks were a lesson in morality for the Soviet Union and
could possibly open the door for a change in her godless 
88policy. Another Jesuit, Reverend John LaParge, was skepti­
cal of Russia's sincerity but not of FDR's. No one who had 
seen President Roosevelt's "profoundly religious and 
patriotic attitude," said LaFarge, could doubt that he would 
insist upon the fulfillment of the terms of the agreement.88 
It was also reported, by Bishop Henry P. Rohiman of Davenport, 
Iowa, that Pope Pius XI was gratified with Roosevelt's work 
in securing freedom of worship for Americans in Russia.88
The Catholic press, while divided on the merits and 
terms of recognizing Russia, was unanimous in its praise of 
President Roosevelt's personal behavior. The Brooklyn Tablet 
did not want recognition now or ever, but felt that FDR's 
handling of the entire matter was "splendid." The Catholic 
News of New York was skeptical about Russia's sincerity, but 
hoped that this might mark the beginning of a change in that
®8Rev. Joseph F. Thorning, S.J., "What Russian Recog­
nition Means," America, December 2, 1933, p. 200.
89Quoted in The Brooklyn Tablet, January 6 , 1934, p. 4.
88New York Times, March 27, 1934, p. 9.
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country. The Baltimore Catholic Review was not satisfied 
with religious freedom solely for Americans, but wanted it 
extended to Russians as well. The Denver Catholic Register 
felt that "President Roosevelt acted in the best of con­
science," but that "recognition was granted because of 
secret international fears." Both The Intermountain Catholic 
of Salt Lake City and The Witness of Dubuque, Iowa, called 
recognition a mistake. The Catholic Universe Bulletin of 
Cleveland felt obliged to support FDR's action because he 
apparently knew more of the entire situation than did the 
general public and the paper trusted his judgment. In 
Rochester, New York, The Catholic Courier congratulated 
President Roosevelt for "winning from Litvinov the concession 
of freedom of religion." The Western Catholic of Quincy, 
Illinois, speculated that Litvinov must have been "shocked" 
by Roosevelt's great stress on religion. FDR's action, 
according to The Catholic Herald of St. Louis, Missouri,
served "official notice that religion means something to the
91American people."
Throughout its coverage of recognition, the Catholic 
press seemed certain of two facts: that recognition of
91A review of these editorial opinions is presented 
in NCWC News Service, December 4, 1933.
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Russia was a bad policy no matter how interpreted; and
second, that President Roosevelt was a hero for defending
the value of religion in society against communistic propa- 
9 2ganda. The over-all reaction was best summarized by
Commonweal, which said that FDR "accomplished as much for
9 3religious freedom in Russia as . . . was possible. A few
sources even credited Catholic pressure with being the
decisive factor in winning the issue of religious liberty a
place at the bargaining table. It was, asserted The Brooklyn
Tablet, the united action of Catholic and Protestant groups
which caused FDR to go slow in the negotiations and to
demand religious freedom as one of the conditions ,for recog- 
9 4nition. The Michigan Catholic felt that Roosevelt 
obviously "kept uppermost in his mind" the demands by Catholics
that he request guarantees of religious liberty from the
9 5Russians. America was satisfied about the terms because
96"what we asked for was accomplished."
^Pax, December, 1933, p . 91.
93December 1, 1933, p. 117.
9 4 November 18, 1933, p. 1.
^November 30, 1933, p. 4.
^December 2, 1933, p. 193.
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What remains unexplained amid all this editorial com­
ment is how the Catholic Church could change from a position 
of outright hatred for a godless regime, whose basic princi­
ples precluded international agreements or any dealings with 
democracies, to a position which, while still skeptical, 
could view the terms of recognition as a real achievement, 
provided Russia kept its word. After constantly hammering 
away at the untrustworthiness of the Russians, "suddenly, the
hierarchy seemed to believe that Moscow, with equal sudden-
97ness, would faithfully adhere to the paper pledges." '
After debating the question of relations on a level which
took note of such historic and philosophical principles of
communism as world revolution, the class struggle, and ethical
pragmatism, Catholics seemed greatly reassured over "paper
pledges" of religious liberty for Americans— a condition which
98Litvinov always insisted already existed in Russia. A 
final explanation for this shift of position is impossible, 
but one may hypothesize that perhaps the Church and most 
Catholic spokesmen never really expected to prevent Roose­
velt's negotiations with Russia, but felt duty bound to make
97Jacobs, "America Recognizes," p. 90.
9®Ibid., p. 19.
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their opinions known on the subject. Then when the adminis­
tration seemed to take cognizance of their views and gave 
them some attention, they became flattered by the unexpected 
hearing. Thrown slightly off balance by the President's 
interest, they accepted his largely meaningless demand for 
religious liberty of Americans in Russia with little critical 
analysis. How else explain Father Walsh who at one time 
stressed the untrustworthiness of Russia and afterwards said 
that the only thing that remained short of normal relations 
was the "honest . . . fulfillment of Moscow's public pledge"? 
Surely all of his prior comments indicated that, to him, such 
an honest fulfillment from the Soviets was impossible.
CHAPTER X 
THE MEXICAN AFFAIR
The Roosevelt administration has been praised by 
historians for its development of a "Good Neighbor" policy 
toward Latin America. The merits and justice of this title 
are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Any final assess­
ment of Roosevelt's Latin American policy would, however, be 
incomplete without an evaluation of his dealings with Mexico 
during the height of that country's troubles with the 
Catholic Church. Such a commentary may also throw additional 
light on the relationship between the American Catholic 
Church and the Roosevelt administration, for the antagonism 
aroused over the "Mexican question" was the most severe strain 
imposed on the generally harmonious relationship between 
Roosevelt and American Catholics.
In order to appreciate the sensitivity of the Mexican 
situation, it should be recalled that the question of the 
Church's role in Mexico, following the epic period of the 
Revolution, had not been settled satisfactorily. As a close 
ally of the old established regimes preceding the Revolution,
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the Church was viewed by many Mexicans as being opposed to 
the Revolution and the ideas behind it. The Church's influ­
ence in education was considered to be a serious hinderance 
to the social goals of the Revolution. During the 1920's, 
much anti-Church legislation had been passed and actual 
physical conflict had broken out between the followers of 
the government and the Church. American Catholics had shown 
a lively interest in the fate of their co-religionists south 
of the border and, through the good offices of Ambassador 
Dwight Morrow, had participated in negotiations to bring 
about a truce between Church and State in 1929. This 
arrangement, however, was a precarious one at best and soon 
the Mexican Government was once more challenging the Church's 
prerogative in education.^
It was with a keen awareness of this situation that 
American Catholics viewed the appointment of Josephus Daniels 
as the Roosevelt ambassador to Mexico. Daniels, as Secretary 
of Navy under President Wilson, had been the chief of the 
young Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was serving as Assistant 
Secretary. Daniels' selection as ambassador in 1933 meant,
^E. David Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison, 
Wisconsin, 1960), p. 83; E. D. Cronon, "American Catholics 
and Mexican Anticlericalism, 1933-1936," Mississippi Valiev 
Historical Review, XLV (September, 1958), 202.
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as the NCWC viewed it, that "FDR would have a personal 
representative in this extra sensitive post."^
American Catholics lost little time in informing 
Daniels of the importance of his new post. Reverend Wilfrid 
Parsons, editor of America. wrote an open letter to the new 
ambassador calling upon him to use his position to pressure 
the Mexican government into curtailing its persecution of 
the Church. Parsons assured Daniels that he had the author­
ity to do this based upon the precedents established by 
Ambassador Dwight W. Morrow. Thus from the very outset 
Daniels was called upon by American Catholics to become 
embroiled in the Church-State question. While not directly 
calling for Daniels to meddle into the internal affairs of a 
foreign nation. Reverend John Burke, Secretary of the NCWC, 
wrote a confidential letter to the Ambassador cautioning him 
about the explosiveness of the Church-State question in his 
new post.4
It soon became clear that many American Catholics
^NCWC News Service, March 20, 1933.
*^Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, "An Open Letter to Ambassador 
Daniels," America, April 1, 1933, pp. 618-19; NCWC News 
Service, April 1, 1933.
4 Cronon, Josephus Daniels, p. 85.
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needed no excuse in order to protest against what they con­
sidered to be unjust treatment of their co-religionists in 
Mexico. On January 12, 1933, the Bishops' Administrative 
Committee of the NCWC issued a statement protesting the anti­
clerical practices of the Mexican government. They asked 
American citizens "to interest themselves in the restoration 
in Mexico of religious freedom for its citizens."^ Ambas­
sador Daniels was, it seemed, about to become a scapegoat 
for an attempt to pressure the Roosevelt administration into 
helping the Church in Mexico.
Daniels was soon to realize that it was virtually 
impossible to avoid the critical eyes of American Catholics. 
When presenting his credentials to President Abelardo L. 
Rodriguez upon arrival in Mexico, the new ambassador 
expressed admiration for the great social advances made by 
the Mexican people. The statement was a mere platitude, 
almost universal among diplomats at largely ceremonial 
meetings. Yet Daniel's remarks provoked condemnation by the 
Baltimore Catholic Review and a few other Catholic publica­
tions. This— to Catholics— inauspicious beginning was 
mitigated some by the effect of the ambassador's call for
^Huber, Our Bishops Speak, p. 201.
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freedom of religion in his address in Mexico City on July 14, 
1933. This address was given wide coverage by American 
Catholic papers.**
In the meantime, events occurred in Mexico which gave 
Daniels reason to hope that his conduct could win the support 
of American Catholics. Archbishop Diaz of Mexico City, one 
of the leading churchmen in the country, had seen fit to 
praise Daniels for his "high conception and conduct . . .  on 
religious matters." The Archbishop remarked in private 
conversation that the ambassador's public statements and 
actions "had gained the friendship, respect and confidence 
of many people in and out of government circles."^
Daniels' hopes were shortlived, for soon American 
Catholics were demanding his recall. In retrospect, the 
cause celebre which was the reason American Catholics called 
for Daniels' dismissal and pressured President Roosevelt to 
intervene in Mexican affairs, seems embarrassingly innocent. 
On July 26, 1934, Ambassador Daniels addressed the members of
6The Brooklyn Tablet, July 22, 1933, p. 1; Cronon, 
"Mexican Anticlericalism," pp. 203-204.
^Memorandum of a conversation between Colonel Moreno 
and Archbishop Diaz, Mexico City, August 28, 1933, Box 777, 
Josephus Daniels Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress.
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a seminar on education in Mexico City. In the course of his 
speech, he quoted the remarks of General Plutarco Elias 
Calles on the importance of education to the future of Mexico. 
Callas had said, "we must enter and take possession of the 
mind of childhood, the mind of youth." Daniels, considering 
this phrase innocent enough, had remarked that, "to the 
carrying out of that aim, which alone can give to Mexico the 
high place envisioned by its statesmen, the Government is 
making the rural school a social institution."®
What appeared innocent to Ambassador Daniels, however, 
was not viewed in the same light by American Catholics. A 
few Catholic publications immediately criticized the speech. 
Seeking to head off an unpleasant situation, the NCWC News 
Service■sought out Daniels own interpretation of the affair 
and published a fair account. It stressed the fact that the 
Ambassador was only endorsing the type of public school
Qsystem used in the United States. But many Catholic editors 
had a different interpretation of the speech. Commonweal 
wrote that Daniels' action in "upholding the destructive 
central policy of the absolute state, will have a profound
Q #Copy of address by Daniels, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
QCronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 208.
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effect upon the New Deal in the U. S." It would cause 
Americans "to ask themselves how soon they are to meet the 
same fate here as their fellow religionists are suffering in 
Russia, Germany, and Mexico."^® The Catholic World, through 
the editorial comments of Reverend James Gillis, said that 
the education praised by Daniels was socialized and atheistic. 
Gillis felt that Daniels should keep quiet or else resign his 
p o st.H The Jesuit weekly, America, agreed that Daniels 
should resign. If the Ambassador did not know the entire 
context of Calles' remarks that he had quoted, his ignorance 
could not be excused. Later the same magazine claimed that 
the entire "good neighbor" policy developed by Roosevelt was
being jeopardized by an antireligious government fostered by
12our State Department.
The protest soon spread to Catholic organizations.
In New York City, delegations of Catholic students picketed
^October 26, 1934, p. 600.
^ The Catholic World, CXL (December, 1934), 259-60.
•^America, September 1, 1934, p. 484; December 1,
1934, p. 169. Catholic diocesan papers also joined the gen­
eral condemnation of Daniels; see The Catholic Register. 
Baltimore Catholic Review, and The Brooklyn Tablet, which 
all expressed disapproval of Daniels' remarks and suggested 
his removal. Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 208;
The Brooklyn Tablet, November 3, 1934, p. 9.
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the Mexican Consulate and called for the resignation of 
Ambassador Daniels. The Catholic Evidence Guild sent letters 
of indignation to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull.
Even the Ancient Order of Hibernians got into the act.1^
Mary C. Duffy, Regent of the Catholic Daughters of America, 
wrote to the President protesting Daniels' endorsement of 
the pagan education of Mexico.14 The Holy Name Societies of 
Cleveland, Ohio, and Richmond, Virginia, passed similar reso­
lutions rebuking Daniels and asking for his recall.16 Both 
the National Council of Catholic Women and the Massachusetts 
League of Catholic Foresters sent resolutions to the White 
House expressing very much the same theme.16
Other signs appeared which indicated the growing 
seriousness with which American Catholics viewed the situation. 
A public meeting was called in New York City to protest the 
anticlerical policy of the Mexican Government. Reverend 
Wilfrid Parsons made the major speech of the evening and
1^The Boston Pilot, December 22, 1934, p. 1.
14Mary C. Duffy to President Roosevelt, November 8,
1934, Reel 1, Sel. Mat.
15Cronon, “Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 209? NCWC 
News Service, Cleveland, October 20, 1934.
16Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 209; The 
Boston Pilot, January 12, 1935, p. 3.
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criticized Ambassador Daniels. Parsons also sounded a note 
which was to recur during the whole episode. He called on 
the United States to stop intervening in Mexican affairs as 
it was doing through its support for the current anti­
clerical government. Here was a nice bit of double-think. 
Realizing the futility of calling for Roosevelt to intervene 
to help the Church in Mexico, Parsons would avoid this diffi­
culty by calling for a cessation of intervention, both a 
possible and popular move. The priest pointed to Daniels'
endorsement of Calles' speech as evidence that the United
17States was, in fact, intervening in Mexico. The priest's 
assertion received support from Reverend Charles C. Coughlin, 
the radio priest of Detroit. Coughlin told his listeners 
that the United States Government "from Wilson down to our 
President Roosevelt, has aided and abetted the rape of 
Mexico."18
What explains the scope and rapidity of protest 
following Daniels' action? The fact that such a storm of 
protest followed so quickly the remarks of the Ambassador 
makes one speculate that American Catholics were anxiously
-*-̂New York Times, November 19, 1934, p. 14.
l8Quoted in The Brooklyn Tablet, December 29, 1934,
p. 3.
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looking for some reason to voice their growing concern over 
the persecution of the Church in Mexico. If Daniels had not 
made his statement, some other excuse would no doubt have 
been found to release the frustrated feelings of American 
Catholics. Indeed, as events developed, Daniels himself soon 
faded into the background as Catholics directed their pres­
sure toward Roosevelt himself, demanding that he intervene 
in Mexico to stop the persecution of the Church. It was 
perhaps inevitable that Roosevelt would be dragged into the 
dispute which arose over Daniels. The Ambassador was the 
personal friend of the President. Furthermore, as the scope 
of criticism widened, it was essential to Catholics that the 
President become the focal point for pressure since he alone 
could dictate the policy they sought.
One of the first signs that the President would be 
called upon to enter the dispute was the great volume of mail 
pouring into Washington from Catholic sources. Most of these 
letters asked for Daniels’ removal and for an end to Mexican 
anticlericalism. The list of Senators and Representatives 
asked to take action in this matter is a lengthy one. It 
included such separate representatives as Senator Francis T. 
Maloney of Connecticut, Representatives James M. Meade of 
New York, and Ernest Lundeen of Minnesota. In fact, few
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Senators and Representatives were neglected in the surge of
protest mail, which came both from individuals and from groups
such as the Knights of Columbus. Of course, the fact that a
Senator or a Representative presented a petition to Congress
did not mean that he was personally committed to the ideas
expressed in the petition. Senator Robert Wagner of New
York, for one, simply put forward petitions sent to him by
his constituents without any supporting remarks. Although
some Catholic papers attempted to leave the impression that
Wagner was in sympathy with the resolution, such was not the 
19case.
Catholic attempts to exert Congressional pressure on 
the administration to take action against Mexico received 
unexpected support from widely respected Senator William E. 
Borah of Idaho. Borah introduced a resolution in the Senate 
in late January, calling for an investigation by the foreign 
relations committee "into the persecution of Christians . . .
19Clipping of The Catholic Telegraph, January 24,
1935, in Box 778, Daniels Papers; The Boston Pilot, January
26, 1934, p. 1; see Official File 28, Roosevelt Papers, for 
letters of protest. E. David Cronon, in Josephus Daniels in 
Mexico. calls Wagner "an influential Catholic Democrat." As 
a matter of fact, Senator Wagner did not become a Catholic 
until the 1940's. Cronon is also mistaken about the religious 
affiliation of Rep. John Higgins of Massachusetts, whom he 
also discusses under the topic of Catholic congressmen.
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now being practiced in Mexico." The measure also called for
Senate resolutions protesting the "anti-religious campaign"
2 oin Mexico. Why Senator Borah, an avid isolationist and 
non-Catholic, should sponsor a measure so inconsistent with 
his career is difficult to analyze. When asked to explain 
his action, Borah said he had evidence that American citizens 
were "being maltreated" in Mexico. If American citizens 
were not involved, however, he said "the situation would be 
different."21
Evidence exists that the idea of a resolution
originated with Martin H. Carmody, Supreme Knight of the
Knights of Columbus. The Knights had visited Congress in 
early January, 1935, to help put pressure on the Roosevelt 
administration. A delegation of Knights had met with Repre­
sentative Higgins and Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts.
Judge John E. Swift, Massachusetts director of the Knights,
22reported later that both men promised to be helpful. Walsh, 
who was in contact with the Apostolic Delegate regarding the
2^Quoted in The Catholic World, CXL (March, 1935), 746.
21Quoted in The Boston Pilot, February 16, 1935, p. 3.
22 .Newspaper clipping, January 21, 1935, in Scrapbook
No. 49, David I. Walsh Papers, Holy Cross College Library,
Worcester, Massachusetts.
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Vatican’s attitude toward Mexico, apparently agreed to 
approach Borah and ask him to present the resolution. Walsh
and Carmody probably felt that the petition would gain more
23weight if introduced by a widely respected non-Catholic.
In any event, Carmody wired to Borah on January 31, 1935, 
that Walsh had informed him of the former's willingness to 
sponsor the resolution.2^ The question still remains, how­
ever, as to why Borah should be susceptible to Walsh's 
pressure. One scholar has speculated that this was a pay­
off for the strong Catholic support Borah had earlier re­
ceived in defeating the World Court resolution.2^ Whatever 
his motive, it soon was apparent that Borah was not enthus­
iastic about the resolution. He failed to defend it 
vigorously and even refrained from voting for it when it 
later came up before the committee.
The Catholic press, on the other hand, strongly 
supported the Borah resolution. Commonweal, generally more
22Clipping of Boston Globe, January 27, 1935, Scrap­
book No. 49, David I. Walsh Papers.
2 A Robert E. Quigley to Rev. W. L. Lucey, September 13, 
1960, in Letter Pile, 1935, David I. Walsh Papers. Mr. 
Quigley, professor of History at LaSalle College, wrote Rev. 
Lucey, Holy Cross Librarian, and cited Carmody's telegram 
to Borah of January 31, 1935, in the Borah Papers.
2^Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 214.
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temperate in its statements, supported the congressional
attacks on Daniels.28 The editor of America answered the
objection that the Borah resolution would be intervention in
Mexico's internal affairs by asserting that "the Mexican
question is an American question of the most domestic kind."
His reasoning was based on the premise that the United States
had put the existing "atheistic" Mexican government in power
originally. "An inquiry into religious persecution in
Mexico," said the editor, "is an inquiry into our own deal-
2 7ings with Mexico." When it appeared that Roosevelt was 
not supporting the Borah resolution, The Catholic World wrote
that the administration would be more sympathetic "if Method-
28ists or Baptists were suffering in Mexico." Diocesan 
newspapers also clamored for the passage of the Borah resolu­
tion. They generally insisted that Americans had a right to 
know what was going on in Mexico. The idea that President 
Roosevelt might be out to kill the resolution led some of 
these papers to warn that the consequences of such an action
26Commonweal, January 18, 1935, p. 329.
^America, February 16, 1935, p. 437; March 2, 1935,
p. 487.
28The Catholic World, CXL (February, 1935), 523.
might be political alienation.^
These newspapers were right in their assessment of 
President Roosevelt's attitude. The administration viewed 
the Borah resolution as a gigantic mistake. R. Walton Moore, 
Undersecretary of State, wrote to Senator Pittman that the 
measure was "a premature indictment of a friendly neighboring 
Government." More importantly, Moore said the measure had 
the effect of permitting the Senate to shape foreign policy 
"without the aid or advice of the President."'*® Actually 
there was little danger of the measure being adopted once 
the President and Cordell Hull let their desires be known.
This set back, however, did not distract some of the 
more vitriolic critics of Roosevelt's Mexican policy. 
Representative Clare G. Fenerty of Pennsylvania, Representa­
tive Hamilton Fish of New York, and Representative John P. 
Higgins of Massachusetts kept the drums beating in the House. 
By June, Higgins was circulating a petition among hris col­
leagues asking for an inquiry into the religious persecution 
in Mexico. This was the Borah resolution minus Borah.
^9The Brooklyn Tablet, April 13, 1935, p. 10; The 
Catholic Herald, April 4, 1935, p. 4; The Boston Pilot,
August 31, 1935, p. 6 .
3 ®R. Walton Moore to Senator Pittman [n.d.], Box 10, 
Mexico, R. Walton Moore Papers.
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Higgins succeeded in obtaining the signature of 242 members 
of the House to his petition. What this meant in terms of 
real support is unclear, because various motives were involved 
in the response. A number of Catholic Representatives were 
absent from the list. Furthermore, pressure was successfully 
exerted by other Catholic Representatives, who did sign the 
petition, to add a footnote saying that the signees were 
"unalterably opposed to any semblance of . . . intervention 
in Mexico.
On July 16, 1935, Higgins presented the petition to 
President Roosevelt at the White House. In its final form, 
the document deplored the persecution of all Christians and 
not just the Catholic Church. It asked that Roosevelt 
inquire about the inability of American citizens to practice 
their faith in Mexico but rejected any intervention by the 
United States into the internal affairs of that nation. It 
appeared that the petitioners really wanted a statement by
FDR in which he would publicly disassociate himself from
32Mexico's antireligious policy. Roosevelt, however, was
31Edward L. Reed to R. Walton Moore, June 21, 1935,
Box 10, Moore Papers; Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 
219; New York Times, July 17, 1935, p. 1.
^2New York Times, June 22, 1935, p. 13; July 17,
1935, p. 1.
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aware that the main question remained the status of the 
Catholic Church under the current Mexican government. In 
answer to the petition, he issued a statement saying he was 
in sympathy with those who "make it clear that the American 
people and the Government believe in freedom of religious 
worship not only in the United States, but also in other 
nations.1,33
The Catholic press was happy to play up the Presi­
dent's remark as a forthright call for a cessation of 
religious persecution in Mexico. A large number of diocesan
papers carried verbatim reports of the President's state- 
34ment. The NCWC News Service sent out a story with the 
explanatory note that President Roosevelt's remarks must be 
construed as a protest against Mexico's antireligious 
campaign. This protest was, according to this source, the
O Cmotive behind the petition. The Denver Catholic Register 
thanked FDR "for breaking the silence on the persecution of 
Catholics in Mexico," and confidently predicted an "official 
protest from Washington to Cardenas." Such a protest, the
33Rosenman, Public Papers, IV, 305.
34P. H. Callahan to James A. Farley, August 1, 1935, 
Box 778, Daniels Papers.
3^NCWC News Service, July 22, 1935.
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editor felt, would have a telling effect."*® The Commonweal
applauded the President’s statement and suggested that this
attitude might lead to a "Kellogg Pact" type of international
agreement by all nations "pledging freedom of religious 
37worship." The editors of America said that when FDR 
issued his statement, "a major objective of our campaign on 
Mexico was achieved. Altogether, the congressional 
petition seemed to have produced satisfactory results.
Not all Catholics, however, were satisfied with this 
settlement. Existing concurrently with congressional pres­
sure were the efforts being made by the Knights of Columbus. 
Indeed, the Knights represented the most serious Catholic 
effort to have Roosevelt intervene in Mexico. The Knights’ 
activities began on January 13, 1935, when the Supreme Board 
met in New York City and adopted a resolution attacking the 
Mexican Government as being "opposed to religion, morality, 
justice, and liberty." The resolution further declared that 
the anticlericalism in Mexico meant that this nation had 
"forfeited its rights to further association with our govern­
ment. . . . "  As a consequence of this feeling, the Supreme
36July 18, 1935, p. 1. 37July 26, 1935, p. 316.
38July 27, 1935, p. 362.
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Board, in the name of 500,000 Knights, petitioned the Roose­
velt administration
. . .  to make representations to the government of 
Mexico, that unless the evils . . . are ended forth­
with, further recognition of the Mexican government 
will be withdrawn and diplomatic relations . . . 
will be severed.39
These statements were the opening broadside in a cam­
paign by the Knights which would last throughout 1935. The 
major protagonist in the Knights' effort was Martin H.
Carmody of New Haven, Connecticut. Carmody was the Supreme 
Knight of the organization, and was characterized by one 
observer as "a life-long R e p u b l i c a n . E a r l y  in January, 
1935, Carmody and a committee of Knights sought a private 
interview with the President to press their case. Their 
argument at that time, and throughout the dispute, incor­
porated all the stock phrases used by Catholics to attack the 
Mexican government and gives little indication of original or 
personal investigation. Roosevelt demurred from meeting the 
Knights at this time, claiming the press of public business, 
and referred them to Cordell Hull and the State Department. 
After meeting with the Secretary for an hour, the Knights
39Quoted in The Boston Pilot, January 26, 1935, p. 2.
4 0P. H. Callahan to Stephen B. Gibbons, August 8 ,
1935, Box 778, Daniels Papers.
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emerged and termed the talk "very satisfactory." From here
they visited Senators Pittman, Wagner, and David Walsh,
undoubtedly to coordinate the congressional petitions on 
41Mexico.
Roosevelt, however, was mistaken if he felt he could 
placate Carmody and company by having Hull assure them of 
the United States' continued interest in religious freedom.
By April, 1935, Carmody was writing Roosevelt again. In his 
letter, the Supreme Knight pointed out that no action had 
been taken on the January resolution passed by the Knights.
He reminded the President that conditions in Mexico had grown 
worse since that time and that women and children were being 
subjected to persecution for their faith. Carmody requested 
a private conference with Roosevelt as soon as possible to 
discuss the matter. Before FDR had time to reply another 
letter of May 3, arrived from Carmody. In this second letter, 
Carmody was acting under authorization of the Supreme Board 
of Directors who, meeting in Detroit in early May, had 
apparently been stirred to action by the May 1 statement of 
the American bishops on the Mexican situation. Carmody now 
complained about Roosevelt's disregard for the prior petitions
4^NCWC News Service, January 22, 1935.
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of the Knights, explained that conditions in Mexico were 
getting worse, and deplored the apparent opposition of the 
administration to the Borah resolution. The Supreme Knight 
also insisted that there was clear precedent for intervention 
in such a case of religious persecution as was now occurring 
in Mexico.
Roosevelt referred Carmody's second letter to the 
State Department for preparation of a suitable reply. By 
May 11, Assistant Secretary of State Moore had drawn up a 
reply for the President's signature. Moore stressed that 
the United States had no more right to intervene in the case 
of Church-State relations than it had in any other domestic 
Mexican question. In an attempt to explain United States 
policy, he referred to the "Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States" signed at Montevideo, December 26, 1933.
At this meeting Secretary Hull, acting for the United States, 
had voted for the article forbidding one state from inter­
vening in the affairs of another. Indeed, concluded Moore, 
Carmody's proposal went against the entire tenor of the
"Good Neighbor" policy Roosevelt was attempting to implement
«
toward Latin America. It was decided by the White House
42The Catholic World, CXLI (June, 1935) , 364.
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that Hull, rather than Roosevelt, should sign this reply to 
Carmody
Carmody and the Knights of Columbus were not so easily
satisfied. On June 23, Carmody again wrote to the President
and stressed his disappointment over Roosevelt's refusal to
acknowledge the earlier telegram. Carmody also regretted
that he was unable to see the President personally and
44lamented the fate of the Borah resolution. After this 
communication, Roosevelt apparently decided that something 
had to be done to satisfy the Knights. He sent Carmody's 
latest note to Hull with the following memorandum: "For
preparation of reply for my signature as quickly as possible, 
as I think that speed is essential."4"*
Meanwhile, the State Department was feeling direct 
pressure over the Mexican question from the Knights and other 
Catholic groups. This prompted Assistant Secretary Moore to 
write to Hull that, although they must refrain from any 
action offensive to Mexico, if they did not make some
^Memorandum of May 11, 1935, by Assistant Secretary 
of State, Official File 146, Mexico, 1933-40, Box 1, Roose­
velt Papers.
44Martin Carmody to President Roosevelt, June 23,
1935, Official File 28, Roosevelt Papers.
4^Ibid., June 26, 1935.
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statement "fairly satisfactory" to the Catholic interest, 
"the political effect may be injurious in many localities." 
Moore felt that there would be no harm in making a reply to 
indicate that the State Department did "honestly regret the 
situation in Mexico." With this in mind, Moore submitted a 
draft reply to Catholic inquiries which made the following 
points: (1) There was no treaty between the United States
and Mexico covering religion. (2) The United States had 
always demanded religious freedom for its nationals within 
its jurisdiction. (3) The United States had no power to act 
in this case, since it would be an unwarranted intervention 
in Mexico's domestic affairs.4^
A few days after receiving this recommendation from 
his Assistant Secretary, Cordell Hull also received FDR's 
request for a reply to Martin Carmody's new letter. After 
consultation with James Farley, who recommended that the 
Knights be ignored for their discourtesy, Hull submitted a 
draft reply which the President on July 3 sent to Carmody. 
Apparently Hull had decided not to incorporate Moore's 
recommendations into this reply because, in its final form,
4 ^R. Walton Moore to Secretary Hull, June 24, 1935, 
Mexican Religious Situation, Box 10, R. Walton Moore Papers.
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the letter simply explained to Carmody that pressing public
business had prevented a private audience earlier, but that
now the President would be glad to meet and discuss the
Mexican situation with h i m . ^
After some preliminaries, a meeting was arranged for
July 8 between the President and a delegation of Knights,
including Carmody, William J. McGinley, secretary, D. J.
Callahan, treasurer, Luke E. Hart, advocate, John E. Swift,
and James Donahoe. The delegation declared that they
represented not merely the 500,000 Knights but all American
Catholics. They reiterated their plea that the President
protest the persecution going on in Mexico and brought up
many precedents in which the United States had spoken out
under similar circumstances. Roosevelt listened with his
usual patience and good manners. He made a few remarks about
religious conditions in the world and about communism, but
was noncommittal regarding the particular subject of the
Knights' visit. The group left, reporting to the press that
48the President was very courteous and generous with his time.
^Memorandum of Secretary of State, June 26, 1935, 
Mexico, 1933-40, Official File, Box 1, Roosevelt Papers.
^Columbia, August, 1935, p. 4; New York Times, July 
9, 1935, p. 6 .
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It should be noted that it was only eight days after this 
visit that President Roosevelt met with the congressional 
delegation on the same topic and issued his statement on 
religious freedom.
Roosevelt's statement to the congressional delegation 
did little to placate the Knights of Columbus. As reports 
continued to flow into the United States of atrocities 
against Christians in Mexico, the Knights met at their annual 
convention in New York City on August 21. One of their first 
actions was to authorize Carmody to send another letter to 
President Roosevelt concerning Mexico. In the same unanimous 
resolution, the Knights expressed regret at the administra­
tion’s passivity toward the question and disappointment that
the State Department, with the President's approval, was
49opposing the Borah resolution. This outburst, however, was 
only a small indication of what was to come from the Knights 
on the subject of Mexico.
In early October, a quarterly meeting of the Supreme 
Board of Directors of the Knights was held in Chicago. At 
this meeting it was decided to make another vigorous repre­
sentation to the President on the Mexican situation. A
^Columbia, October, 1935, p. 17; New York Times,
August 22, 1935, p. 15.
letter of protest was drawn up here but was not sent until 
Roosevelt returned from an extended trip late in the month. 
Signed by Carmody and by W. J. McGinley, the letter traced 
the events since the July 8 meeting with the President. At 
this time, said the Knights, President Roosevelt promised to 
make a public statement deploring the Mexican religious 
situation. It was noted that FDR had made a statement 
favoring religious freedom on October 2 in San Diego, Cali­
fornia. At that time Roosevelt had said:
Our national determination to Keep us free of 
. . . foreign entanglements cannot prevent ua fr n
feeling deep concern when ideale and nrinciplas 
that we have cherished are ch~^lenged. a regard 
it as axiomatic that every person siiall enjoy the 
free exercise of hie religion a-’cording to the 
dictates of his conscience. . . .50
Many newspaper" sugges ,ad that ^h^s statement, because it 
was made neai the Mexican border, was a reply to the Knights 
request and was directed aya'nst M^rioo. Carmciy and com­
pany, however, we*e more mcxinec to accept one reporter's 
opinion ^ a t  thi speech was "a s; all :»op to the Catholics.," 
Indeed, Carmodv not only accepted «his interpretation, but 
added that our "Good Neighbor" policy could not excuse
50Quoted in Denver Catholic Register, October 3, 1935 
p. 4, whose editor praiseu the statement as an answer to the 
Knight's charge of Presidential indifference.
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inaction. In a tone of surprising bitterness, Carmody con­
cluded his letter:
You cannot escape responsibility for throttling 
the Borah Resolution. You cannot escape respon­
sibility for the endorsement given to the Mexican 
Government . . .  by your Ambassador. You cannot 
escape responsibility for non-action on behalf of 
bleeding and oppressed Mexico.51
The tone of this latest outburst by the Knights embar­
rassed many Catholics. Most Reverend John J. McNicholas, 
Archbishop of Cincinnati, felt compelled to issue a public 
statement, read in all churches of his archdiocese on 
November 3, that the Knights "in no sense speak for the 
priesthood or for the Catholic laity" of Cincinnati. This 
response was made even though the Archbishop himself felt 
the administration could have done more to ameliorate the 
Mexican situation.52
Taking note of this divided sentiment, the President, 
after consultation with Catholics close to the administration 
such as Jim Farley and Frank Walker, replied to the October 
attack of the Knights. In a letter addressed to Carmody and 
dated November 13, Roosevelt flatly refused to interfere in
^Quoted in Columbia, December, 1935, p. 11; New York 
Times, October 28, 1935, p. 3.
52QUOted in The Catholic World, CXLII {December,
1935), 362.
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the domestic affairs of Mexico. As for United States citi­
zens in Mexico, the administration desired that they should 
be permitted freedom of worship. But, Roosevelt went on, 
"there has not been brought to this government during the 
past year a single complaint by any United States citizen 
that such opportunities in Mexico have been refused him." In 
light of this, Roosevelt insisted that his policy of non­
intervention would continue. This, however, did not mean 
that he was unsympathetic to the cause of religious tolerance. 
Roosevelt quoted from his recent speech in San Diego regard­
ing his "deep concern" for religious freedom. Obviously the 
President was deeply committed to such freedom, but he did 
not feel that this was a justification for intervening in 
the domestic affairs of a foreign nation.5^
For Roosevelt this letter represented the final word 
in the episode. Catholics, however, had different ideas.
The Catholic press was almost unanimous in its criticism of 
Roosevelt's reply to Carmody. The Brooklyn Tablet, predict­
ably critical, pointed out that Catholics had asked Roosevelt 
to end intervention, not start it.5^ The Catholic Action of
^President Roosevelt to Martin Carmody, November 13, 
1935, in Rosenman, Public Papers, IV, 450-52; Commonweal, 
November 29, 1935, pp. 113-14.
"*̂ The Brooklyn Tablet, November 23, 1935, p. 1.
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the South, a New Orleans paper, felt that Roosevelt's atti­
tude could only give comfort to the enemies of religion. The 
Baltimore Catholic Review said that FDR was condoning tyranny. 
The Catholic Tribune of St. Joseph, Missouri, remarked that 
Catholics should have expected a refusal because of Roose­
velt's past actions. The Providence Visitor called Roose­
velt's reply mere "political hedging" and reiterated the 
Knight's claim that the President could not escape much of 
the responsibility for current conditions in Mexico. Light, 
a publication of the International Catholic Truth Society, 
insisted that FDR should make Mexico honor the pledge of 
religious freedom given to Woodrow Wilson. This paper called 
Roosevelt's reply to Carmody mere "artful weaving of words. 
Reverend Wilfrid Parsons, editor of America, insisted that 
Roosevelt's letter would give a "green light" to those 
elements in Mexico most antagonistic toward the Church. Un­
fortunately, the President had intervened even while refusing 
to do so, said Parsons, and the result was to give "comfort 
to the enemies of religion.
^^In Albany, New York; Hartford, Connecticut; St.
Louis, Missouri; Buffalo, New York; Portland, Maine; and 
Rochester, New Yorlf, the Catholic diocesan press echoed 
these criticisms of the President and at times went even 
further. See Columbia, January, 1936, p. 18, which 
published a resume of Catholic press reaction.
~*6New York Times, November 19, 1935, p. 7.
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In retrospect it appears that President Roosevelt had 
little chance of appeasing these elements of Catholic thought. 
They insisted that what they wanted was not intervention, but 
a cessation of the interference then taking place. Unfor­
tunately, they could point to no specific action by the 
Roosevelt administration, save Ambassador Daniel s statement, 
which could be termed intervention. It is difficult to imag­
ine what more they desired in the way of a public statement 
by the President if they were not satisfied with his San 
Diego remarks. In his reply to the President, Carmody used 
the same argument— that he had never asked for intervention, 
only an investigation of charges of oppression. How this 
investigation was to be accomplished without intervention, he 
did not specify. Carmody's reply, in the form of a public 
statement to the press, was made November 17, 1935, in New 
York City, when the Supreme Knight insisted that Roosevelt 
had ignored good precedent for speaking out against foreign 
religious persecution. After another month had elapsed, 
Carmody wrote to the President again. On December 16, he 
accused Roosevelt of distorting history to support his
^ New York Times, November 18, 1935, p. 1; The Catholic
World, CXLII (December, 1935), 362-63; Columbia, December,
1935, p. 13.
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position of non-intervention. The Knights concluded that 
FDR's reasons for not acting in this case were "based upon a 
false premise," namely, that the Knights desired actual 
physical intervention.^®
This final outburst by the Knights was referred from 
the White House to Sumner Welles of the State Department. 
Welles examined the letter and wrote to the President that 
it did not deserve a reply, because "it raises no new ques­
tions." He further presented a detailed memorandum showing 
that the supposed incidents of persecution of Americans in 
Mexico mentioned by Carmody had nothing to do with the 
religious situation. Roosevelt replied that Welles was 
correct to assume that Carmody would not be answered and
that he and Steve Early were treating the subject as "a
59closed incident."
Roosevelt's trouble with the Knights of Columbus, 
however, was only one aspect of the pressure exerted against 
his administration in connection with Mexican anticlericalism. 
Equally important were the feelings of members of the Cath­
olic hierarchy. While all of the bishops were not articulate
^Columbia, January, 1935, p. 6 .
C Q Sumner Welles to President Roosevelt, December 21, 
1935, Official File, Box 28, Roosevelt Papers.
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about the Mexican situation, there was enough public criti­
cism to cause some uneasiness in the administration. 
Ambassador Daniels had been directly rebuked by Bishop 
William J. Hafey of Raleigh, North Carolina, on October 6 , 
1934, when the latter publicly regretted the remarks the 
former made about Mexican education and hoped they were unin­
tentional. Yet the Bishop felt this "serious error" deserved 
a public refutation by Roosevelt, so it would not appear 
that his administration was endorsing Mexican atheism.60
Other members of the hierarchy seemed to be in 
sympathy with Bishop Hafey. At an annual meeting in Wash­
ington, D.C., November 14-17, 1934, some seventy-eight 
members of the American Catholic hierarchy issued a statement 
on the "anti-Christian Tyranny in Mexico." "We cannot but 
deplore," read the statement, "the expressions, unwittingly 
offered at times, of sympathy with and support of governments 
and policies which are absolutely at variance with our own 
American principles." After this jibe at Daniels, the 
bishops went on to say that they did not "believe for a 
moment" that the United States favored the actions of Mexico. 
While the hierarchy praised American principles of toleration
60Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 209.
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and freedom, they did not wish "to impose those principles 
as political principles upon any other nation," even though 
they were "as true outside as inside the physical territory 
of our country." With this in mind they called for an end 
to the indifference with which the United States viewed the 
Mexican situation and urged citizens to press their repre­
sentatives to "be guided by true American principles with
61respect to Mexico."
In February, 1935, further episcopal action was forth­
coming. An organization called "The Catholic Bishops Com­
mission, Incorporated, for Mexican Relief" was formed under 
the leadership of such men as Archbishop Michael J. Curley 
of Baltimore, Bishop Francis C. Kelley of Oklahoma City and 
Tulsa, and Archbishop Arthur J. Crosserts of San Antonio, 
Texas. Other prominent prelates who lent their support to 
the organization included Bishop John M. Gannon of Erie, 
Pennsylvania, and Bishop James A. Griffin of Springfield, 
Illinois. This commission was not directed against the 
administration, but was primarily concerned with soliciting 
aid and assistance "for the relief and support" of Mexicans 
suffering under the antireligious laws of their country.
61 "Statement of American Catholic Hierarchy," November 
15, 1934, in Huber, Our Bishops Speak, pp. 205-208.
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Still, a campaign directed toward raising money "for the 
defense of religious freedom in Mexico" was treading upon 
international diplomacy and could not help but come under the 
scrutiny of the United States State Department.
Other members of the hierarchy also spoke out. In 
February, Cardinal Dougherty of Philadelphia sponsored a 
mass protest meeting in his diocese against the "anti-God"
fi *3actions of the Mexican government. In Springfield, 
Illinois, Bishop James A. Griffin outlined four objectives 
for American Catholics in the controversy. One of these was 
to awaken public opinion in the United States in favor of an 
official investigation into Mexican actions.6^
Unquestionably the most outspoken member of the 
American hierarchy on the Mexican question was Archbishop 
Michael J. Curley of Baltimore. In an open letter to the 
Washington Post, Curley defended the Borah resolution as a 
legitimate inquiry which deserved the sponsorship of the 
Roosevelt administration. A few weeks later, the Bishop,
62The Catholic World, CXLII (March, 1936), 747-48; 
Commonweal, February 7, 1936, p. 411.
®^NCWC News Service, Philadelphia, February 19, 1935.
^ Commonweal, March 29, 1935, p. 625.
6 5 Ibid., March 1, 1935, p. 510.
addressing a public gathering in Washington, deplored the 
attitude of the President toward the resolution. "If that 
resolution is killed," said Curley, "it will be because the 
Chief Executive of the nation has issued orders that it be 
killed.". These were rather strong words, but Curley was not 
finished. In a statement which carried overtones of a 
political threat, the clergyman remarked, "twenty million 
American Catholics are getting pretty tired of the indif­
ference shown by the Administration." Despite a further 
reference to the "Catholic vote," Curley denied he was 
threatening anyone. He went on to criticize the President 
for refusing to grant an interview to a delegation of Knights 
of Columbus which had attempted to call upon him. He casti­
gated the foreign policy of Cordell Hull as being against 
all American traditions. Finally, he insisted, somewhat 
naively, that a mere word from President Roosevelt would 
suffice to relieve the anticlerical pressure in Mexico.66 
Despite the prominence of the speaker and the proximity of 
the speech, the Roosevelt administration took no official 
notice.
66New York Times, March 26, 1935, p. 1; Cronon, 
"Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 220; W. T. Walsh, "Some 
Precedents for the Borah Resolution," The Catholic World,
CXLI (August, 1935), 555.
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The significance of Curley's outburst was that it
represented a hardening of episcopal opinion toward the
Mexican question. This shift was underlined by the May 1
public statement of the Administrative Committee of the NCWC.
These bishops, speaking for the American hierarchy, requested
that Washington speak out on Mexican anticlericalism. "The
traditional policy of our Government," read the Committee's *
statement, "does not permit it to remain silent at the
present moment. . . . "  They admitted that we could not
"interfere with the internal affairs of another nation," but
pointed out that the United States had never been silent
regarding such a basic principle as religious freedom. They
concluded by promising to continue to urge Catholics to
petition Congress and the President to use their influence
7to restore religious liberty to Mexico. In furtherance of 
this attitude, Bishop Charles D. White of Spokane, Washington, 
circulated a petition for signature among the laity of his 
diocese requesting the President and the Secretary of State 
"to exercise every personal and governmental power possible 
to relieve the injustices and to avert the threatened dangers
67Huber, Our Bishops Speak, p. 307; The Catholic
World, CXLI (June, 1935), 363-64.
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of the present anti-religious policy of the Mexican Govern­
ment. 1,68
To lend additional emphasis to the Bishops' statement 
on May 1, Bishop John F. Noll of Fort Wayne, Indiana, a 
member of the Administrative Committee, wrote President 
Roosevelt a personal letter on Mexico. Noll reminded the 
President that he had been informed by Reverend John Burke, 
General Secretary of the NCWC and liaison man to the 
administration, that "it would be difficult to keep the 
Catholics quiet" if the Catholic hierarchy was "completely 
ignored." The Bishop recalled for Roosevelt that the state­
ment by the American hierarchy had made no mention of the 
Borah resolution or the petition by the Knights of Columbus. 
The bishops, said Noll, approved these statements but had 
refrained from speaking out in order "to give your Excellency 
an opportunity to do something with less embarrassment." Now 
Noll asked Roosevelt to make a statement "on the general 
principles of the rights of all people to religious liberty." 
Such a statement, he insisted, would be of great help to all 
oppressed peoples and was certainly within the historical 
precedents of the United States. Finally, such a statement
60NCWC News Service, Spokane, Washington, May 6, 1935.
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would also end the rumors of FDR's growing sympathy for 
communism.69
Roosevelt was obviously impressed with the earnestness 
of Noll's letter. When drafting a reply, he called in Father 
John Burke for advice. Burke composed a letter for the 
President's examination and Roosevelt signed it virtually 
unchanged. In the letter Roosevelt once again asserted his 
own "devotion" to religious liberty and promised that the 
cause of the Bishop’s letter would "receive our earnest, 
thoughtful attention." The President closed by promising to 
do all he could "to promote the principle of freedom of 
conscience and the exercise of religious liberty." Signifi­
cantly, Mexico was not mentioned once in the letter, but 
Roosevelt did stress the complexity and delicacy of foreign 
affairs.70
All members of the Catholic hierarchy, however, were 
not so intent as Noll upon soliciting a statement from Presi­
dent Roosevelt. Indeed the clergyman closest to the scene of 
conflict, Archbishop Pascual Diaz of Mexico City, expressed
^9Bishop John F. Noll to President Roosevelt, May 13, 
1935, President's Personal Fire, No. 2406, Roosevelt Papers; 
see also Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
^President Roosevelt to Bishop John Noll, May 23, 
1935, Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
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the opinion that nothing could be worse than for the Presi­
dent of the United States to make a statement demanding an 
investigation of Mexican affairs. "Such an action," said 
the Archbishop, "would be very injurious to the interest of 
the Church in Mexico" and he personally would never condone 
such a step. The Archbishop also expressed the personal 
opinion that Secretary of State Hull was doing a great job
"and thoroughly approved of what he had and was doing to
71prevent an investigation into Mexican affairs."
In the United States, Bishop Schrembs of Cleveland
was not so much interested in Roosevelt’s Mexican policy as
he was in the possibility that the President might consent
to appear before a Eucharistic Congress being held in his
diocese. Representative Martin L. Sweeney of Cleveland,
Ohio, was asked by Schrembs to try to convince Roosevelt to
appear before the Congress. Sweeney wrote to the President
that all Catholics were impressed by his July statement on
religious liberty, but the Eucharistic Congress would present
72a perfect forum for a public address on the same topic.
^^Memorandum of private conversation between Mr. 
Aguirre and Archbishop Pascual Diaz, Mexico City, April 13, 
1935, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
^Rep. Martin L. Sweeney to President Roosevelt,
August 12, 1935, Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
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Roosevelt decided to limit his participation to a message of 
greetings and good will, which was delivered by his delegate 
to the Congress, Jim Farley. This message was apparently 
enough to satisfy Cardinal Hayes of New York, who, after 
deploring the religious persecution occurring in other 
countries, expressed delight over the President's greeting. 
Hayes was moved to remark that, "we have a President who 
believes in religion and wants his fellow citizens to do 
likewise." Farley himself remarked that the United States
had set an example of religious toleration, but that other
« 71nations failed to appreciate this lesson. Bishop Schrembs,
the host of the Congress, was also gratified by Roosevelt's
contribution and wrote to the President that his "appeal in
the cause of religion" had made a success of the entire
affair.74
As one observes over-all Catholic opinion at this time, 
it appears that the good feeling manifest over the Eucharis­
tic Congress was a mere lull in the criticism of the adminis­
tration by Catholic spokesmen. Most public spokesmen for the 
Church remained angered by the President's failure to take
7^Quoted in New York Times, September 24, 1935, p. 1.
74Most Rev. Joseph Schrembs to President Roosevelt, 
October 2, 1935, Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
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more vigorous action toward Mexico. Some expressed regret 
that the statements of Hayes and Schrembs, and later the 
criticism of the Knights by Archbishop McNicholas of Cincin­
nati, represented a division in the force of Catholic 
opinion.7** Large elements of the Catholic press were 
vitriolic in their criticism of the administration.7^
Prominent individual Catholics and Catholic organiza­
tions also contributed to the rising clamor against the 
administration. Reverend James Gillis, editor of The 
Catholic World, was disgusted with the procrastination of 
Roosevelt. Gillis felt that the United States had a mission
to "champion the cause of those who suffer persecution for
7 7conscience sake." He wanted full-fledged intervention in 
Mexico. Reverend William J. Kenealy, S.J., speaking on the 
Catholic Truth Period over Boston Radio, also stressed the
75Catholic Transcript, December 19, 1935, p. 4; The 
Brooklyn Tablet, November 23, 1935, p. 8 .
7 67 For evidence of the position of the Catholic press 
see Pax, December, 1935, p. 81; Extension, December, 1935, p. 
17; Columbia, May, 1935, p. 12; Commonweal, January 18, 1935, 
p. 329; The Boston Pilot, November 23, 1935, p. 4; The Cath­
olic Transcript, May 2,.1935, p. 4; The New World, May 17, 
1935, p. 4; The Catholic Messenger, June 20, 1935, p. 2; and 
The Brooklyn Tablet, July 13, 1935, p. 9, all of which attack 
either Daniels' incompetence or Roosevelt's timidity.
77The Catholic World, CXLII (March, 1936), 641-46.
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United States' responsibility for anticlericalism in Mexico. 
According to Kenealy, the Roosevelt administration was keep­
ing the Mexican "atheists" in power by virtue of diplomatic
7 8recognition, and by financial and moral support. Reverend 
G. A. McDonald published an open letter to President Roose­
velt in the pages of The Queen1s Work, in which he criticized
the administration's handling of Catholic protest over 
79Mexico.
A few individuals were especially extreme in their 
criticism. Father Kenealy, not satisfied with his radio 
speech, wrote an article for The Catholic Mind in which he 
proposed that the United States Government should "stop 
preventing them [the Mexican people] from securing religious 
and political freedom."88 But perhaps the height of hysteria 
was reached by Reverend Michael Kenny, S.J., author of No God 
Next Door. Kenny wrote that the Supreme Masonic Councils of 
Mexico and the Supreme Council of the Scottish Rite 33rd 
Degree in Washington were influential in the refusal of
^8The Boston Pilot, August 31, 1935.
7 9 Copy of The Queen1s Work, December 13, 1935, in 
Official File, 28, Roosevelt Papers.
8 8Rev. William J. Kenealy, S.J., "The Mexican Reli­
gious Persecution," The Catholic Mind, XXXIII, No. 23 
(December 8 , 1935), 453, 454, 457.
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President Roosevelt to intervene in Mexico. It seems that 
Roosevelt was a 32nd degree Mason and had just initiated his 
two sons into masonry. Father Kenny read conspiracy into 
these events.®^-
Against this seemingly widespread Catholic disillu­
sionment with Roosevelt's Mexican policy was arrayed a number 
of individuals who attempted to defend both Ambassador 
Daniels and the President. There were some who sought to 
counteract the charges made by the Knights of Columbus and 
the diocesan press. Foremost among these was Colonel P. H. 
Callahan, an influential Catholic layman, and former execu­
tive of the Knights of Columbus. Callahan, a native of 
Louisville, Kentucky, was a prohibitionist and, like Daniels,
®!Rev. Michael Kenny, S.J., to the Editor, Commonweal, 
December 20, 1935, p. 213. These individual protest were 
supplemented by appeals made by the following Catholic organ­
izations who demanded everything from U.S. intervention to 
the removal of Daniels: The Ancient Order of Hibernians;
National Catholic Women's Union of Hudson County, New Jersey; 
The Supreme Board of the Catholic Daughters of America; St. 
Louis Council of Catholic Women; and a number of others. Lay 
Catholics such as Joseph Gurn and Dr. Thomas E. Purcell, 
President of the NCCM, spoke out against recognition of a 
"communist-dominated" Mexican government and suggested that 
the Good Neighbor policy be used as a pretext for interven­
tion to help Mexican Catholics. See the following: New
York Times, May 6 , 1935, p. 16; February 23, 1936, II, 1;
Box 777, Daniels Papers, NCWC News Service, St. Louis, 
Missouri, May 11, 1935; Washington, D. C., March 8 , 1935; 
Union City, New Jersey, April 5, 1935.
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an old supporter of William Jennings Bryan. He quickly 
became convinced that the efforts by American Catholics to 
have Daniels removed and to have Roosevelt intervene in 
Mexico could only hurt tne Church's position in that country. 
Furthermore, Callahan warned, if Catholics succeeded in 
removing Daniels it would*produce a reaction by American 
Protestants, resentful of this show of political power, that 
would make the Smith campaign look insignificant.82
As soon as Daniels was attacked for his remarks on 
Mexican education, Callahan began a campaign to defend the 
Ambassador against the charges of the Catholic press. He 
wrote to such individuals as A. J. Beck, editor of The 
Michigan Catholic; Patrick F. Scanlan, editor of The Brooklyn 
Tablet; Vincent de Paul Fitzpatrick, editor of The Baltimore 
Catholic Review; and Joseph M. Schifferli, editor of The 
Buffalo Echo of New York. Callahan pointed out that Josephus 
Daniels had no religious prejudice. In fact the Ambassador 
had been extremely generous to Catholics durinc World War I , 
in the number of chaplains he allotted to each faith when he 
was Secretary of the Navy. Daniels had not, insisted 
Callahan, endorsed pagan education. As for the Ambassador
8 2P . H. Callahan to H L. Mencken, December 21, 
1934, Bux 778, Daniels Papers.
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shaking hands with Calles, what else could be expected from
*
a representative of the United States Government? "Some of
our co-religious," wrote Callahan, "expected the Ambassador
to conduct himself as if he were representing the Vatican at
83Rome instead of the U.S.A."
The Colonel constantly sent copies of his correspond­
ence to the White House and the State Department. He also 
wrote directly to the administration during the height of the 
pressure campaign by the Knights of Columbus. According to 
Callahan, Carmody and the Supreme Council did not represent 
a majority of the Knights in their opposition to Roosevelt.
He also indicated that Carmody and Luke Hart were life-long 
Republicans. Callahan suggested to Jim Farley that Carmody's
actions were probably connected with the "plans of A1 
84.Smith." It is difficult to determine specifically how this 
information was used by the administration, although Secre­
tary of State Hull wrote to Callahan that he had "utilized
®3p. H. Callahan to Patrick F. Scanlan, February 27,
1935, for other letters see "Callahan Correspondence" in
Reel 2, Sel. Mat. Many of the Callahan letters were 
published by the diocesan press.
84P. H. Callahan to Stephen B. Gibbons, August 8 ,
1935; Callahan to James A. Farley, November 9, 1935;
Callahan to James McCaughey [n.d.]. Box 778, Daniels Papers.
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them [the letters] to good advantage."85
Another prominent Catholic layman who assisted the
administration in counteracting unfavorable opinion in the
Church was Michael Francis Doyle, a Philadelphia lawyer and
active Democratic politician. Although in some respects
Doyle appears to have been a sycophant of the President, he
did strive to counteract Catholic criticism. As soon as it
appeared that Daniels was in for a roasting by the Catholic
press, Doyle wrote to the administration seeking evidence of
the Ambassador's pro-Catholic attitude while Secretary of 
86the Navy. He intended to see that this material was
placed in the press. Doyle also wrote of having "conferences"
with the NCWC, and the Catholic Alumni Sodality, and of
stifling their criticism of the administration. Roosevelt
and Daniels were both assured that the attitude of the
Knights of Columbus and of Archbishop Curley "did not reflect
the general attitude of American Catholics" who "fully
appreciated [Daniels] splendid qualities and . . . belief in 
religious toleration."8^ The Philadelphian claimed to be
85Cordell Hull to P. H. Callahan, February 15, 1935,
Box 778, Daniels Papers.
86Michael F. Doyle to Louis Howe, December 26, 1934, 
Official File 237, Roosevelt Papers.
8^Michael F. Doyle to Josephus Daniels, January 24, 
1935, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
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working within various Catholic groups, hoping to moderate
their demands for the Borah resolution. One such group was
the Catholic Association for International Peace— Doyle
succeeded in removing a discussion of Mexico from the agenda
of their annual meeting for 1936.®®
Indeed, Doyle appears to have been more concerned over
the attitude of American Catholics toward the administration
than was Roosevelt himself. After FDR had answered the
Knights of Columbus in his November letter, Doyle reported
the formation of the "Catholic Bishops Commission for Mexican 
89Relief." Doyle wrote to Marvin McIntyre that "I fully 
understand the Administration's attitude and will do every­
thing in my power to see that this movement is not used for 
any political purpose."90 It should be noted, however, that 
President Roosevelt did not appear unduly affected by the
letters Doyle wrote. The President saw Doyle only once at 
»the beginning of the Daniels affair, despite the latter's 
pleading for more audiences.
83Michael F. Doyle to Josephus Daniels, March 6 ,
1935; April 17, 1936, Box 778, Daniels Papers.
®9See p. 281.
90Michael F. Doyle to Marvin McIntyre, November 27, 
1935, Reel 1, Sel. Mat.
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Of more importance to Roosevelt was the work done by 
Reverend John J. Burke, General Secretary of the NCWC. Burke 
was respected at the White House; Roosevelt often called 
upon him to interpret and even answer letters from the hier­
archy. Throughout the Mexican crisis this priest was 
sympathetic to both Roosevelt and Daniels.91 One typical 
example of his help came when Cardinal Hayes of New York, in 
mid-1935, expressed his disappointment that the President 
had not asserted himself in favor of religious freedom in 
Mexico. Burke immediately set the record straight and told 
Hayes all that Roosevelt had done and was attempting to do 
within the bounds of diplomatic protocol. The Cardinal must 
have been impressed, for he wrote to Burke apologizing for 
his ignorance and expressing appreciation for Roosevelt's 
efforts. Although Burke seems to have had little control 
over the Knights of Columbus, he continually criticized their 
actions toward the President.
There were other Catholics who braved the apparent 
mainstream of Catholic feeling on Mexico to defend the
Q  1 Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 226.
92Sumner Welles, Asst. Secretary of State, to Presi­
dent Roosevelt, June 25, 1935, President's Secretary Pile I, 
Diplomatic Correspondence, Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt Papers.
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administration and Ambassador Daniels. Judge Martin T.
Manton of New York City was one. Manton spoke out at the 
March, 1935, annual convention of the Catholic Association 
for International Peace held in Washington. In his speech 
he deprecated the Borah resolution as a violation of the 
Montevideo Convention of 1934 and suggested that the Church- 
State dispute in Mexico be handled by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. For implying that American Catholics 
should stop attacking the administration, Manton was soundly 
rebuked by such leading prelates as Reverend John LaFarge, 
Reverend J. F. Thorning, and Archbishop Curley. Thorning 
insisted that Mexico was attacking United States citizens, 
but the administration was keeping this news from the people. 
Curley simply called Manton ignorant of both the Mexican 
situation and of the position of American Catholics. One 
Catholic editor not only applauded Curley's attack but sug­
gested that Manton get permission of his bishop before making 
any more public pronouncements on the situation. To some, it 
seems, the affair had entered the realm of faith and
Q Omorals.
Reverend John F. O'Hara, president of Notre Dame
^ Commonweal, May 10, 1937, p. 44; The Catholic
Transcript, May 9, 1935, p. 4.
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University, was another prominent Catholic leader who refused
to follow the line laid down by Bishop Curley and the Knights
of Columbus. In a public interview in December, 1934, O'Hara
said: "Anything like an attempt at intervention by the U.S.
in the internal affairs of Mexico would be distasteful to all
Latin American countries, and would result in more harm than 
94good." He also wrote Daniels of the "cherished and affec­
tionate regard" he had for him. Secretary Hull received 
word from O'Hara on how much the latter regretted "the mis­
understanding" between Daniels and American Catholics. These 
same thoughts O'Hara conveyed to Daniels h i m s e l f .
Some elements of the Catholic press actually took a 
pro-Roosevelt stand. In Chicago, Cardinal Mundelein's The 
New World admitted that Daniels was not qualified for his 
post but also stressed that Catholics had no right to demand 
his resignation. Indeed, those who did so only succeeded in 
making themselves appear "rather ridiculous." Daniels was 
"in no sense anti-Catholic," but the current actions by some 
misguided souls might turn him against the Church. Daniels 
was in Mexico to represent the United States, insisted this
94Quoted in Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 227.
95Rev. John P. O'Hara to Josephus Daniels, December 
19, 1934; January 4, 1935, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
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editor, not the Catholic Church, and his mistakes should be 
attributed "to ignorance rather than malice."
A significant step toward enlightening public opinion 
was taken when William Franklin Sands, professor at George­
town University, toured Mexico to investigate the supposed 
anticlericalism. Sands reported to the American press that 
Ambassador Daniels was being unjustly maligned. Daniels had,
said the professor, gone out of his way to try to resolve the
97religious strife in Mexico.
There is still more evidence that the Knights of 
Columbus did not represent all American Catholics in their 
approach to Mexican anticlericalism. Father John A. Ryan,
96The New World, October 12, 1934, p. 4; January 18, 
1935, p. 4. The Michigan Catholic attempted to explain the 
faux pas committed by Daniels by attributing it to his lack 
of Spanish which led him to misinterpret Calles ’ remarks as 
simply praising popular education (December 6 , 1934, p. 1); 
Commonweal pointed out that the ambassador did have an 
excellent record of religious tolerance, and supported A1 
Smith in 1928, against the opposition of many of his North 
Carolina neighbors (February 15, 1935, p. 441); the Louis­
ville paper, The Record, proclaimed: "we stand with Presi­
dent Roosevelt in his commitment . . .  of the United States 
to non-interference in the affairs of Mexico" (clipping, 
November 21, 1935, Box 778, Daniels Papers); Central-Blatt 
and Social Justice Review insisted that the entire problem 
was inherited, not caused, by Roosevelt (XXVII, March, 1935, 
389) .
9^Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt, August 2, 
1935, President's Secretary File I, Diplomatic Correspon­
dence, Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt Papers.
300
for example, rejected the overtures of Maurice A. Tobin to 
become involved in a campaign to pressure President Roosevelt 
into intervening in Mexico. Ryan felt that the Borah resolu­
tion would certainly fail because it was "an undue inter-
QQference in Mexican affairs." ° Then there was Joseph P.
Tumulty, former secretary to the late President Wilson, who
was barely persuaded by friends not to publicly answer the
charges Father Coughlin was making against Ambassador 
99Daniels. Ralph Adams Cram audaciously suggested in the 
pages of Commonweal that American Catholics place faith in 
the good intentions of President Cardenas. During a personal 
visit to Mexico, Cram found Cardenas to be a reasonable man. 
Cram felt that the Mexican Church could only benefit under 
his rule.100
The most evident sign that Catholic opinion on the 
United States' role in Mexico was divided was the decision 
by the University of Notre Dame to present President Roose­
velt with an honorary degree in the midst of his dispute with
Q Q Rev. John A. Ryan to Maurice A. Tobin, February 19, 
1935, Ryan Papers.
99Joseph P. Tumulty to Josephus Daniels, January 5, 
1935, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
100Ralph Adams Cram, "A Note on Mexico," Commonweal, 
May 22, 1936, pp. 91-92.
301
Martin Carmody. It is not clear who initiated the idea of
presenting the degree to the President, but Frank C. Walker,
a close advisor of Roosevelt and a graduate of Notre Dame,
was deeply involved in the preliminaries for the ceremony.
Reverend John F. O'Hara, president of the university, was
elated over the idea and telegraphed to FDR on November 6 ,
1935, formally inviting him to receive an honorary Doctor of
Laws and to speak at a special convocation honoring the
Philippine Commonwealth, recently made independent. A week
later, O'Hara traveled to Washington for a personal meeting
with the President to iron out all the details. The priest
even submitted to Marvin McIntyre a draft of his welcoming
speech, asking for any suggestions on its contents. Quite
clearly the university was anxious to have the President 
101appear.
Notre Dame officials were not the only ones elated at 
the news. Reverend Maurice S. Sheehy of Catholic University, 
a close friend of the administration, expressed delight to 
Marguerite LeHand that Notre Dame was granting the President 
a degree. Recalling that Catholic University had acted
3-03-Steve Early to Frank Waler, telegram, November 5, 
1935; Rev. John F. O'Hara to President Roosevelt, November 6 , 
1935; November 18, 1935; Rev. John O'Hara to Marvin McIntyre, 
December 5, 1935, Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
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similarly in 1933, Sheehy said: "When we gave him an honorary
degree we made an act of faith in him. That faith has cer­
tainly been justified." Sheehy pictured Roosevelt as the man 
who had saved the country from economic collapse. In an 
obvious reference to the Mexican situation, the priest 
regretted the unfortunate "campaign" currently being waged 
against the President. He hoped that Miss LeHand could keep 
these attacks from the President’s view and he urged her to 
ignore them herself.-*-02
On December 9, 1935, before a large audience at South 
Bend, Notre Dame presented honorary degrees to President 
Roosevelt and to Senor Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine editor 
and educator. Presiding at the ceremony was George Cardinal 
Mundelein of Chicago. Mundelein, an enthusiastic supporter 
of Roosevelt, used his opening remarks to make his current 
position clear. The Cardinal explained his presence at Notre 
Dame as a guarantee that Roosevelt would be among friends.
He praised the New Deal and FDR's "indominatable perserving 
courage." As for the current quarrel between the President 
and the Knights of Columbus, the Cardinal made it clear that
neither he nor the Church were in politics and that no one
102Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy to Marguerite LeHand,
December 2, 1935, Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
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had a right to speak for the political allegiance of American
Catholics. Despite this disclaimer, tJie Cardinal was in
politics whether he liked it or not. The fact that he
publicly lavished praise on the President at the same time
that the Knights, Bishop Curley, Coughlin, and others were
sharply criticizing him was of political significance.
Harold Ickes was not alone in interpreting the speech as "a
pretty complete endorsement of the President." When informed
by reporters on the scene that he had virtually given a
nominating speech for the President, the Cardinal merely
101remarked: "I always go all the way for a friend."
Roosevelt, who had hardly expected such an endorse­
ment, was especially pleased with the Cardinal's remarks.1 ®4 
He prefaced his own speech with an emotional thanks to 
Mundelein for his praise. The President then went on to 
speak of the necessity in any "true national life" for the 
recognition of the "right of man." "Supreme among these 
rights," said PDR, "we . . . hold to be the rights of freedom 
of education and freedom of religious worship." This was a
103Gannon, Spellman. p. 156; Ickes, Diary. I, 479-80; 
New York Times, December 10, 1935, pp. 12, 13; Commonweal, 
December 20, 1935, p. 216.
104Ickes, Diary, I, 479.
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clear enough endorsement of religious freedom.'*'®^
Arthur Krock, political editor of the New York Times, 
interpreted the entire affair as a Catholic endorsement of 
President Roosevelt and a repudiation of the Carmody and 
Curley campaign. According to Krock, Roosevelt and the New 
Dealers were especially pleased by the endorsement of 
Cardinal Mundelein, who usually kept out of politics. His 
statement had added meaning because, according to Krock, 
"literally millions look for sociological appraisal as well 
as spiritual guidance" from the Cardinal. There were, 
thought Krock, three reasons for the Cardinal’s statement. 
First, Mundelein wanted to publicly rebuke political clergy­
men like Coughlin who had been attacking the New Deal. 
Second, he wanted to reprimand laymen like Carmody who had 
criticized Roosevelt and usurped the prerogative of the 
bishops to speak for the Church. Finally, he wished "to 
endorse his conception of the President's efforts to spread 
the blessing of American prosperity." Krock saw real sig­
nificance in the fact that a leader in a conservative force 
like the Church should endorse the New Deal at a time when 
other so-called conservatives were speaking of communist
■L0^Rosenman, Public Papers, XV, 493-96.
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influence in government. He concluded: "the unscheduled,
fervent praise of the Cardinal made the journey far more 
notable than any of the White House entourage expected when 
the trip was arranged."1^
Other sources did not react as favorably to events at 
Notre Dame. For certain elements in the Church, it was dis­
tinctly embarrassing to have the President granted an honorary 
degree from the foremost Catholic university in the land and 
be praised by a leading churchman such as Mundelein. The 
editor of the Baltimore Catholic Review, Bishop Curley's 
organ, insisted that Catholics were expressing "deep regret" 
over the entire affair. Monsignor Albert Smith insisted that 
the honorary degree was only "in gratitude for the independ­
ence of the Philippine Islands, a Catholic country."^®7 The 
Brooklyn Tablet insisted that Notre Dame would "be years 
regaining respect" due to its decision to honor Roosevelt.
As for the President, he should not expect the Catholic voter
to be deceived by his "walking on both sides of the 
1 Oftstreet." Finally, the Commonweal insisted that Catholic
IQ^New York Times. December 13, 1935, p. 24.
107ciipping of New York Herald Tribune, December 5, 
1935, Reel 1, Sel. Mat.? New York Times, December 5, 1935, 
p. 29.
^®November 23, 1935, p. 9; December 21, 1935, p. 11.
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opinion of Roosevelt was not significantly "affected" by the 
Notre Dame affair. As a matter of record, the Catholic 
press did not play up the ceremony.
It is difficult to determine what effect all these 
Catholic comments had on the internal workings of the Roose­
velt administration. It is clear that the President was 
concerned over the pressure being exerted from various 
Catholic sources. When Ambassador Daniels first made his 
remark on the Mexican educational system, the storm of pro­
test which broke loose was enough to cause Under Secretary of 
State Phillips to ask Daniels for an explanation. "In view 
of the political strength of all combined . . .," Phillips 
wanted to quote Daniels' explanation that he was only 
praising education in general and that he did not realize 
there was anything in the Calles speech dealing with reli­
gious matters .̂ -10
The President himself soon felt the pressure of 
Catholic protest. At his press conference of October 17, 
1934, he was asked if Daniels was going to be recalled
109December 27, 1935, p. 241.
^°Memorandum of telephone conversation between 
Ambassador Daniels and Under Secretary Phillips, October 14, 
1934, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
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because of the recent criticism leveled at him by Catholic 
groups. Roosevelt displayed some irritation and pointed 
out that most of these charges sounded " fishy. " H I
When it was rumored that Roosevelt intended to visit 
Mexico in the summer of 1935, some Catholic sources became 
especially irritated. Daniels was so afraid of the political 
implications of the Catholic criticism being directed at him 
that he wanted to avoid having the President involved. 
Accordingly he suggested to the President that he put off his 
Mexican trip at this time. Roosevelt apparently agreed with 
Daniels' analysis, for he wrote, "from present indications 
. . . the Borah resolution has not served to quiet things 
down and my one great regret is that it may keep me from
T i nvisiting you . . . this year." The trip was never made.
Meanwhile, Ambassador Daniels did his best to clear 
up the controversy. He issued a statement through the State 
Department reaffirming his dedication to "the principles of 
our country with reference to public schools, the freedom of
lllCronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 210.
112Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt, February 
1, 1935; Roosevelt to Daniels, February 9, 1935, President's 
Personal File, 8 6 , Roosevelt Papers.
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religion and the freedom of the press. " H 3 Privately he 
wrote to Roosevelt expressing bitterness over the criticism 
being leveled at him. He pointed out that he had supported 
Smith for the presidency in 1928 and had fought the bigots.
His record as Secretary of the Navy was also evident of his 
"disregard of a man's church affiliation in public affairs."
In view of this, Daniels said, "it seems strange that they 
could forget my lifetime devotion to freedom of religion and 
my freedom from discrimination against Catholics. . . .
In a letter to the Catholic Columbian Daniels pre­
sented a detailed defense of his behavior as Ambassador.
Here he pointed out that he was a Christian, that he had no 
sympathy for atheism, and that he felt the American public 
school system was the best in the world. As for the incident 
which precipitated Catholic criticism, Daniels insisted 
that, as he understood it, Calles had "simply made a declara­
tion for universal education." Admitting that he had not 
seen the entire text of Calles' speech, the Ambassador could 
not understand how anyone could interpret his comments as 
being against religion. This was he wrote, especially
l*3Quoted in Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 210.
l^Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt, December
6 , 1934, President's Personal File 8 6 , Roosevelt Papers.
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surprising, in view of his "lifelong devotior to the pre­
cepts of the Christian religion," and his "unbroken opposition 
to intolerance in any shape or form. 5
Behind the scenes, Roosevelt did his best to amelio­
rate Catholic criticism. He was greatly assisted by Reverend 
John Burke, and to a lesser extent by Judge Martin T. Manton 
and Bishop Francis Spellman. When a particular bishop 
requested the President's opinion on the Mexican situation, 
Roosevelt generally discussed the reply with Burke, who also 
kept Roosevelt up to date on developments in Mexico's atti­
tude toward the Church and served as a liaison man to the 
116Vatican. Burke personally favored a settlement which
would involve only the Mexican Church and government. He 
often expressed embarrassnfent over the political antics of 
the Knights of Columbus. At the same time, in hopes of
reaching a settlement, Judge Manton sought to arrange a 
meeting between Bishop Spellman, another supporter of the
H 5 j osephus Daniels to Catholic Columbian, January 3, 
1935, in clipping of January 25, 1935 issue, Reel 1, Sel. Mat.
^-^Confidential memorandum from Marvin McIntyre to 
President Roosevelt, May 27, 1935, Official File 146, Mexico 
1933-40, Box 1, Roosevelt Papers.
l^Siunner Welles to President Roosevelt, June 25,
1935, President's Secretary File, Diplomatic Correspondence, 
Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt Papers.
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administration, and President Cardenas of Mexico. Roosevelt 
was advised of this move and agreed to arrange such a meeting, 
provided it was cleared with the Vatican. Spellman was 
personally willing to undertake the job, but the Apostolic 
Delegate to the United States, Archbishop Cicognani, pre­
ferred that all negotiations between the Church, Roosevelt, 
and Mexico be handled by Father Burke. All hopes of a meet­
ing ended with this rebuttal. Judge Manton felt, according 
to Spellman, that the Church was "missing a good oppor­
tunity. 1,118
Besides these maneuvers, Roosevelt himself publicly 
made statements favoring religious freedom on at least three 
different occasions in 1935. These included his reply to 
the Congressional petition of July 18, his speech at San 
Diego on October 2, and his remarks at Notre Dame.
As the election year of 1936 approached, it was only 
natural that the administration should hope that Catholic 
criticism would abate. Certain elements in the Church, how­
ever, were interested in keeping the issue alive. The 
Knights of Columbus refused to accept Roosevelt's letter of
118Gannon, Spellman, cites diary, July 10, 1935, p.
118; Judge Martin T. Manton to President Roosevelt, July 11, 
1935, Official File 28, Roosevelt Papers.
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November 13 as the last word on the subject of Mexico.
Indeed, one Catholic priest called the letter "an affront to
the sense of equity of the multitude of American Cath- 
119olics." Martin Carmody continued to take his case to the
public over the radio and in public appearances. Over the 
Boston air waves he insisted that the Knights had never 
called for intervention in Mexico and that the President had 
brought this up to confuse the i s s u e . I n  Philadelphia 
Carmody spoke publicly against the administration. Here, 
however, he was confronted with a counterattack by Michael 
Francis Doyle who had a rebuttal published in the local news­
paper. Roosevelt was so impressed with Doyle's defense that
he sent it to Father Burke "with the thought that it might
121be extensively used."
The Catholic press also did a good job of keeping the 
Mexican issue alive in 1936. Columbia naturally reported 
faithfully the speeches of Carmody. The editor of The Sign, 
national Catholic monthly, felt that the Mexican government
H^Rev. George J. Reid to Editor, Commonwea1, January 
3, 1936, p. 274.
^ ^The Boston Pilot. February 29, 1936, p. 1.
^lwichael p f Doyle to Marvin McIntyre, March 2, 1936; 
Roosevelt Memorandum, March 14, 1936, Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
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was not acting as if President Roosevelt had given his 
blessing to its anticlericalism. These critical ideas were 
shared by Reverend Theophane Maguire, a contributer to The 
Sign, who warned that Roosevelt's "nice but innocuous" words
did not confuse American Catholics about the extent of his
122sympathy. * As evidence of the United States' responsibility
for the chaos in Mexico, America pointed to the fact that
Daniels, who had demonstrated his incompetence, was still in 
123office. In another Catholic periodical, Light, Frederick
V. Williams sought to answer the pro-Calles views presented 
by Cram in Commonweal. Williams felt that Cram had been 
influenced by the propaganda put out by Washington, which 
was aimed at saving the Catholic vote. But Williams was sure 
that Roosevelt and the Democratic party had "no doubt lost 
this election year by the refusal of the President to check 
our Ambassador . . .  in his flagrant support of the Communist 
persecution of the Church,"124
1 2^Columbia, May, 1936, p. 3; Clipping of The Sign, 
April, 1936, p. 523, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
123ciipping of America, February 29, 1936, p. 487,
Box 777, Daniels Papers.
124F. V. Williams, "An Answer to Cram," Light, July, 
1936, clipping in Box 777, Daniels Papers. This magazine 
was the official organ of the International Catholic Truth 
Society. Other evidence of continued disenchantment with
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There were certain signs developing, however, to 
indicate that this belligerent attitude by the Knights of 
Columbus and others had in reality antagonized more people 
than it had converted. The Knights were accused of having 
political motives behind their campaign against Roosevelt. 
Frank Picard of Saginaw, Michigan, wrote to Martin Carmody 
to express disappointment over the campaign against the 
first President to have given Catholics "a fair deal." He 
further accused the Supreme Knights of attempting to split 
the northern Catholic vote in order to throw the 1936 
election to the Republicans. "I do resent," said Picard,
"this damned Republican propaganda under the guise of 
religion."125 This same charge was made by Joseph Leib of 
South Bend, Indiana. To both men Carmody gave assurance 
that "there has been nothing political, partisan, or per­
sonal in the position of the Knights of Columbus." Further­
more, he would not permit such an issue to be made a political 
football.
the Roosevelt foreign policy appeared, meanwhile, in many 
diocesan papers. See also The Catholic World, CXLIII 
(August, 1936), 620-21; Commonweal, August 14, 1936, p. 388; 
The Boston Pilot, September 12, 1936, p. 1, and The Catholic 
Transcript, March 12, 1936, p. 4.
125Frank Picard to Martin Carmody, April 12, 1935, 
Official File, 28, Roosevelt Papers.
126joseph Leib to President Roosevelt, December 16, 
1935, Official File 28, Roosevelt Papers; New York Times, 
December 13, 1935, p. 14.
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Despite these comments bv Carmody, many individuals 
still feared that the Mexican controversy was going to hurt 
Roosevelt with Catholic voters at the polls in 1936.
Josephus Daniels, for one, was not worried about his own 
reputation among Catholics, but was chiefly concerned "lest 
some politicians might seek to arouse Church opposition to 
Roosevelt in the next presidential election." Daniels, 
who expressed this opinion to President Roosevelt as early 
as August, 1935, was not alone in this estimation. Frank 
Tannenbaum, a noted Columbia University economist who was an 
authority on Latin America, also feared Catholic political 
reprisal. With these fears in mind, he had even attempted 
to convince Mexican officials to grant more religious free­
dom to Catholics. The professor reported to Ambassador 
Daniels that he had a verbal assurance from President 
Cardenas that Mexico would conduct its religious policy in 
such a way that it could not be used to hurt Roosevelt
politically. Daniels himself suggested that Catholic opinion
1 2ftbe soothed by "liberal dosages of patronage."
127j0sephus Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat (Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina, 1947), p. 179.
12®Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt, August 
26, 1935, President's Secretary File I, Diplomatic Corr., 
Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt Papers.
315
At first, the Roosevelt administration was divided 
over how to combat the political problems raised by the 
Mexican affair. Jim Farley wanted Daniels to take an active 
part in the campaign, because he thought the Ambassador's 
influence would help the ticket in certain sections of the 
country. Secretary Hull and others, however, felt it would
be best to keep Daniels out of the campaign and attempt to
129ignore the entire issue.
While division of Catholic opinion no doubt had some 
effect on Roosevelt's method of handling this politically 
sensitive issue, it does not entirely explain his actions. 
Roosevelt was primarily interested in domestic issues in 
1935 and 1936 and wanted to avoid any foreign squabbles.
But the President also was firmly convinced that any action 
similar to that requested by the Knights of Columbus could 
only hurt both the Catholic Church and United States-Mexican 
relations. Consummate politician that he was, Roosevelt
l^cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico, p. 109.
■*-3^Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 219, advances 
this view, but it could be argued that the difficulties 
Roosevelt was having with domestic issues would make him more 
prone to placate Catholic criticism at home. He would sacri­
fice a foreign policy, one not considered of prime importance 
at the time, to insure Catholic support for his New Deal 
legislation.
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correctly calculated that American Catholic opposition was 
divided and, therefore, unlikely to be of significance in 
the 1936 election. Indeed, his public statements and private 
actions, although undoubtedly quite sincere, were phrased in 
such a way as to retain the sympathy of many Catholics.
Of course, the overwhelming victory of 1936 clearly indicates 
that no large minority group, Catholic or otherwise, deserted 
Roosevelt at the polls.
Roosevelt's political acumen and actions, however, 
were only one reason why the Mexican issue was not signifi­
cant in November, 1936. The height of Mexican anticlerical­
ism came in 1935. By 1936, some improvements in Mexican 
Church-State relations had been made. One student of the 
period believes that "had the elections taken place some 
eighteen months earlier . . . Roosevelt would have lost some 
votes.',3-32 As it was, the divided opinion of American Cath­
olics gave the administration tactical room to maneuver, and 
the solid cooperation of such men as Burke, Mundelein, Calla­
han, and Doyle was a valuable asset.
If the Mexican episode did not have political
^■■^Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 219. 
132Ibid., p. 224.
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repercussions in 1936, it was still important for a number 
of reasons. The entire affair demonstrated the difficulties 
the Church experienced when it attempted to exert political 
leverage. It is true that Roosevelt was sympathetic to the 
Church and gave Catholics extensive recognition, but this 
did not mean that he could be pressured into actions that he 
considered contrary to the best interest of the country. 
Finally, the Mexican affair demonstrated a number of things 
about the American Catholic Church. Obviously this was no 
monolithic institution which could demand unity of thought 
and action by its members concerning a largely secular topic. 
Furthermore, when voting time arrived in 1936, Catholics 
reacted in much the same way as their fellow citizens; they 
agreed that foreign affairs were not the most pressing 
problem facing America.
CHAPTER XI 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1936
If Mexican anticlericalism was not to be a significant 
issue in the campaign of 1936, there were still many other 
topics which made both Roosevelt and the Catholic Church 
especially conscious of each other's existence and power. 
While Ambassador Daniels persisted in emphasizing that Mexico 
might still be an issue, Jim Farley was warning the President 
that the charge of communism in the administration was begin­
ning to evoke sympathetic audiences, especially among 
Catholics. Father Charles Coughlin, an old supporter of the 
New Deal, had by this time become totally disenchanted and 
was sponsoring a third-party movement behind the political 
figurehead of William Lemke. A1 Smith and the American 
Liberty League were pushing hard the theme of constitutional 
government, a phenomenon that they insisted had disappeared 
under FDR. On the bright side, however, the President could 
count on the support of such prominent prelates as Cardinal 
Mundelein of Chicago, Father John Ryan of Washington, and a
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number of influential Catholic laymen. The election results 
of 1936 showed clearly that fears of American Catholics 
defecting from the Democratic party were unfounded.
The administration, however, had no way of foreseeing 
this in early 1936. Furthermore, there were numerous signs 
on the horizon which pointed to disenchantment of Catholics 
with the New Deal. Already some of them had tried to 
capitalize on dissatisfaction over the Mexican anticleri­
calism. Now, from Mexico, Ambassador Daniels wrote to the 
President that he should make sure that "there is a Catholic 
in your cabinet." Without one the administration would 
leave itself wide open for charges of religious discrimina­
tion. In addition, Daniels remarked that he was advised 
that Bishop Kelley of Oklahoma was actively campaigning for 
Landon and would be "an advisor" for him. "If the Republi­
can Catholics are going to be active for Landon," said 
Daniels, "I am sure you will do as you have been doing to 
show such recognition as their long devotion to the party 
deserves to able Democrats of that faith."^ Specifically,
^■Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt, June 22, 
1936, President's Personal File, 86, Roosevelt Papers. P. H. 
Callahan wrote Daniels frequently during 1936 expressing 
fear that Mexico would be used to win Catholics away from 
FDR.
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Daniels felt that Michael Francis Doyle deserved recognition 
for the splendid work he was doing in combating the criti­
cism of the Knights of Columbus regarding the Mexican ques­
tion. The Ambassador enthusiastically endorsed Doyle for 
the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy.^
Daniels was not the only one to be concerned with the 
allegiance of American Catholics to the Democratic party 
during 1936. His concern was now reinforced by Mary W. 
Dewson, Democratic National Committeewoman. Miss Dewson had 
received letters from other politically active women which 
indicated that Ambassador Daniels ' indifference toward 
Mexico's anticlericalism was hurting the party's image among 
Catholics. She expressed the wish to Eleanor Roosevelt that 
the President might make Daniels "Secretary of War, or some- 
th ing."^
Roosevelt himself had occasion to be reminded of the 
sensitivity of the Catholic vote when he received warning 
from Reverend H. J. Watterson of Westfield, New Jersey, that 
the administration's attitude toward Mexico was going to cost
^Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt, March 30, 
1936, Official File 237, Roosevelt Papers.
^Miss Mary W. Dewson to Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
October 19, 1936, Official File 237, Roosevelt Papers.
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the party votes in November. The President replied by 
expressing appreciation for the priest's frank expression 
and personally regretting that it was not within his power 
to solve this question.^
There were a number of other issues raised during the 
course of the 1936 campaign which provoked strong interest 
among American Catholics. One of the most important was the 
defection from the Democratic party of Alfred E. Smith. The 
ex-Governor had been moving away from the Roosevelt adminis­
tration ever since the very beginnings of the New Deal. His 
discontent rested on the argument that it was necessary to 
fight for the preservation of states-rights against the ever­
growing power of the central government. Smith's criticism 
reached its apogee on January 25, 1936, when he addressed a 
star-studded meeting of the American Liberty League at the 
Mayflower Hotel in Washington. In a speech that was praised 
by Pierre S. duPont and other leaders of American capitalism, 
Smith attacked the New Deal and Roosevelt as being communist- 
oriented.
^Rev. H. J. Watterson to President Roosevelt, July 5, 
1936, Official File 146-A, Mexico miscellaneous, Box 4, 
Roosevelt Papers.
^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval 
(Boston, 1960), p. 519.
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Joseph T. Robinson, who ran on Smith's ticket for 
vice-president in 1928, was designated as the administra­
tion's spokesman to reply to Smith. The main theme of 
Robinson's rebuttal was the fact that Smith had deserted the 
cause of progressivism, for which he had fought in New York 
state, to take the side of the barons of wealth. Roosevelt 
himself never once publicly attacked Smith and even tried to 
regain his friendship after the Liberty League speech.**
The actual political effect of Smith’s defection and 
his subsequent support of Governor Landon is difficult to 
assess. Rexford Tugwell has stated that Smith probably did 
not hurt Roosevelt among Catholic voters in 1936. Smith’s 
biographer, Oscar Handlin, is careful to point out that 
Smith chose to leave the New Deal at a time when the National 
Catholic Welfare Conference was praising Roosevelt's efforts,
Qand that few people followed him. There are other indica­
tions that most Catholics were embarrassed by the New 
Yorker's rebellion from the party. It is true that C. W. 
Thompson, political analyst for Commonweal, hailed the
6Ibid., pp. 519, 520.
7Tugwell, Democratic Roosevelt, pp. 172-73.
8Handlin, A1 Smith. p. 181.
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Liberty League speech by Smith as being significant because 
it started a movement away from Roosevelt among prominent 
Southern and New England Democrats.^ Yet Thompson's analysis 
was not shared by others. In Chicago, a meeting of the 
Catholic Conference on Social Problems was the occasion for 
strong criticism of A1 Smith's speech.
Of more significance, because of its greater depth, 
was the criticism of Smith made by Reverend Ignatius W. Cox, 
who gave a radio address called "The American Liberty League 
and Our Immoral Economic Order" on February 7, 1936, in New 
York City. Basing his remarks on the Papal encyclicals, Cox 
asked the rhetorical question: "In reacting so strongly
against the danger of collectivism, has the American Liberty 
League fallen into the lap of the opposite danger, branded by 
Pius XI as Individualism?" The League, said Cox, seemed to 
be primarily interested in the welfare of the individual, 
while Catholic social thought placed emphasis on the common 
welfare. The emphasis on rugged individualism, espoused by 
the League and by Smith, was an aspect of modern thought 
which "no Catholic who knows Catholic social doctrine can 
approve." As for Governor Smith, he had grossly over-
9C. W. Thompson, "As the Primaries Begin," Commonweal, 
March 6, 1936, p. 509.
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simplified the issue by saying that the present struggle was 
between communism and constitutional government. To Cox, 
plutocracy was just as dangerous as communism. He pointed 
out that "not all regimentation is communistic," and that 
too long had economic forces been unregulated in the United 
States. The priest chided Smith for pointing to communism 
as the main danger facing America. In fact communism was 
only a symptom of the economic liberalism favored by the 
Liberty League. This latter force was the real danger to 
America, and he suggested that Smith direct his efforts 
against it rather than sponsor it.10 These remarks by 
Father Cox were widely publicized as evidence that neither 
Smith nor the American Liberty League spoke for the Church 
on social issues.11
Reverend Maurice S. Sheehy of Catholic University 
also took exception to the speech by ex-Governor Smith. 
Writing to Miss Margaret LeHand, Sheehy said that he had 
"given considerable thought to the possible effect of
1(̂Rev. Ignatius W. Cox, "The American Liberty League 
and Our Immoral Economic Order," The Catholic Mind, XXIV
(March 8, 1936), 113-21; "Constitutional Liberty and Our 
Immoral Economic Order," The Catholic Mind, XXXIV (March 8, 
1936), 105-13.
1]~New York Times, February 8, 1936, p. 2; Commonweal.
March 20, 1936, p. 577.
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Governor Smith's speech on the Catholic following of Presi­
dent Roosevelt." The President might not consider it of any 
significance, remarked the priest, but it "has been a major 
heartache to those who expected nobler things of Governor 
Smith." After all, Smith was not only condemning the Presi­
dent in his speech; he was indirectly criticizing "the 
leaders of his Church, including Cardinal Hayes." This 
followed because Hayes and others had forthrightedly 
endorsed the aims of the New Deal on many occasions. It was 
this same philosophy of the common good which Smith now 
labeled "socialism." Clearly, said Sheehy, "Governor Smith 
perhaps forgets that the greatest foe of Communism was the 
Catholic Church, and the most earnest champions of President 
Roosevelt's social policies have been the Catholic bishops." 
As to the political implications of Smith's defection,
Sheehy was sure, on the basis of his talks with three
bishops, that Catholics were more than ever behind the Presi-
12dent. Others felt the same way. In the East, Ed Flynn, 
Senator Robert Wagner, and other New York politicos reported 
that Smith's decision would have little impact on the 
voters.
l2Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy to Miss Margaret LeHand, 
January 30, 1936, Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
13Ickes, Diary, I, 687, 698-99.
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Still, as the campaign progressed, it became clear 
that the major charges made by Smith— the disappearance of 
constitutional government and communist influence in the 
administration— struck a sympathetic chord with some Catholic 
leaders. Certain elements in the Church were beginning to 
express dissatisfaction with the course of the New Deal. F. 
P. Kenkel, editor of the Central-Blatt and Social Justice 
Review, directed his attack more at Roosevelt's advisors than 
at the President himself. Kenkel felt the Brain Trust was 
attempting to foster a planned economy on the people, "de­
spite the Constitution." Applauding the decisions of the 
Supreme Court on NRA and AAA, this editor felt that the New 
Deal was doomed to failure from the start "because its 
provisions were incompatible, not alone with the organic law 
of the land, . . . but with the traditions and the very 
spirit of the American people." Some relief was given to 
the people, but it was incorporated in a scheme of economic 
nationalism and state-socialism. The main culprits in this 
scheme were not the elected officials but rather people like 
Hugh Johnson and James Warburg, who, Kenkel felt, aimed at 
the destruction of the middle class in America. As for the 
assertion that their ideas resembled the Papal encyclicals, 
Kenkel insisted that this was a mere "enchanting fancy,
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which the men chiefly responsible for Mr. Roosevelt's planned 
economy . . . were at no pains to destroy." The Pope's plan 
envisioned no such large exercise of state power, but rather 
would have the state "discharge its obligations . . . through 
the professional organizations, accepting all the tasks they 
are able to fulfill.
A number of other Catholic editors were also breaking 
away from the Roosevelt consensus. Patrick Scanlan of The 
Brooklyn Tablet, one of the President's strongest Mexican 
critics, wrote that Roosevelt's popularity was slipping. He 
attributed this decline to such things as continued high 
unemployment, prolific government spending, and poorly 
designed laws. The planned economy was an obvious fraud, so 
why not admit it, felt Scanlan, instead of preaching class 
hatred and insinuating that it was a crime to make more 
money than one's neighbor.^ In New England, The Boston 
Pilot was crying out against what it considered another 
attempt by the government to over-regulate the private lives 
of its citizens, an idea which had recently proved futile in
^ F .  P. Kenkel, "New Deals," Central-Blatt and Social 
Justice Review, XXVIII (March, 1936), 381-83; (July-August, 
1936), 115-18..
15The Brooklyn Tablet, April 6, 1935, p. 9; July 4, 
1936, p. 9.
i
prohibition. The editor insisted that the same tendency was 
present in the “twenty thousand regulations . . . enacted 
since 1933." This constant growth of bureaucratic govern­
ment should be checked for it tended toward one-man rule. 
Indeed, remarked the editor, "it is possible that the country 
is somewhat nearer dictatorship than the average citizen 
realizes."16 Reverend James Gillis, editor of The Catholic 
World, lamented the defection of A1 Smith from the Roosevelt 
cause but could sympathize with him. Excessive government 
spending, continued unemployment, and the disrespect for the 
Constitution which seemed to be characteristics of the New 
Deal were causing Gillis himself to have second thoughts
* 17about the President. ' Even Commonweal, a pro-Roosevelt 
publication, was concerned enough to question the President's 
"strength as a candidate for re-election." The editor 
remarked that "the essential dissatisfaction was . . . less 
with ‘planned government* as such than with the evidence to 
show that the planning hadn't actually been planned."1® 
Reverend Edward Lodge Curran, president of the International
16The Boston Pilot. February 1, 1936, p. 4.
17The Catholic World. CXLIII (April, 1936), 1-9. 
18Commonweal, April 17, 1936, p. 674.
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Catholic Truth Society, was so disturbed about the course of 
New Deal legislation in 1936 that he suggested that Cath­
olics ought to band together as a group to fight to preserve
1 Qthe Constitution.
The most dangerous indication of Catholic dissatis­
faction, however, was seen in the political activities of
#Father Charles Coughlin, the radio priest from Detroit. 
Coughlin was especially effective among people who feared 
communist influence in government, because red infiltration 
of the New Deal was one of his favorite themes. Before 
1936, Coughlin was not significant in the story of Catholic 
relations with the New Deal. He represented primarily a 
personal movement which, while perhaps revealing certain 
aspects of Catholic thought, was not entirely within the 
mainstream of the Catholic Church.^® Yet in 1935 and 1936 
he entered the political scene in such direct fashion that 
he prompted many members of the Catholic Church to take a 
more direct role in the presidential election.
19Ibid., October 30, 1936, p. 3.
^Charles J. Tull, "Father Coughlin, The New Deal, 
and The Election of 1936" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Notre Dame, 1962), p. 217, writes that it is 
perfectly clear that the radio priest did not represent a 
concerted political effort on the part of the Catholic 
Church in America.
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A history of Father Coughlin's relations with the New 
Deal is not at issue here. It is clear that in the early 
stages of the Roosevelt administration, he was an enthusias­
tic backer of the President, and that his support was wel­
comed. The break in this relationship seems to have 
developed partially over the fight to have the United States 
join the World Court in January, 1935. Roosevelt favored 
this move, but Coughlin is attributed with helping to defeat 
it in Congress. One should not, however, place too much 
emphasis on any one event, but rather consider the growing
estrangement as inevitable in view of the strong personal-
21ities involved.
It might be well here to sketch the course of this 
estrangement. As early as February, 1935, Coughlin was 
charging that the administration had communist tendencies.
In the same speech, however, he paradoxically insisted that 
Roosevelt was also a tool of capitalism.22 On November 17, 
1935, the priest seemed to take an irrevocable step when he
21Dyson, "The Quest for Power," p. 29, points to two 
factors leading to the break: Coughlin favored inflation to
cure the depression while FDR had already tried this and 
found it wanting; Coughlin wanted to be an intimate advisor 
and public spokesman for the New Deal, but FDR was not 
interested.
^Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 107.
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publicly announced that the principles of his movement for
social justice and the aims of the Roosevelt administration
were “unalterably opposed." As long as the President
entertained both communistic schemes and the support of the
plutocrats (an unwitting compliment to Roosevelt's political
dexterity)r he would be unable to effectively bring relief
to the American people. Later, on June 5, 1936, Coughlin
retreated some by asserting that the President was probably
not personally conscious of the communistic tendencies
within some of his new schemes, but was "being driven by
23sinister influences he does not fully comprehend." This 
was only a momentary lapse, however, and as the campaign got 
under way, Coughlin, who was leading the support for William 
Lemke and his Union Party, became even more vitriolic. In 
New Bedford, Massachusetts, the priest reached a high point 
of inanity when he publicly declared: "As I was instrumental
in removing Herbert Hoover from the White House, so help me 
God, I will be instrumental in taking a Communist out of the 
chair once occupied by Washington. "^4 Later in the campaign, 
Coughlin was guilty of such indiscretions as calling the
23t u 11, "Father Coughlin," pp. 140, 167.
24Ibid., p. 187.
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President a liar and a "scab."
The main significance of this performance is not the 
neurosis which gripped this particular priest, but rather 
the reaction his performance prompted from both the Catholic 
Church and from the administration. This reaction resulted 
not so much from concern with Coughlin the individual as 
with concern over his role as a Catholic priest and the 
impact he was having upon the Catholic image in the United 
States. It is from this point of view that Coughlin should 
be viewed here, without reference to the merits or demerits 
of his philosophy and personality. He was an irritant, and 
as such both the Church and the administration had to come 
to grips with him.
The outbursts of Smith and Coughlin were not isolated 
phenomena. Both men had an effect on the Catholic populace 
of the nation. Perhaps not all priests were so influenced 
by Coughlin as was Reverend James A. Smith, pastor of a 
Catholic Church in Long Island, who urged his congregation 
not to vote for Roosevelt because of his "red" affiliations, 
but there is evidence of growing concern among Catholics 
with this charge.25 In 1936 it appeared that the Church was
^ New York Times, November 2, 1936, p. 2; Dyson, 
"The Quest for Power," p. 57, says that the priest's 
concentration on communism was especially attractive to 
Catholic voters.
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in the midst of a crusade against communism. Lay organiza­
tions such as the Catholic Daughters of America, Notre Dame 
Alumni, and the Holy Name Society were all active in this 
denunciation of the "Red Menace."26
So popular was the charge that even Roosevelt was 
becoming concerned with its effect on his public image. On 
September 29, 1936, in Syracuse, New York, he publicly dis­
associated himself from the Marxist movement. He said:
Here and now, once and for all, let us bury that 
red hearing and destroy that false issue. . . I 
have not sought, I do not seek, I repudiate the 
support of any advocate of Communism or of any 
other alien "ism" which would by fair means or foul 
change our American democracy. That is my position.
It has always been my position. It always will be 
my position.2?
There was a prelude to this strong statement by the President 
which is worth mentioning here. Sumner Welles had reported 
to Roosevelt the substance of a conversation he had with 
Charles Taussig of New York. Taussig had called Welles to 
report that he and Adolph Berle had dined with Bishop Molloy 
of Brooklyn and "certain other prominent Catholics." The 
clerics had expressed sincere concern about the communism
26Darrow, "Catholic Political Power," p. 60.
2^Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of 
Upheaval, p. 620.
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charges being labeled against the administration. Both 
Taussig and Berle were now "deeply disturbed and worried" by 
the effect that Coughlin, with his wild accusations about 
Roosevelt's leftist proclivities, was producing among Roman 
Catholics. Welles suggested to Roosevelt that Berle might 
write a speech dealing with this question for delivery by 
the President on Columbus Day. Apparently the administration 
was well aware of this situation because Secretary Hull 
replied to Welles that the President had decided to deal with 
this charge of communism in his address to the Democratic
28State convention of New York at Syracuse on September 29.
The speech that Roosevelt gave on September 29 should 
have satisfactorily ended the matter. Unfortunately, this 
was not to be the case. Despite Roosevelt's forthrightness, 
Father Gillis of The Catholic World complained that the 
speech lacked precision in its condemnation of communism. 
Gillis attributed this lack of precision to "a want of com­
plete intellectual honesty." The priest also pinpointed the 
issues of the campaign as "the decline of democracy, the 
increase in centralization of governmental powers, and the
^®Sumner Welles to President Roosevelt, September 25, 
1936, President's Personal File 182, Roosevelt Papers.
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possible emergence of the absolute state."*29 Jim Parley was 
still so concerned over the effect of the communist charges 
that he „jked Roosevelt to consider "calling Cardinal 
Mundelein in Chicago and asking if he would be willing to 
make a statement." While Farley did not expect the Cardinal 
to come out publicly for Roosevelt, he did feel that Munde­
lein would announce that there were no communists connected 
with the administration. Roosevelt, however, demurred on 
this suggestion, although he remained well aware oi' the 
importance of Cardinal Mundelein's support. w
Still, the administration had to evolve skillful 
tactics to deal with Coughlin ai.d his charge f̂ communism. 
Because of his unique scaJ us as a Roman Catholic priest in 
politics and becaur * of his fanatical appeal, Coughlin pre­
sented specia problems."*1 Roosevelt himself was certainly
Catholic World, CXLIV (November, 1936), 129, 132.
30 Farley to Roosevelt, October 23, 1936, President's 
Personal Iile 321, Roose\ -It Papers. Roosevelt felt that 
Welter Cummings was a better man for the job suggested by 
Farley.
■^Scholars have pointed out another reason why Roose­
velt took notice of Father Coughlin’s political activity: 
the possibility that he mighu be able to "bridge the gulf 
between t.io rur^.l fundamentalist Protestants and the urban 
Irish Catholics." James Shenton, "The Coughlin Movement," 
p. ”'54 and Peter Morris, "Father Coughlin," p. 22 fn. , 
accept this, out Morris substitutes "old Populist agrarians" 
for "rural fundamentalist."
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aware of the difficulties Coughlin could cause. During the 
debate on the Bonus bill in January, 1936, a measure which 
Coughlin vigorously supported and which Congress passed over 
Roosevelt's veto, the two men came into direct conflict. 
Roosevelt was reported to have been so upset over the 
priest's antics that he threatened to release incriminating 
material on Coughlin's financial dealings. The President 
also played around with the idea of conferring with Cardinals 
Hayes, O'Connell, and Mundelein "to show them the attacks a 
priest had made on the President and ask them how this jibed 
with their theory that the Catholic Church should have an 
ambassador in each country.
Roosevelt's political acumen, however, was too sharp 
to allow him to carry out this threat. He continued a policy 
of active silence which had earlier caused him to send Frank 
Murphy, just returned from his post as Governor of the 
Philippines to run for Governor of Michigan, to see Coughlin, 
an old friend of the Irishman. Murphy's mission was to try 
to dissuade Coughlin from engaging in political debate during 
1936. Several long talks between Murphy and the priest 
followed. The former even went on the radio to try to
^Blum, From the Morqenthau Diaries, p. 255.
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counteract some of Coughlin's charges against the President. 
All of this had little effect, however, as Coughlin continued 
his barrage. The extent to which Murphy and Coughlin fell 
out over Roosevelt is indicated by the fact that the priest 
eventually supported the Republican candidate for Governor
O "Iof Michigan against Murphy. J
The official strategy of the administration throughout
1936, however, was to avoid public condemnation of the priest.
When this rule was broken by Secretary Ickes, who gave a
speech criticizing Coughlin, Roosevelt expressed displeasure
34over it: at a cabinet meeting. The President preferred to 
ignore the priest publicly but to exploit the sympathy among 
Catholics which his attacks produced. Ickes and Farley 
informally sounded out such political figures as Senator 
Robert Wagner and Ed Flynn on the effect of Coughlin and
O CSmith's attacks among Catholics. The President was well- 
advised not to publicly attack Coughlin, but to let him 
continue on his way until he had irritated his fellow
^Lunt, "Prank Murphy,” p. 137; Tull, "Father 
Coughlin," p. 124.
^Dyson, "The Quest for Power," p. 70.
^Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 222; Ickes, Diary, I,
686.
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Catholics with his tactics. This is precisely what happened 
in Catholic circles which controlled most of the Church's 
public expression. Although there was never any official 
condemnation of Coughlin by a joint meeting of the American 
bishops, as we shall see, most bishops, priests, and laymen 
grew more and more disillusioned as his tactics increased in 
vehemence.
While it is difficult to abstract the motives which 
caused the Church to be critical of Coughlin, certain tend­
encies are evident. One central fact is that many of the 
clergy were avid supporters of Franklin Roosevelt. They 
recognized the President's contributions in attacking the 
depression and appreciated his liberal approach toward the 
Church. To hear Coughlin call the President a liar and a 
communist was enough to cause this element intense embarrass­
ment. Secondly, a number of Catholics expressed dismay that 
Coughlin's efforts were destroying the good relations which 
the Church had developed with the Roosevelt administration. 
This was the argument advanced by Reverend Maurice Sheehy of 
Catholic University.
In confronting the Coughlin movement the Church faced 
a dilemma. It was clear that the priest's attacks were 
alienating many non-Catholics and that many were looking upon
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him as the official spokesman of the Church. Doctor Walter 
Maier, professor at the Concordia Lutheran Theological Semi­
nary of St. Louis, expressed a popular idea when he publicly 
stated that Coughlin had not been repudiated by his Church, 
but rather that he "talks personally with Rome by radio 
phone," and "if ever Coughlinism should triumph . . . his 
church would capitalize the triumph, for the voice behind 
that radio priest is the voice of his church." This was
announced to a crowd of 4,500 at an annual Lutheran Day
36ceremony.
Maier's outburst was supplemented by a more rational 
approach from the editor of the New Republic, who, in an 
article on the political significance of the Coughlin move­
ment, judged it to mean the entrance of the Catholic Church 
into American politics. This evaluation he defended by 
claiming, first, that Coughlin was the best man to organize 
Christian socialism in this country. Second, the Inter­
national influence of the Vatican was slipping in Europe, 
which made the conquest of the United States imperative. 
Third, Coughlin's attacks on Roosevelt had attracted Cath­
olics, many of whom, on religious grounds, opposed the
^ New York Times, August 2, 1936, p. 12.
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President because of his son’s divorce, Eleanor's support of 
birth control, and the condoning of anticlericalism in Mexico
07by Josephus Daniels. '
It seemed that a growing number of Americans were 
beginning to equate Coughlin's remarks with the official 
position of the Catholic Church. Yet the Church could not 
officially silence the radio priest. A number of difficul­
ties stood in the way of such an action. As long as Coughlin 
had the support of his bishop, Michael Gallagher of Detroit, 
he could not be touched short of Papal intervention.
Secondly, many priests were conscious of the fact that 
Coughlin had such a hold on his followers that many of them 
would desert the Church if he should be attacked. Finally, 
there was also the problem of publicity which would arise if 
the Church did silence Coughlin. Liberals would take this 
as proof of the Church's basic antipathy toward civil rights 
as expressed in the Constitution.^8 Altogether, the 
Coughlin movement presented a rather delicate situation to 
the Church.
Despite the lack of an official position, there is
37t u 11, "Father Coughlin," pp. 178-79.
3®Dyson, "The Quest for Power," pp. 71, 80, 81.
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abundant evidence of the Church's displeasure with Coughlin's 
political activities and with his attacks on the Roosevelt 
administration. This displeasure was expressed by a process 
of disassociation of elements of the Church from the Coughlin 
movement, by public deploring of the priest's tactics, and by 
public and private support for the President.
Expressions by Catholic hierarchy seemed to indicate 
that a large number of disenchanted bishops privately de­
plored Coughlin's activities. Among the three Cardinals in 
America there was unanimity regarding the radio priest. 
Cardinal O'Connell of Boston, an old foe of Coughlin, spoke 
of "hysterical voices among the clergy" which were out of 
keeping with the priestly vocation.39 Cardinal Hayes also 
privately resented Coughlin's attacks on Roosevelt. Most 
significant, however, was the role played by Cardinal 
Mundelein of Chicago. Mundelein was an old supporter of the 
President and was eager to help erase the impression that
the Catholic Church was speaking through the voice of Father 
40Coughlin. Publicly, Mundelein stated that Father Coughlin
39Quoted by Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 132.
4^Later the President was to write Josephus Daniels 
that Mundelein had been "perfectly magnificent all through 
the campaign." See President Roosevelt to Josephus Daniels, 
November 9, 1936, President’s Secretary File, Diplomatic
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had a right to his own political view, by virtue of his 
American citizenship, "but he is not authorized to speak for 
the Catholic Church, nor does he represent the doctrine or 
sentiments of the Church."41 In September, 1936, Mundelein 
publicly expressed his support for the Roosevelt administra­
tion and praised the prosperity which it had returned to the 
United States.4^
These public remarks and private actions were not 
without their effect. Arthur Krock of the New York Times 
commented on the great reception given Roosevelt in Chicago 
during the campaign. Searching for reasons for this support, 
Krock pointed to "the sympathetic attitude toward him [FDR] 
of the eminent Catholic hierarchy in this city and State, 
chief of whom is Cardinal Mundelein." According to Krock, 
Mundelein felt that FDR's re-election was "necessary
Corr., Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt Papers. In this same letter 
FDR suggested to Daniels that he look into the feasibility 
of opening a Catholic seminary in Mexico City to train 
natives for the priesthood. Mundelein had suggested such a 
seminary for Texas, but FDR felt it should be located in 
Mexico itself and suggested to Daniels that "the germ of the 
idea might be planted with good effect." These remarks are 
cited only to illustrate the close relationship which existed 
between Mundelein and FDR.
41Quoted in Shannon, American Irish, p. 317.
J  A
Clipping of Chicago Daily Times, September 15, 1936, 
in Reel 1, Sel. Mat.
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definitely to rout the forces of social radicalism.
Edward J. Kelly, Mayor of Chicago, placed great emphasis 
upon the Cardinal's support when analyzing FDR's political 
fortunes in Illinois. After the Cardinal had publicly 
praised the New Deal, Kelly wrote to the President and 
stressed the fact that Mundelein was held in high esteem by 
millions of Catholics and non-Catholics in the area. "Even 
the slightest comment," said the mayor, "either direct or 
indirect, is accepted as a standard by his followers and 
admirers." Mundelein's words of praise would "therefore be
A Ahighly productive in [FDR'sJ favor at the proper time."
Other elements of the hierarchy were also sympathetic 
with the Roosevelt cause. Of significance in measuring this 
sympathy are the remarks of Reverend Maurice Sheehy. As 
early as July 18, 1936, Sheehy was writing to the administra­
tion on the political implications of the Coughlin movement. 
At this time Sheehy described a meeting at the Waldorf- 
Astoria of four bishops, three monsignori, and himself.
They discussed Coughlin's personal attacks on FDR. "We 
decided," said Sheehy, "how this action might be handled most
^ New York Times, October 20, 1936, p. 24.
^Edward J. Kelly to Roosevelt, September 16, 1936,
Reel 1, Sel. Mat.
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effectively. We have taken action." Sheehy insisted that 
his group wanted nothing to do with the political, but simply 
wanted "to tell the President his friends are not ignoring 
the calumnies of Father Coughlin."4'*
What actions were contemplated at the Waldorf-Astoria 
meeting is difficult to discern. Two of the biships there, 
Thomas O'Reilly of Scranton, Pennsylvania, and James H. Ryan 
of Omaha, Nebraska, began a campaign along with Sheehy to 
seek statements by American bishops defending President 
Roosevelt against Coughlin's charges that he was a communist. 
In September, 1936, Sheehy again wrote to Steve Early that 
he could expect a number of letters from American bishops 
"affirming their faith in [FDR] despite the communist 
charges of Coughlin. Sheehy admitted thav the charges did 
not deserve a reply but added that "in as much as the Catholic 
Church is the great foe of communism, these letters will be 
worthwhile.
45Quoted in Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 216. When 
asked about this meeting, Father Sheehy could not recall any 
specifics but indicated that "some of the bishops individ­
ually wrote the President saying that Father Coughlin did 
not represent the Catholic Church." Sheehy, letter to 
author, June 21, 1965.
46Rev. Maurrce S. Sheehy to Steve Early, September 29, 
1936, Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
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Roosevelt had already received such a telegram from 
Bishop Bernard J. Mahoney of Sioux Palls, South Dakota in 
July, 1936. Mahoney spoke "in the name of the priests and 
people of the diocese," and protested "against references to 
you [FDR] by clerical vulgarian."47 In September, Mahoney 
telegraphed to Sheehy asking him to inform the President 
that he considered Coughlin's charges of communism in the
AQadministration "most unjust." Bishop James H. Ryan of 
Omaha, Nebraska, also wrote to the President in the same 
vein. Ryan spoke of his astonishment at the statements 
linking FDR with communism. He called these charges "unfair, 
unjust and untrue." "To affirm," said Ryan, "that the 
President of the U.S. is linked with communism is to speak 
irresponsibly and without knowledge of your true opinions." 
Ryan's telegram was supplemented by an editorial he wrote 
for The True Voice, the official organ of his diocese. In 
this article of October 2, 1936, Ryan condemned certain
47Quoted by Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 215.
AQ^Bishop Bernard J. Mahoney to Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy, 
telegram, September 26, 1936, Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
49Most Rev. James H. Ryan to President Roosevelt, 
September 25, 1936, Reel 3, Sel. Mat. This letter was for­
warded to Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney by Early with a note 
that "none of the other letters from the Bishops has been 
received as yet, but copies will be sent to you as they 
come in."
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parties who had forgotten ethical principles in their poli­
tical attacks on the President. "There is not one shred of 
evidence," read the editorial, "direct or indirect, to con­
nect the name of President Roosevelt, with Communism, its 
principles, and its propaganda." Ryan concluded that FDR 
was always an enemy of communism.^
Other members of the hierarchy also expressed disap­
proval of Coughlin's attack on FDR. In Cincinnati, Arch­
bishop John T. McNicholas reacted violently to Coughlin's 
assertion that Roosevelt was "anti-God." While he made 
clear that he was not making a political speech for or 
against the Democratic party and its candidate, the Arch­
bishop did insist that Coughlin "transcends bounds" of 
decent morality by making such an accusation against the 
President. "There can be no objections to expressing con­
demnation of the acts of the administration in destroying 
crops and food," said the Archoishop, but this did not 
justify Coughlin's conclusion that Roosevelt was "anti-God,"
50Clipping of The True Voice, October 2, 1936, Reel 
3, Sel. Mat. Roosevelt, in reply to Ryan's telegram, 
expressed deep appreciation for having "so valiant a vindi­
cator as yourself." FDR to Bishop Ryan, October 6, 1936, 
Reel 3, Sel. Mat. It should be noted, however, that there 
is no evidence that any more letters from American bishops 
were forthcoming to the administration.
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or that bullets should be used if the election did not turn 
out the way he wanted. "The mere suggestion," said Mc- 
Nicholas, "of advocating a revolution even in the heat of 
oratory is most dangerous. Father Coughlin gives the impres­
sion that he appeals to force. In doing so he is morally in
C 1error."“'-L Bishop Schrembs of Cleveland was equally upset 
about Coughlin's criticism of Roosevelt. While defending
c 9the priest's right to speak, he deplored his tactics.
Bishop Noll of Fort Wayne, Indiana, reacted with irritation 
when the press linked him with the Coughlin cause. Noll 
pointed out that no one had criticized the radio priest more 
than he had.5'*
Bishop Gallagher of Detroit took a rather ambiguous 
position toward Coughlin in 1936. Without Gallagher's tacit 
approval, Coughlin could never have continued his public 
campaign. Furthermore, Gallagher for sometime had approved 
of Coughlin's interpretation of the Papal encyclicals. Yet, 
as the political campaign of 1936 developed, the Bishop's 
position was somewhat confused. True, he repeatedly defended
^Quoted in New York Times, September 27, 1936, p. 28; 
Commonweal, October 9, 1936, p. 543.
52Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 214.
53Ibid., p. 215.
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Coughlin's right to freedom of speech, and even his state­
ment on using bullets instead of ballots. Furthermore, on 
returning from Rome, a journey the American press insisted 
was taken because the Vatican wanted Coughlin silent, Bishop 
Gallagher remarked that his famous priest was "just fighting 
communism." The Bishop also denied that the Vatican wanted 
Coughlin silenced. He always insisted that "there is nothing
in Church doctrine to prevent a priest from taking part in
54public affairs."
Yet there were other signs which indicated that even 
Gallagher was getting a little upset about Coughlin's politi­
cal activities. Upon returning from Rome, Gallagher was 
asked his opinion on the merits of the three Presidential 
candidates. He replied: "As far as my present knowledge of
the candidates goes, Roosevelt is the best of them."55 In 
September, Gallagher went into more detail in a public broad­
cast. He attacked the money plank in the Lemke platform5^
5^New York Times, September 6, 1936, p. 19; Common­
weal, July 31, 1936, p. 344.
5 5Quoted in New York Times, September 6, 1936, p. 19.
^ W i l l i a m  Lemke, a Republican Representative from 
North Dakota, ran as the Union Party's candidate on a 
ticket which incorporated many of Coughlin's principles.
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as being unsound. He felt that Roosevelt was a better man 
to have in the White House because he "has a much better 
background to work out these monetary problems than this man 
from the Dakotas." This was a remarkable statement in view 
of the fact that the money plank in the Union Party program 
was one of the main contributions of Father Coughlin. 
Gallagher ended his statement by insisting that the Union 
Party was not the Catholic party and that there would never 
be such a Church party in America.^
Apparently Gallagher was trying to make clear that 
while he might defend Coughlin's right to freedom of speech, 
this did not mean that he agreed with his platform, or that 
the priest spoke for the Church. It was suggested by one 
news source that Gallagher had even forced Coughlin to 
moderate his tone. When Coughlin publicly apoligized for 
calling FDR a "scab President," some saw the Bishop's hand 
at work. Gallagher, however, denied forcing any action, but 
subtly suggested that force was not the only way of achieving 
results.**® Whatever his motives, many people were not 
surprised to see Gallagher join the Roosevelt campaign train
5?Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 202; Dyson, "The Quest 
for Power," p. 78.
^ N e w  York Times, November 1, 1936, p. 48.
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when it stopped in Detroit during October. He joined the 
President for lunch and, according to one source, discussed 
the activities of the radio priest. Unfortunately, the 
details of the conversation are not available, but it is con­
jectured that Roosevelt warned Gallagher that Coughlin was in 
a position to bring discredit upon the Church not only by 
his political activities but by the financial dealings of 
some of his close associates.
There was also a persistent rumor during 1936 that 
the Vatican was on the verge of censoring Father Coughlin 
for his political attacks on FDR. Gallagher’s visit to Rome 
was looked upon as the beginning of this action. Roosevelt
received word from Charlton Ogburn, a prominent New York
0
attorney and close friend, that the Vatican was being informed
"of the harm which Father Coughlin was doing to the Catholic
Church in America by attacking you." A few days later
Osservatore Romano, the Vatican newspaper, came out with a
60story criticizing Coughlin for his attacks on Roosevelt.
S^New York Times. October 16, 1936, p. 1; Grace Tully, 
interview with author, June 2, 1965, Washington, D. C.
^°Charlton Ogburn to Roosevelt, September 10, 1936, 
President's Personal File, 3794, Roosevelt Papers; Ogburn 
spoke of having briefed Count Fumasoni Biodi, a powerful 
Italian nobleman, of the situation. Biodi promised to "trans­
mit these views to the Vatican." Shenton, "The Coughlin 
Movement," p. 363 fn.
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On October 8, 1936, Cardinal Pacelli (the future Pope 
Pius XII), the Vatican Secretary of State, arrived in the 
United States for a month's vacation and tour. This visit 
by such a high ranking Vatican official in the midst of a 
presidential election was the source of countless rumors.
The New York Times insisted that he had come over to reassure 
Roosevelt of the Church's support despite the attacks by 
Coughlin. Others felt that his presence was to prevent 
Coughlin from making any more critical remarks about the 
President. Some students have even traced to Pacelli's 
arrival the starting point in the decline of Coughlin's 
fortunes. Unfortunately, Pacelli made no public statement 
regarding Father Coughlin or the election. Furthermore, 
Coughlin seemed to take little notice of the Cardinal and 
continued his campaign unabated.
Speculation grew intense when Pacelli paid a social 
call on President Roosevelt in November, 1936. The press had 
to guess at what was discussed, because Bishop Spellman, who 
was acting as Pacelli's official guide while he was in the
^Dyson, "The Quest for Power," p. 79; Darrow, 
"Catholic Power," p. 61, says the Cardinal was primarily 
concerned with communism and the Spanish Civil War. Farley 
says the trip was made because of Coughlin but did not 
relate to politics. Farley, interview with author, March 20, 
1965, Washington, D. C.
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the United States, refused to let reporters question him on 
the subject of the talk.^ It seems unlikely that Coughlin 
was the main topic of conversation, since Roosevelt had 
already won a smashing victory at the polls. It is more 
likely that there were some cursory remarks made about the 
feasibility of sending an ambassador from the United States 
to the Vatican.^
While the Vatican failed to take an official position 
toward Coughlin, such was not the case with significant 
elements of the American Catholic press. Commonweal was a 
long-time supporter of the administration. When the charge 
of communism first arose in the 1936 campaign, this magazine
^2New York Times, November 6, 1936, p. 1.
63Grace Tully, who was at Hyde Park at the time but 
not present for the interview, insists it was a mere social 
call. Interview with author, June 2, 1965, Washington, D. C. 
An interesting aspect of Cardinal Pacelli's visit to the U. S. 
was the reaction it produced in the Nazi press. General Erich 
von Ludendorff, leading a neo-pagan movement in Germany, 
issued a statement, "Let us not forget that Brother Roosevelt 
is not only the representative of the Jews and Masons; he is 
also Cardinal Pacelli's man of confidence and will do every­
thing possible to increase Rome1s influence in the great 
democracy and to prepare for the conquest of the United States 
by Rome."- The National Socialist Angriff, the German Labor 
Front's organ, published an article saying that FDR had made 
political commitments to Pacelli for which the Cardinal 
promised to deliver the Catholic vote to the Democrats. New 
York Times, November 4, 1936, p. 27; December 6, 1936, p. 42.
immediately denied such an influence in the Roosevelt govern­
ment. The editor considered it a special burden of the 
Catholic press to refute such accusations because they 
emanated from two notable Catholics— Father Coughlin and A1 
Smith. Besides branding the charge false, the editor warned 
Smith and Coughlin of the danger of falling prey to their 
own rhetoric. According to Coughlin and Smith's definition 
of communism, much of the Church's social teaching would 
fail to pass the test of purity. "Yet it remains true," 
wrote the editor, "that the highest teaching authority in 
the Catholic Church, the Pope, has declared that the main 
evils of modern society in the sphere of economics are 
precisely those evils denounced by President Roosevelt."
Now Smith and Coughlin had accused him to being a communist 
because of his stand. Actually, the New Deal was, in the 
Commonweal1s estimation, a rather conservative movement in 
that it sought to reform institutions of capital "which 
greed, and private and corporate dictatorship . . . have 
almost shattered." Only the emotionally disturbed could 
believe the charge that President Roosevelt was planning 
a red dictatorship.^
^ Commonweal, February 7, 1936, p. 395; May 4, 1934,
p. 2; July 10, 1936, p. 274; October 9, 1936, pp. 541-42.
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The Denver Catholic Register, one of the more influ­
ential diocesan papers, was also at odds with Coughlin's 
criticism of Roosevelt. Indeed, while Coughlin was calling 
FDR a communist, this paper's editor was praising him as a 
statesman of the highest order. To the charge that Catholics 
were antagonized by the way FDR handled the Mexican affair, 
the editor claimed that no Catholic leader of significance 
"doubted the sincerity of the Roosevelt administration in 
its handling of this vicious problem." While not officially 
supporting either candidate, the paper made clear that it 
could not stand silent but must call for a leader "who was 
in spirit with the Papal encyclicals." This did not mean 
that one should vote for Roosevelt, but it did mean that 
everyone should be aware that if the relief program insti­
tuted by the New Deal were cut off "this country would be in 
the hands of revolutionists in less than a year." Catholics 
and others should recognize that laissez-faire capitalism 
was dead and that it was proper for the government to inter­
fere in business. Quadraaesimo Anno called for "precisely 
such a program."^5
^Denver Catholic Register, January 19, 1936, p. 4; 
January 26, 1936, p. 4; July 19, 1936, p. 1? September 10, 
1936, p. 4; November 15, 1936, p. 4.
355
The editor of Extension magazine, S. A. Baldus, also 
spoke out in defense of the President. Baldus labeled those 
elements which were preaching contempt against the President 
"demagogs" and dangerous "crackpots." As for the claim by 
the American Liberty League and others that the Constitution 
was in danger, this was "a lot of hokum," and political 
rabble-rousing at its lowest level. "Our Constitution," 
said the editor, "is in no danger— certainly not at the hands 
of President Roosevelt." Those politicians who felt they 
could capitalize on this fear as an issue in 1935 were in 
for a surprise because they would find that "the multitude 
will be more interested in getting jobs and something to eat, 
than in ’saving' the Constitution." A person might be too 
blind to give Roosevelt credit for the obvious improvement 
in America's economic situation over the last four years, 
but this should not blind anyone to the fact that there had 
been such an improvement.
Besides these comments from £he press, Roosevelt and 
the administration had other reasons for believing that 
Coughlin's efforts were not affecting the Democrats' hold on
6 6Bxtension. July, 1965, p. 17; September, 1936, p.
19; Commonweal, February 7, 1936, p. 412; The Catholic 
Messenger of Davenport, October 29, 1936, p. 4, also 
expressed similar sentiments.
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American Catholics. All during the campaign, letters and 
resolutions poured into the White House from various Catholic 
ethnic groups who expressed support for the New Deal. The 
Catholic Workman, a Bohemian Fraternal Mutual Benefit Asso­
ciation of St. Paul, Minnesota, wired its loyalty to the 
President. John Straka, President of the National Alliance 
of Bohemian Catholics, from the national convention in Chicago, 
sent a similar message. The chairman of the Lithuanian Roman 
Catholic Alliance of America sent greetings on the part of 
that organization and pledged'"loyal support to his construc­
tive program which is successfully rebuilding economic 
structure of this country." Elements of the Polish National 
Catholic Church, meeting in Scranton, Pennsylvania, wired 
sentiments of "encouragement in your work for the good of 
the working man through the New Deal." The Slovak Catholic 
Sokol of New Jersey adopted a resolution at its annual con­
vention endorsing the New Deal and especially the CCC and 
NYA. The Croatian Catholic Union of America, sent similar 
greetings. Reverend E. J. Higgins, the National Chaplain of 
the Catholic War Veterans, read an open letter to Roosevelt 
over the New York radio. Higgins praised Roosevelt for 
"opening the treasure vaults of Uncle Sam, " by which he had 
"killed communism with one stroke," and restored faith in
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the underprivileged. He concluded by saying that "no poli­
tical force will be able to destroy this image [as friend of 
the poor] in the hearts of humanity." On the subject of 
communism, the Board of Directors of the National Alliance 
of Bohemian Czeck Catholics of America congratulated FDR on 
his October speech in which he repudiated left-wing political 
support. One of the remarkable things about this rather 
diversified outpouring of support is that Roosevelt saw fit 
to acknowledge almost all of them. Busy as he was, he often 
wrote the acknowledgment from his campaign train and in one 
case had the Department of Commerce trace the Catholic
Workman of St. Paul so he could send a note of thanks to the
6 7proper people.
More important was the public and private support for 
Roosevelt which was expressed by many individual Catholics, 
both priest and layman. Some of this support was prompted 
by what Catholics considered an unjust campaign by Coughlin. 
Others were honestly convinced that Roosevelt had helped the
67All of these letters, and more, can be found in 
Reel 3, Sel. Mat. John Straka to Roosevelt, June 10, 1936; 
The Catholic Workman to Roosevelt, May 28, 1936; Alexander 
Aleksis to Roosevelt, July 1, 1936; Mrs. Emily Sznyter to 
Roosevelt, August 10, 1936; Roosevelt to Joseph G. Prusa, 
September 14, 1936; The Croatian Catholic Union to Roosevelt, 
October 11, 1936; Rev. E. J. Higgins to Roosevelt, October 
26, 1936.
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country out of the depression. John B. Kelly, a millionaire 
and leader of the Democratic machine in Philadelphia, was 
dismayed over the political antics of Father Coughlin. Kelly 
felt that the priest was disgracing his vocation by his 
attacks on the President. Joseph P. Kennedy, Boston million­
aire and loyal supporter of FDR, was a close friend of 
Coughlin, but he could not stand by and see the priest brand 
the President a communist. In a speech to the Democratic 
Businessmen's League of Massachusetts in October, Kennedy 
called FDR "a God-fearing ruler who has given his people an 
increased measure of social justice." Kennedy criticized 
those who sought to confuse the public into believing that 
the social justice of the Roosevelt administration was 
communism. He pointed to two facts. First, FDR had insisted 
upon religious freedom when granting diplomatic recognition 
to Russia. Second, and more decisive, Kennedy reminded his 
audience that Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago had praised 
Roosevelt for his work. "Who in the face of the eloquent 
testimony of Cardinal Mundelein," asked Kennedy, "can doubt 
the President's stand on the great issues between man and 
his Maker?" Kennedy concluded by sardonically pointing out 
that if Roosevelt was the dictator some claimed, he would
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long ago have silenced the radio priest.6®
A third layman who was active in the Roosevelt cause 
during 1936 was Frank P. Walsh of New York. Walsh was a 
long-time friend and supporter of the President and was 
active in the Catholic promotion of the Child Labor amend­
ment. He was dismayed at the sympathy which the Coughlin 
charges of communism in the administration were receiving in 
Catholic circles. Walsh was interested in trying to stop 
what appeared as a move to set up the Catholic Church as the 
special institutional foe of international communism. As a 
member of the Executive Committee of the Progressive 
National Committee, he supported Roosevelt for re-election
£ Qand publicly decried the smear tactics of his opponents.
Among priests there was also a sizable segment ready 
to defend the President. Reverend Bryan J. McEntegart, a 
Director of the Catholic Charities of New York, expressed 
enthusiasm for the social security act and for the NFA at the 
annual meeting of the National Conference of Catholic
6®Quoted in New York Times. October 25, 1936, p. 33; 
Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 213; Shenton, "The Coughlin 
Movement," p. 367 fn. Kennedy also cited the speech of 
Father John A. Ryan to prove Roosevelt was not a communist.
C. Walsh to F. P. Walsh, October 5, 1936, Box 
95, and Scrapbook No. 27, F. P. Walsh Papers; Leuchtenburg, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 182.
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Charities held in Seattle, Washington. "Planning has re­
placed the laissez-faire idea," said McEntegart, and "this 
is good as long as it follows the mean suggested by Leo XIII 
[of] acting for the common good."7^ Reverend Wilfrid Parsons, 
who had earlier attacked the idea that Father Coughlin was 
speaking for the Church in economic matters, went to great 
lengths in America in 1935 to emphasize this point and to
7*1show that Coughlin's ideas were loosely constructed. As
for Coughlin's assertion that the Roosevelt administration
was filled with communists, Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen of New
York and Reverend Francis J. Haas agreed with Frank Walsh
that the Catholic Church should not be set up as a sort of
anticommunist front. Sheen declared that rather than
attacking communists, Catholics should "go out and find
72what is good in them." Haas wrote to Father John J. Burke, 
Secretary of the NCWC, expressing concern that the denuncia­
tions of communism being made by certain Catholics created 
the impression that the Church's own program was a negative
^Rev. Bryan J. McEntegart, "Catholicism and Social 
Welfare," NCCC Proceedings. August 2-5, 1936, Seattle, 
Washington.
71Rev. Wilfrid Parsons to Rev. John A. Ryan, May 14, 
1935, Ryan Papers; Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 132.
7^Quoted in Commonweal, March 20, 1936, p. 576.
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one. "It is my judgment," wrote Haas,
. . . that the cause of religion is hurt in our 
country by the fact that the secular press fea­
tures only the condemnation of Communists and 
neglects reference to the paramount fact that the 
Church has an affirmative, constructive program 
for social justice.73
Father Sheehy of Catholic University, at the suggestion of 
Senator 0 'Mahoney, toured the West, visiting a number of 
bishops and priests. Upon his return, he reported that 
"some extraordinary things" were underway to counteract 
Coughlin's efforts in the campaign.74
Equally robust were the efforts of Reverend John A. 
Ryan. Indeed, this priest played the most active role of 
any during the campaign. His support took both private and 
public form. In his private correspondence Ryan tried to 
allay the suspicions aroused by Coughlin and other opponents 
of the administration. On the charge that the administra­
tion favored communism and had demonstrated this in its 
dealings with Russia and Mexico, Ryan was quick to reply. 
"The Mexican Bishops," he pointed out, did not want any 
interference by the United States "as that would hurt the
73Rev. Francis J. Haas to Rev. John J. Burke, June 3,
1936, Haas Correspondence.
74Quoted in Lunt, "Frank Murphy," p. 151.
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Catholic in Mexico." Moreover, Roosevelt was President of 
the United States, not of Mexico, "and a Catholic's attitude 
toward him ought to be determined by the kind of administra­
tion he has given to our own country.”7'* All this hysteria 
about communists in government confirmed Ryan's suspicion 
that most Catholics were "extremely gullible in their re­
actions to professional hunters of alleged Reds." He 
wondered how anyone who knew "anything about Catholic social 
teaching" could accept the charges being leveled against 
Roosevelt. The only "Reds" in the Roosevelt administration 
were those "who are sufficiently 'red* to believe in social 
justice."76
Ryan also supported Roosevelt among the Catholic 
press. When it appeared that Father James Gillis, editor of 
The Catholic World, was becoming disenchanted with the 
administration because of its fiscal policies, Ryan promptly 
wrote a letter to the editor. Using economic statistics, 
Ryan argued to Gillis that the current national debt was not 
dangerous; that in fact, it could go much higher. As for
75Rev. John Ryan to Miss Kathryn Gazda, October 28, 
1936, Ryan Papers.
76Rev. John Ryan to R. F. McAuley, May 21, 1934, and 
to Mrs. Roy E. Grimmer, April 2, 1935, Ryan Papers,
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the constitutional integrity of the New Deal/ Ryan argued 
that the Court had precedent on both sides of the issue and 
that the President had to take into consideration the needs 
of the people more than the subtle meanings of the Constitu­
tion. Furthermore, the Popes were more radical than the New 
Deal. If Roosevelt was defeated, wrote Ryan, the victors 
would not be men with either "the desire or competence to 
provide a more perfect program of social justice." If
77Roosevelt lost, it would be "the Burbons" who triumphed.
Ryan had less success when dealing with Patrick 
Scanlan, editor of The Brooklyn Tablet, who violently opposed 
the administration during the 1936 campaign. Scanlan's 
major charges were over the recognition of Russia and 
relations with Mexico. He filled his paper with anti-Roose­
velt material during 1936, and he usually played up the 
comments of Father Coughlin. Ryan did not attempt to dis­
suade Scanlan from this course but rather sought to make 
public the unreasonable bias of the editor. This led him 
into a personal feud with Scanlan which took the form of 
letter and counterletter published in the pages of The 
Brooklyn Tablet. Scanlan called Ryan a blind supporter of
77Rev. John Ryan, "Open Letter to the Editor," The 
Catholic World, CXLIII (April, 1936), 22-26.
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the President. Ryan replied that Scanlan was a professional 
"Roosevelt hater."7®
While this dialogue was confined to the readers of 
the diocesan press (a rather select audience) Ryan did not 
restrict his activities to this narrow field. As early as 
February, 1936, he publicly called for a program of social 
justice which would institutionalize many of the advances 
made under the New Deal. He dismissed as "silly" A1 Smith's 
charge that the New Deal was communistic. In his peroration 
the priest remarked:
If the present administration is not continued 
in office, there will follow another orgy of exces­
sive capital investment, excessive plant capacity 
and soon thereafter another depression. And that 
depression will be incomparably more devastating 
than the one from which we have now partially 
emerged.79
Ryan's most valuable service, however, was played 
later in the campaign as a semiofficial apologist for the 
administration against the attack by Father Coughlin. From 
an early position of sympathy for the radio priest, Ryan had 
come to view him as loose in his thinking and dangerous in
78Rev. John A. Ryan to Patrick F. Scanlan [n.d.], Ryan 
Papers, 1936-1937; The Brooklyn Tablet, May 29, 1937, p. 11.
79Quoted in New York Times, February 16, 1936, II, 1.
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his speech. In May, 1936, he privately characterized 
Coughlin's economic program as being poorly put together.
"It contains," wrote Ryan, "no definite proposals for prac­
tical and beneficial action in the field of social or 
economic reforms." The idea of a central banking scheme, 
which was the only definite part of Coughlin's program, Ryan 
termed "all wrong and futile."®^
As the campaign of 1936 drew to a climax, more and 
more friends of the administration grew concerned over 
Father Coughlin's effectiveness with the voters. Even Jim 
Farley, who later predicted that FDR would carry all but two 
states, was apprehensive over the attractiveness of the 
communist charge made by Coughlin. Tn September, 1936, Ryan 
received word from James J. Hoey, a New York politician and 
friend of Roosevelt, that he had attended a political con­
ference at Hyde Park during which word was passed about that 
the President faced a greater danger from Coughlin than from 
Landon. This was obviously an exaggeration, but when Senator 
Joseph 0 'Mahoney of Wyoming also supported Hoey’s contention, 
Father Ryan grew worried. Hoey and 0 'Mahoney's great fear 
was that Coughlin's charges of communism would stick in the
®^Rev. John A. Ryan to Richard A. Froehlinger, May 22, 
1935, Ryan Papers.
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Catholic mind. They pointed out that the radio priest had 
been received enthusiastically by Holy Name organizations 
when he made these accusations. They called on Ryan to speak 
out publicly against Coughlin.®^
It is difficult to explain why Ryan did accept this 
role of public defender of the administration. Although an 
admirer of the New Deal, he had never been an intimate of 
the President, nor had he contributed anything directly to 
the social reforms passed during the first administration. 
Some months after the 1936 election, Ryan explained his 
decision to take on the role suggested by Hoey. The priest 
insisted that someone had to prevent the imminent "diversion 
of millions of votes from Mr. Roosevelt to Mr. Lemke." While 
the election results hardly substantiate this contention,
Ryan pointed out that "the managers of the national Demo­
cratic campaign were unanimous in the belief that this 
diversion of votes might defeat Roosevelt." Furthermore, if 
this defeat could be traced to the political activities of a 
Catholic priest, the consequences in terms of public resent­
ment against the Church would be substantial. As Ryan saw 
the situation, many thousands of Catholics felt that Lemke's
®ljames J. Hoey to Rev. John Ryan, September 23,
1936, Ryan Papers.
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views, drawn from Coughlin, had the approval of the Catholic 
Church. Someone had to erase this impression and Ryan did 
not regret for a minute that he had adopted this role. He 
concluded, "I am glad I made that radio speech. I regard it 
as one of the most effective and beneficial acts that I have 
ever performed in the interest of my religion and my 
country."82
After making his decision to speak for the adminis­
tration, Ryan discovered that Hoey and others had certain 
definite ideas on what should be mentioned. Hoey suggested 
that Coughlin's name be mentioned in the speech, as the 
President was expecting this. Hoey, 0 'Mahoney and Charles 
E. Michelson, Democratic publicity chairman, had a hand in 
revising Ryan's original draft. On October 8 , 1936, Ryan 
went on a national radio hookup to speak on the subject,
oq"Roosevelt Safeguards America.1
Ryan offered two major themes: that there was no
basis for the charge that Roosevelt was under communist 
influence, and that Father Coughlin's economic thought was
82Letter to editor, The Catholic Transcript. June 17, 
1937, p. 4; Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 229.
83Rev. John A. Ryan to James J. Hoey, October 27, 
1936, Ryan Papers; Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 225.
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outdated and in no way connected with the Papal encyclicals. 
In the first place, Ryan emphatically denied that Roosevelt 
or his advisors, such as Tugwell, Frankfurter, and Sidney 
Hillman, were under communist influence. People who made 
such an accusation were breaking the eighth commandment. On
the contrary, it was the work of the New Deal which had 
frustrated the growth of communism in the United States. As
for Coughlin's economic theory, Ryan insisted that, from all
his experience, the radio priest's proposals were all wrong. 
"If . . . enacted," said Ryan, "they would prove disastrous 
to the great majority of the American people, particularly 
to the wage earners." Ryan insisted that these proposals 
found "no support in the encyclicals of either Pope Leo XIII 
or Pope Pius XI." He closed his address with an appeal that 
his listeners not vote "against the man who has shown a 
deeper and more sympathetic understanding of your needs and 
who ha3 brought about more fundamental legislation for labor 
and for social justice than any other President in American 
history."84
The reaction to Ryan's speech was rapid in developing.
84Pamphlet, "Roosevelt Safeguards America," October
8 , 1936, published by Democratic National Committee, Ryan 
Papers.
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Members of the administration were swift to forward their 
approval. James Parley wrote to Ryan that the speech had a 
"real effect in every section of the country." Farley, who 
did not "know of any address made during the campaign [that 
was] more effective," immediately had the Democratic party 
reproduce copies of the speech for distribution.®^ Josephus 
Daniels wrote from Mexico City that the speech had "heartened" 
him and that he was sure it "had a great effect with the 
voters." Homer S. Cummings, Attorney General, called Ryan's 
remarks "admirable in every way." President Roosevelt sent 
a telegram of appreciation.®®
While the remarks of Parley and Daniels can be 
attributed to the generous nature of these men, there is 
some evidence that Ryan's speech was, in fact, used effec­
tively during the campaign. In Washington, Joseph R. Burko, 
student director of the Roosevelt University Clubs, reported 
having distributed many copies. John W. Chase of New York 
wrote to Ryan requesting copies of his speech to use in 
swinging Catholic voters behind Congressman Sisson, a
®®James A. Parley to Rev. John Ryan, October 31,
1936, Ryan Papers.
®®Josephus Daniels to Ryan, November 9, 1936, Ryan 
Papers; Broderick, Right Reverend, pp. 228-29.
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Roosevelt supporter who was having difficulty.®^
Meanwhile, the Catholic press displayed an ambivalent
attitude toward the entire affair. The Pittsburg Catholic
mirrored the opinion of Bishop Hugh C. Boyle when it wrote
88that the speech would probably be beneficial. The Omaha 
True Voice and America both agreed that Coughlin's economic 
thought was outdated and that Father Ryan was the most 
authoritative Catholic voice in this field.®^ The Baltimore 
Catholic Review and The Brooklyn Tablet agreed that neither 
Coughlin nor Ryan had any business in the political arena, 
although the Baltimore paper was not convinced by Ryan1s
claim that communism had not found a home in the Roosevelt
90administration. The Catholic Transcript editorialized on 
the possibility of having a bishop come out for Landon so 
that all candidates would have a prominent prelate backing
them. Yet the editor admitted that Coughlin had instigated
91Ryan's speech by his own continued intemperance of speech.
®^John W. Case to Elizabeth Sweeney, telegram, October 
13, 1936, Ryan Papers.
®®Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 228.
8 9Ibid., pp. 227-28.
9QNew York Times, October 16, 1936, p. 21.
^October 22, 1936, p. 4.
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The Davenport Catholic Messenger pointed out that Ryan was 
teaching economics before Coughlin was born. The editor gave
no credence to the charge by Coughlin that Ryan was a paid
gopolitxcal spokesman for the New Deal. The Catholic Tele­
graph, while taking no editorial position, did display 
numerous political advertisements which used Ryan1s address 
as a keynote to exhort the reader to vote Democratic.^
Commonweal, on the other hand, looked upon the entire 
affair as evidence that there was.no "Catholic vote." If 
such prominent Catholics as Father Coughlin, A1 Smith, and 
Father Ryan could all find themselves on different sides of 
the political fence, surely there was no "Catholic political 
solidarity," as the myth would have it. In any case, the 
editor was convinced that Ryan's remarks would have little
effect upon Coughlin's followers, who had to recourse to
94emotion rather than reason.
Finally, in further estimation of Ryan's effort, some 
mention should be made of the volume of personal mail he 
received soon after October 8 . The priest admitted to a
920ctober 15, 1936, p. 1.
930ctober 29, 1936, p. 7.
9^Commonweal, October 23, 1936, pp. 597-98.
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correspondent that he had received "at least 1200 letters" 
from Coughlin's supporters and that most of them were filled 
with derogatory remarks. In contrast he could point to only 
200 letters favoring his speech. Yet Ryan felt that even 
this small amount of approval justified his making the 
speech. Significantly, he mentioned that he had not received 
more than three or four letters of approval from priests. A 
closer examination of these pro-Ryan letters reveals a number 
of interesting characteristics. A few expressed sympathy for 
Roosevelt because he appointed Catholics to his Cabinet. 
Others insisted that Coughlin was distorting the social mes­
sage of the Church and should be silenced. Such letters were 
generally from a better educated audience. In contrast, the 
anti-Ryan mail revealed a poorly educated group. Some of the 
themes which dominated this correspondence were fear that 
communism was taking over the Roosevelt administration, dis­
taste of recognition of Russia, criticism of the manner in 
which Roosevelt treated anticlericalism in Mexico, and the 
fact that the President was a member of the Masonic order.
The tone of these letters revealed extreme class bitterness
95and a note of anticlericalism.
QCSee Ryan Papers where these items are all grouped 
together in 1936 file. Shenton, "Coughlin Movement," p. 366,
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The smashing victory that Roosevelt achieved in 1936 
made all the dire predictions appear chimerical. The Presi­
dent amassed over twenty-seven million popular votes compared 
to Landon's sixteen million and Leirike's 900,000. Even more 
impressive was the electoral vote with FDR capturing all but 
two states for a grand total of 523. American Catholics 
voted overwhelmingly for Roosevelt in 1936. In this they 
simply followed the current of the times which affected 
their fellow citizens in like manner.
The evidence that Catholics supported the President 
is impressive. On one level is the testimony of numerous 
individuals. Father Ryan, working on the basis of his own 
circle, estimated that at least seventy per cent of the 
Catholic clergy in the country voted for Roosevelt. He knew 
personally that a great number of his fellow professors at 
Catholic University supported the Democratic ticket.^6 Father 
Sheehy corroborated this estimate. Sheehy was proud of his 
own role in swinging an estimated seventy-six per cent of
points to the fact that most of the letters attacking Ryan 
were from Irish and German writers. Too much should not be 
made of this, however, because Roosevelt received mail 
critical of Coughlin from the same ethnic group.
Q£Broderick, Right Reverend, pp. 231-32; Ryan to 
Henry G. Leach, March 19, 1937, Ryan Papers.
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the Catholic vote behind Roosevelt. In a letter to the 
President some years later, he outlined his role as threefold; 
(1) contacting personally many bishops; (2) supplying Demo­
cratic campaign material to the Catholic press; and (3)
Q7sending the Ryan speech to 11,000 Catholic pastors.
Before the election results were in, Sheehy reported to 
Margaret LeHand that his visits with numerous bishops and 
priests revealed a strong sentiment for the President.
"There is a feeling prevalent among the priests," said Sheehy, 
"that the priesthood, through Father Coughlin, has betrayed 
the President, and some extraordinary things are being 
attempted to offset this betrayal."®®
From Kentucky came the observations of P. H. Callahan, 
another friend of the administration. Callahan presented a 
detailed vote analysis. He examined areas in his own state 
where large religious congregations were located and found 
that in most cases these areas supported Roosevelt by large 
margins. On a nation-wide basis, he delineated the voting 
of seven states which he characterized as having the largest
®7Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy to Roosevelt, May 13, 1940, 
Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
®®Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy to Margaret LeHand, October
5, 1336, Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
375
Catholic population: New Mexico, Arizona, Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, Maryland, California, and Connecticut. By 
contrasting the voting record of these states in 1932 and 
1936, Callahan demonstrated that all had given Roosevelt a 
larger majority in 1936 than in 1932."
Monsignor Robert F. Keegan, Cardinal Hayes' assistant, 
wrote to the President after the election expressing con­
gratulations. Keegan called Coughlin's activities "grossly 
intemperate" and concluded:
I am proud and happy that my vote and the vote 
of every friend whom I could influence, went to 
swell the magnificent total. . . . You are an 
answer to prayer— the prayer of all of us close to 
the man in the street, the factory, on the farm, 
and for whom any other result would have been the 
worst calamity that could have befallen America.
There is also more scientific evidence of Catholic
" p . H. Callahan to Joseph Polin [n.d.], Ryan Papers, 
1936r P. H. Callahan to Edward Keating [n.d.], Box 95,
Frank Walsh Papers. The Callahan figures are as follows:
1932 1936
N.M.-----------  40,772 47,380
Ariz. ---------  36,860 51,930
R.I. ----------  31,338 41,851
Mass. ---------  63,189 172,417
Md. -----------  130,130 148,000
Calif. --------  476,255 735,825
Conn. ---------  6,788(Hoover)103,264
^■^Msgr. Robert Keegan to Roosevelt, November 5, 1936, 
President's Personal File, 628, Roosevelt Papers.
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support for FDR in 1936. Various public opinion polls 
indicated that the President received a large share of the 
ethnic and religious vote. One study concluded that eighty- 
one per cent of all Catholics who voted supported Roose­
velt.'1"01 Both the Gallup and Roper polls indicated that 
Roosevelt had received substantial support from Catholics, 
Gallup estimating it at over seventy per cent.10^ The vote 
of the large urban centers in the United States, where most 
Catholic votes were congregated, went to Roosevelt, who won 
with smashing majorities in Chicago, Detroit, New Orleans, 
St. Louis, New York, Philadelphia, and Milwaukee. Roosevelt 
won every one of the twelve cities in the United States 
with a population of over 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 .10^
lO^Darrow, "Catholic Political Power," p. 35 fn.
102QOSneu / champion Campaigner, p. 166, who also says 
that FDR got only a bare majority of the Protestant vote in 
1936. A Good Neighbor League was set up by the Democratic 
National Committee under the leadership of prominent Protes­
tants such as Dr. Stanley High and Methodist Bishop Edgar 
Blake to offset the pro-Catholic image of the party. See 
Gosnell, p. 159.
lO^Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt, pp. 82, 103, 
110, 120, 130, 149, 180.
The following figures are indicative:
City Demo. Rep.
Chicago (Cook County) 1,253,164 701,206
New Orleans 108,012 10,254
Detroit 404,055 190,732
St. Louis 260,063 127,887




Lemke and Coughlin were buried in this avalanche of 
votes. Yet some discussion of their support is relevant 
because of its special characteristics. Lemke received only 
two per cent of all votes cast, but he was not on the ballot 
in every state. Samuel Lubell has analyzed Lemke's support 
and concluded that outside of his home state, he carried 
over ten per cent in only thirty-nine counties in the United 
States. Of these counties, twenty-one were "more than 50 per 
cent Catholic." Furthermore, twenty-eight of them were 
predominantly German. Lubell has concluded: "Drawn pri­
marily from Irish and German Catholics, Lemke1s following 
represented the most belligerently isolationist voters in 
the country."'1'04
Explaining why Catholics voted for Roosevelt is 
another matter. Some scholars attribute this support to 
gratitude for the welfare measures of the New Deal. It 
seems, however, that more than welfare was at stake. As one
lO^Lubell, Future of American Politics, p. 152.
Lubell's findings have been challenged, however, by William 
Leuchtenburg, Franklin Roosevelt, pp. 195 fn., 183 fn., who 
feels it was "unlikely that foreign affairs were that com­
pelling in 1936." One might ask how compelling an issue is 
required to be to sway two per cent of the voters. Tull, 
"Father Coughlin," also challenges Lubell's interpretation, 
attributing Lemke's vote to support for Coughlin's ideas and 
disenchantment with the progress made under the New Deal.
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historian has remarked, "the newer ethnic groups in the 
cities swung to Roosevelt, mostly out of gratitude for the 
New Deal welfare measures, but partly out of delight with 
being granted 'recognition.'"105 This seems a balanced and 
judicious interpretation. If this analysis has shown any­
thing it is that Roosevelt was solicitious of the Catholic 
Church. He never failed to respond to a note of gratitude 
or encouragement from Catholics. His appointment policy 
was enough to make anyone forget the bigotry of the past.
There were a myriad of reactions to the Roosevelt 
victory. Certainly the contention by Commonweal, that 
Roosevelt might be "in trouble among Catholic voters in the 
industrial states," and that Lemke1s vote "will be a large 
one," seems ridiculous in retrospect.106 When the votes 
were counted it was time for a reappraisal. Cardinal Hayes 
in New York wired his congratulations and thanked the Presi­
dent for receiving Cardinal Pacelli.10  ̂ In Detroit, Father
105Leuchtenburg, Franklin Roosevelt, pp. 184-85, who 
also points out that FDR made one judicial appointment in 
every four to a Catholic. The ratio under Harding, Coolidge, 
and Hoover, was one of every twenty-five. On election day 
Roosevelt swept the urban areas of over 100,000 by a count 
of 104 to 2.
106July 3, 1936, p. 254.
107patrick Cardinal Hayes to Roosevelt, November 6 , 
1936, Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
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Coughlin announced on the radio that the election had con­
vinced him to withdraw "from all radio activity in the best 
interest of all the people."108 Naturally Father Ryan 
rejoiced at the results and accepted the invitation of the 
President to render the benediction at the inauguration.
Elements of the Catholic press varied in their re­
action to the election. Commonweal dwelt at length upon 
the "truly representative" vote the President received. He
had support from virtually every section of the United
109States and from every class and interest. Father Gillis,
editor of The Catholic World, admitted that he voted for 
Roosevelt but was disturbed because he feared the President 
would use his victory to embark upon adventures such as 
taking the United States into the World Court. Remarkably, 
Gillis insisted that the President did not have a mandate 
for great change in the election of 1936.110 The Brooklyn 
Tablet admitted that the people of the United States had 
expressed a "desire to allow the government to develop along
108commonweal, November 20, 1936, p. 100; in fact, 
Coughlin was shortly back on the air and remained active on 
the side of isolationism until the early 1940's.
1 0 0Ibid., November 13, 1936, p. 59.
110The Catholic World, CXLIV (December, 1936), 258-60.
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new and modern ideas rather than according to the ideas of
those who hold to the traditional constitutional form." The
editor warned that now more than ever was it necessary to
remain vigilant "to safeguard this nation against the dangers
111of an organized, militant Communism."
It should be made clear that Coughlin's personal 
attacks against the President boomeranged. Roosevelt was a 
popular figure, and the intemperate language used against 
him by Coughlin only served to alienate many Catholics from 
the priest's cause. Others, perhaps neutral about the entire 
affair, became greatly embarrassed by the spectacle of a 
Catholic priest attacking the President of the United States. 
There is little question that this embarrassment was instru­
mental in causing Ryan and other members of the hierarchy to
take a more active pro-Roosevelt position in the campaign
112than had originally been anticipated. Coughlin's political
^ N o v e m b e r  7, 1936, p. 10.
112Josephus Daniels was so impressed "because the 
great loyalty to their party and their principles caused the 
large body of Catholic voters to turn a deaf ear to the 
pleas of Mr. Carmody, Fr. Coughlin and A1 Smith . . that
he suggested to Roosevelt that either Cardinal Mundelein or 
Cardinal Hayes offer prayer before the inaugural address as 
a reward. He pointed to Mundelein's role as pivotal.
Josephus Daniels to Roosevelt, December 4, 1936, President's 
Secretary File, I, Diplomatic Corr., Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt 
Papers.
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activities contributed to this shift. Of course, there were 
other major factors in Roosevelt's triumph which operated 
upon the Catholic voter in the same way they operated on all. 
These included the indisputable fact that economic improve­
ment had been made, that Roosevelt was a better campaigner 
than his opponents, and that the Democrats had large shares 
of patronage with which to operate.113
1 1 ĴOther reasons have been suggested as to why 
Coughlin failed to win large Catholic backing for his candi­
date. Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 224, emphasizes that many 
Catholics did not want to throw away their vote on a hopeless 
cause. This reason does not really seem justified. Has 
anyone ever investigated how much of a motivational factor 
"winning" is in an election? Shannon, American Irish, p.
313, has an interesting passage in which he points out that 
Coughlin lost his support when he threw off the special 
demeanor of a Catholic priest and engaged in bitter political 
diatrabe. His followers were ambiguous in their feelings. 
"They wanted to be respectable and proper but they also 
wanted to rebel and protest. A priest who voiced radical, 
rebellious sentiments in dignified . . . tones and by use of 
religious imagery was uniquely positioned to heal this 
division. . . . When he abandoned his dignity and priestly 
manner, Father Coughlin lowered himself in the eyes of many 
to just another cheap, shouting politician."
CONCLUSION
In attempting to draw certain conclusions from the 
foregoing material, it might be wise to re-emphasize the 
limitation of this study. As was mentioned earlier, most 
of the papers of prominent churchmen of this period are 
still closed to historians. This meant that much of the 
material on the Church had to be obtained from public 
sources. Such a limitation, however, need not be harmful 
unless one feels that there was a wide divergency in the 
1930's between the public and private thoughts of prominent 
Catholics. From what private sources are available, such a 
divergence does not appear. Further, it might be argued 
that only by beginning the dialogue on the basis of public 
statements can it be hoped that future historians will be 
given an opportunity to examine private collections to "set 
the record straight."
If we attempt to analyze some of the salient features 
in the relationship between Roosevelt and American Catholics 
during the period from 1932 to 1936, we must begin by dis­
cussing the sympathy which the Church exhibited for Roosevelt'
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candidacy in 1932. This sympathy seems to have been the
result of a number of factors. First, Catholics remembered
Roosevelt as the man who had campaigned for A1 Smith in 1928
and who had spoken out against religious bigotry. Second,
Roosevelt was on close terms with many members of the hier-
*
archy in New York and had exhibited considerable finesse when 
acting as Governor. Finally, A1 Smith's campaign in New 
England for the Democratic ticket put the final imprimatur 
on the Roosevelt ticket.
The public reaction of many prominent Catholics to 
the depression revealed a radicalisr, which was surprising to 
many observers. Catholic social spokesmen such as Father 
Ryan, Father Gillis, and members of the hierarchy, stressed 
the need for Federal action to combat the ravages of the 
depression. They felt that national planning was a logical 
step to take during the crisis. Such an attitude made for a 
receptive state of mind toward the innovations which Roose­
velt brought to Washington.
The advanced state of Catholic social thought was 
seen in the generally favorable reaction with which Catholics 
greeted the New Deal measures. Such measures as NRA, AAA, 
and the labor policies of the New Deal, were lauded by Cath­
olics as being in complete accord with the Papal encyclicals.
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Although the congruency between the Pope's ideas and the New 
Deal was never so close as some would imagine, the Papal 
encyclicals were couched in such general terms that much was 
left to the imagination. Many Catholics wanted to see the 
New Deal as being in the same tradition as the Popes and this 
made their reaction favorable.
But the general terms of Catholic social principles 
also produced some rather disturbing features when indi­
viduals attempted to express concrete analogies between the 
Pope's intention and the measures of the New Deal. Catholics 
produced a startling variety of thought. A prominent Church­
man such as Father John Ryan saw the New Deal as only a 
beginning and wanted more national planning. Another looked 
upon Roosevelt's election as an indication that the power of 
the Federal government would be curtailed. There was often 
direct contradiction over the interpretation of the Church's 
social teaching. Some said that the Pope wanted all laborers 
to join a union. Others insisted that forcing a man to join 
a union in order to get a job was against Catholic teaching. 
There was also an ambiguity in Catholic reaction to child 
labor and the role of the rural dweller in our society.
While large segments of the Catholic hierarchy and many 
prominent prelates argued vigorously for the passage of the
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Wagner Labor Act, another element of the Church publicly 
lobbied against the child labor amendment. This latter 
group argued that the amendment would lead to Federal con­
trol of children. Apparently the connection between the 
strengthening of American labor and the ending of exploit­
ation of child lc.bor was not readily apparent. Yet it 
should be emphasized that in this area, as in most, a large 
segment of Catholic thought was consistently progressive in 
outlook. Father Haas and Father Ryan both recognized the 
need of protesting exploitation at all stages.
The most vivid example of contradictory philosophies 
in Catholic thought at this time was between Father Ryan 
and Father Luiggiti. Luiggiti was a Jeffersonian agrarian 
who felt that the only hope for society was to return to a 
nation of small family-owned farms. While admitting and 
accepting the need for Federal assistance in his agricul­
tural endeavors, Luiggiti frowned upon any plan to combine 
farming operations into giant combines. Father Ryan, on the 
other hand, worked more in the industrial field and felt 
that if small businesses could not compete with large ones 
in wages they should be allowed to die out.
Despite the fact that Roosevelt was aware of the 
political strength of American Catholics and was sympathetic
to their needs, he seldom let their advocacy of a particular 
line of action influence his own decision when it seemed 
against the best interest of the country. Whenever Roose­
velt and the Church came into direct conflict, such as on 
the recognition of Russia, and dealing with anticlericalism 
in Mexico, it was the Church which gave way. But by simply 
listening to their grievances Roosevelt often took the sting 
out of much of the Catholic attack. He opened the door of 
communication and made a point of considering Catholic 
sensibilities on an issue. In short, he was a master of 
tact when dealing with the Church. This was usually enough 
to satisfy most Catholic critics. In fact, Roosevelt's 
attentiveness to Catholic bishops occasionally paid off in 
terms of political reality. The one instance that stands 
out is his appearance at Catholic University. This appear­
ance gained him valuable allies in the future debate over 
the recognition of Russia. His handling of Father Walsh in 
connection with this priest's protest over Russian recog­
nition is another example of the fruitfulness of his tact 
and accessibility.
After four years of the New Deal American Catholics 
could look back upon a period which saw them make impres­
sive gains politically, socially, and intellectually.
Catholics were now permanent fixtures in the national 
government and in the group surrounding the President. Many 
Church leaders were in close personal contact with the 
President. Catholic educators and reformers such as Father 
Ryan and Father McGowan could look back upon the welfare 
measure of the New Deal as being in close harmony with the 
social encyclicals of the Popes. By 1936, it appeared that 
American Catholics had reached a position of respect and 
integration into public life in the United States. They 
had come a long way from the alienation which they sensed 
after the 1928 election. Father Coughlin was a disturbing 
note in this harmony, but it might be argued that only 
after the Church had gained sufficient respect under 
Roosevelt could such a phenomenon as the radio priest have 
been possible in the 1936 election.
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